Darch v. Bisignano

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 17, 2025
• Docket: 24-5892
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 17 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RACHEL DARCH, No. 24-5892 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:24-cv-05192-SKV v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Sarah Kate Vaughan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 15, 2025 ** Seattle, Washington

Before: W. FLETCHER and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and ORRICK, District Judge.***

Rachel Darch appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the Social

Security Commissioner’s denial of her application for Disabled Adult Child

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable William Horsley Orrick, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. Benefits and Supplemental Security Income disability benefits under Titles II and

XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. and § 1381 et seq. We

review the district court’s decision affirming the Administrative Law Judge’s

(“ALJ”) denial of benefits de novo, and the ALJ’s denial of benefits “for

substantial evidence or legal error.” Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 487 (9th

Cir. 2022). We affirm.

1. The ALJ considered the requisite factors and applied the correct legal

standard in evaluating the medical opinion evidence from Drs. Losee, Wilkinson,

Eisenhauer and Armstrong, and Licensed Mental Health Counselor Associate

(“LMHCA”) Todd. The ALJ does not “give any specific evidentiary weight,

including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s).” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520c(a). Instead, the ALJ must weigh several factors, particularly the

medical opinion’s supportability and consistency. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th

785, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(a)).

“Supportability means the extent to which a medical source supports the medical

opinion by explaining the ‘relevant . . . objective medical evidence.’” Id. at 791–

92 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)). “Consistency means the extent to which

a medical opinion is ‘consistent . . . with the evidence from other medical sources

and nonmedical sources in the claim.’” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2)).

When rejecting a medical source’s opinion, the ALJ must provide “an explanation

2 24-5892 supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 792.

The ALJ did not err by ignoring Dr. Losee’s opinions about Darch’s ability

to tolerate stress at work. The ALJ expressly recognized and then accounted for

those opinions as well as Darch’s related social anxiety limitations through

restrictions imposed in the residual functional capacity. The ALJ also recognized

Dr. Losee’s WAIS adult intelligence testing, and Darch’s “extremely low” working

memory and processing results from 2021, but explained why those conclusions

were inconsistent with specifically identified medical evidence in the record. See

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that

inconsistency between a physician’s opinion and the medical record constitutes a

“specific and legitimate” reason to discount the opinion). The ALJ also

appropriately discounted Dr. Losee’s impressions regarding limitations in working

memory and processing speeds by pointing to evidence in the record showing

Darch engaged in hobbies inconsistent with such limitations. The ALJ’s

inconsistency findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Woods, 32 F.4th

at 793.

The ALJ did not err in rejecting the opinions of Dr. Wilkinson (and by

extension Dr. Eisenhauer) of “marked” limitations in Darch’s ability to

“concentrate, persist, or maintain pace” and to “understand, remember, and apply

information” as inconsistent with the record, for the same reasons. The ALJ’s

3 24-5892 discounting of Dr. Wilkinson’s overall “marked” severity rating was supported by

substantial evidence because nothing in the record or Wilkinson’s own report

supported the determination that Darch would be markedly limited in maintaining

appropriate behavior in the workplace. Id.

The ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Armstrong’s opinion that Darch would

be off of work two to three days a month due to a seizure disorder as unsupported

by Dr. Armstrong’s own report and as inconsistent with Dr. Armstrong’s other

opinions and the record more generally. Those conclusions are supported by

substantial evidence. Id.; see also Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir.

2020) (“[T]he ALJ ‘is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in

medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.’” (quoting Andrews v. Shalala,

53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995))).

The ALJ properly discounted the opinions of agency consultants Drs. Nelson

and Mohney, limiting Darch to one to two or three step instructions, as

unsupported and inconsistent with the record where “claimant’s memory was

consistently judged to be within normal limits or intact, and her evaluating and

treating clinicians did not report that she had limitations in understanding or

applying instructions.” The ALJ also noted the instructional limitations were

inconsistent with Darch’s hobbies. Those conclusions are supported by substantial

evidence. Woods, 32 F.4th at 793.

4 24-5892 Finally, the ALJ properly discounted the opinions of LMHCA Todd that

Darch was markedly or moderately limited in numerous functional areas because

Todd’s limitations were “internally inconsistent, insufficiently unsupported, and

inconsistent with the record as a whole.” The ALJ’s rejection of Todd’s opinions

in light of numerous inconsistencies in Todd’s report and Todd’s failure to explain

or otherwise support the extreme limitations is supported by substantial evidence.

See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Where the evidence

is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the

ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.”).

2. The ALJ did not err in rejecting lay testimony from Darch’s mother

regarding the severity of Darch’s symptoms. We assume without deciding that

Ninth Circuit precedent requiring ALJs to identify “specific, germane reasons” to

discount nonmedical testimony continues to apply following the Commissioner’s

adoption of revised regulations. See Stephens v. Kijakazi, No. 22-35998, 2023 WL

6937296, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2023) (“We have not yet addressed whether under

the new regulations an ALJ is still required to provide germane reasons for

discounting lay witnesses. However, we need not decide this issue because any

error in not addressing these lay witnesses’ testimony was harmless.”).

Here, the ALJ provided a specific, germane reason for discounting the lay

testimony regarding the severity of Darch’s seizures: the mother’s description that

5 24-5892 Darch’s seizures put her “on the ground shaking” was not supported by the record.

That is a germane reason to discount the lay testimony. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427

F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (“An ALJ need only give germane reasons for

discrediting the testimony of lay witnesses. Inconsistency with medical evidence

is one such reason.” (internal citation omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

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