Darbie v. State

711 So. 2d 1280, 1998 WL 251195
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedMay 20, 1998
Docket97-832
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 711 So. 2d 1280 (Darbie v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Darbie v. State, 711 So. 2d 1280, 1998 WL 251195 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

711 So.2d 1280 (1998)

John DARBIE, Petitioner,
v.
The STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 97-832.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 20, 1998.

*1281 Greenman & Manz and Franklin D. Greenman, Marathon, for petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and JORGENSON and LEVY, JJ.

LEVY, Judge.

In November of 1995, John Darbie was charged in Monroe County Court with violating Section 370.092 (1995), Florida Statutes and Article X, Section 16(b)(2) of the Florida Constitution. Those provisions limit certain types of marine net fishing, specifically forbidding the use of a seine net in excess of 500 square feet at a location "in nearshore or inshore Florida waters." While not disputing that he used a seine net in excess of 500 square feet, Darbie claimed that he was not using it "in nearshore or inshore Florida waters" and, therefore, did not violate the charged provisions.[1]

Darbie filed a Motion to Dismiss in County Court, and argued at the hearing that he was using the seine net at a location significantly *1282 further than three miles from any point of land and, therefore, was not in violation of the Florida Constitution. At the time of the alleged violation, Darbie was on the Gulf of Mexico side of Florida, in an area of the Bay of Florida known as Bluefish Bank, which is 4.8 nautical miles (6 statute or land miles) from the nearest continually dry land mass, East Bahia Honda Key. Therefore, Darbie reasoned that if East Bahia Honda Key constituted the coastline, he was not in violation of the constitutional prohibition.

However, an area known as Horseshoe Bank lies midway between East Bahia Honda Key and Bluefish Bank. The State presented evidence that this area of land is surrounded by, and above, water at low-tide, but then is submerged during high-tide. The State argued that Horseshoe Bank met the definition of "coastline", and that Darbie was in violation of the charged provisions, since Bluefish Bank was less than three miles from Horseshoe Bank.

The evidence received at the County Court hearing included a chart published by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the United States Department of Commerce, which indicated that Bluefish Bank, where Darbie was observed, was within three nautical miles of the coastline. As such, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss. Darbie entered a plea of "No Contest", while reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion.

The Circuit Court, acting in its appellate capacity, issued an Order on Appeal affirming the County Court. The case is now proceeding here as a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, by Order of this Court, dated November 14, 1997.

The only issue involved in this petition is whether the Defendant placed a seine net in excess of 500 square feet within "nearshore or inshore Florida waters." For purposes of Article X, Section 16 of the Florida Constitution, "nearshore and inshore waters" are defined as "all Florida waters inside a line three miles seaward of the coastline along the Gulf of Mexico and inside a line one mile seaward of the coastline along the Atlantic Ocean." Id. § 16(c)(5). As such, we must determine what constitutes a "coastline" for purposes of Article X, Section 16 of the Florida Constitution.

I.

According to the Florida Constitution, the issue of what constitutes a coastline is determined pursuant to federal law.[2] Therefore, at the outset we note that our role is necessarily a limited one. Because the Florida Constitution requires us to apply federal law, we must make our determination of what constitutes the coastline consistent with federal precedent. Upon an examination of federal law, it is clear that, where Congress has provided a legislative delegation to an agency of the federal government, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by an administrative agency. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).

As such, we first note that Congress has authorized the Secretary of Commerce "To provide charts and related information for the safe navigation of marine and air commerce ..." 33 U.S.C. § 883a (1994). Consistent with such an authorization, it is NOAA's implicit power to draw navigational charts which are consistent with that agency's mandate; to wit, to draft charts in accordance with federal law. Federal law has consistently defined the coastline as "the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea ..." 43 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1994). See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 3, 15 U.S.T. 1606 (international treaty defining the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea as "the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State."). See also United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 165, 85 S.Ct. 1401, 1415-16, 14 L.Ed.2d 296 (1965); United States v. States of Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi Alabama, and Florida, *1283 364 U.S. 502, 503, 81 S.Ct. 258, 259, 5 L.Ed.2d 247 (1960)(defining coastline as "the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters.").

In the Chevron decision, the Supreme Court articulated a twostep analysis for determining whether an agency's construction of a statute it administers is entitled to deference. The Court stated:

First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter... If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82 (footnotes omitted). See also Hussion v. Madigan, 950 F.2d 1546, 1550-51 (11th Cir.1992); Curse v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Prog., 843 F.2d 456, 460 (11th Cir.1988) Haynes Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. State of Alabama, 820 F.Supp. 590 (M.D.Ala. 1993). In the instant dispute, Congress has not directly spoken on the issue of whether a low-tide elevation is an appropriate land mass for determining the coastal boundaries of a State. The Chevron Court went on to state that:

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711 So. 2d 1280, 1998 WL 251195, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/darbie-v-state-fladistctapp-1998.