Dario Humberto Ortiz Rodriguez v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: March 10, 2026
• Docket: 25-3757
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0115n.06

No. 25-3757

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Mar 10, 2026 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk DARIO HUMBERTO ORTIZ RODRIGUEZ, ) Petitioner, ) ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW v. ) FROM THE UNITED STATES ) BOARD OF IMMIGRATION PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, ) APPEALS Respondent. ) ) OPINION

Before: BOGGS, SILER, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.

BOGGS, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Dario Humberto Ortiz Rodriguez, a Honduran national

who entered this country illegally in 2005, seeks to avoid deportation on the ground that gangs in

Honduras would harm him because of his brother’s past gang ties. He alleges that gang members

cut his foot in 2000, later shot his brother, and threatened to kill him if he returned. An Immigration

Judge denied relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed on the dispositive ground that

Honduras was not unable or unwilling to protect him. This petition followed. For the reasons

below, we deny the petition.

Before turning to the merits, we narrow the field. Petitioner did not exhaust his claims for

protection under the Convention Against Torture or for cancellation of removal or voluntary

departure before the Board. Those arguments are forfeited. That leaves only withholding of

removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).

Even there, petitioner misdirects much of his fire. His brief devotes substantial attention

to the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility determination. But the Board decision did not rest No. 25-3757, Ortiz Rodriguez v. Bondi

on credibility. It concluded that, even if petitioner’s personal account were accurate, he

nevertheless failed to show that the government was unable or unwilling to protect him from gang

violence. That is the ground of decision before us, and that is the question we address.

Our review is for substantial evidence. We may reverse only if the record compels the

opposite conclusion—if every reasonable adjudicator would be required to find that the

government is unwilling or unable to protect petitioner. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

This record does not depict a government that refuses protection from gangs. It shows a

government that has, at times, provided it imperfectly. Petitioner testified that when gang members

attacked him in 2000, police intervened, took multiple reports, prevented an assault, investigated,

and relocated him. That is affirmative evidence of state protection. Although that protection

occurred years ago, petitioner identifies no record evidence that the government has since

abandoned such efforts, ceded control to gangs, or otherwise withdrawn from confronting gang-

related violence. Petitioner’s assertions of governmental incapacity in his brief are not evidence.

Nor are his unelaborated blanket references to country-conditions reports. See Martinez v. City of

Memphis, No. 25-5494, 2025 WL 3516448, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2025) (citing United States

v. Watkins, 179 F.3d 489, 500–01 (6th Cir. 1999)) (refusing to consider blanket record references

on appeal). Moreover, proof of crime or corruption in the abstract cannot establish a governmental

failure to protect this particular petitioner. In sum, the agency was not required to treat the 2000

episode as legally irrelevant.

The more recent shooting of petitioner’s brother was likewise gang-related and

accompanied by a threat directed at petitioner. Police took a report, and the crime remains

unsolved. But that fact, standing alone, does not compel the conclusion that petitioner seeks. It is

not evidence of unwillingness. It is not evidence of incapacity. It is evidence that criminals

sometimes get away with crimes. Were that enough, asylum law would convert every country -2- No. 25-3757, Ortiz Rodriguez v. Bondi

confronting persistent gang violence into a per se “unable or unwilling” jurisdiction. Petitioner’s

brief gestures at additional threats and assaults directed at his family but fails to connect them to

any denial of state protection. Petitioner has thus forfeited this perfunctory argument. See

Hamilton v. Fleming, No. 25-1386, 2026 WL 103462, at *7 (6th Cir. Jan. 14, 2026) (arguments

merely gestured at on appeal are forfeited). In any event, the agency was entitled to view the more

recent violence as reflecting the limits of law enforcement rather than its absence.

Petitioner’s assertion that the Board “ignore[ed]” the shooting incident fares no better. The

Board expressly acknowledged the gang attacks on his family. We can fairly discern that it held

that such attacks could not overcome the countervailing evidence of police intervention. Reasoned

decision-making requires no more than that. Palucho v. Garland, 49 F.4th 532, 539 (6th Cir.

2022); Aoraha v. Gonzales, 209 F. App'x 473, 476 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The [Board’s] decision is

entitled to a presumption of regularity and thus a presumption that . . . evidence [not expressly

discussed] was considered.”). We decline to reweigh the record simply because petitioner would

have struck the balance differently.

PETITION DENIED.

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