UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
PHANTA U. DARAMY-ANDREWS,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 22-1694 (TJK)
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In April 2019, Plaintiff’s home and personal property were damaged by flooding caused
by a burst pipe in her basement. Defendant, her insurer, determined coverage and compensated
her for her loss based on its findings. Plaintiff now sues, claiming that she is entitled to much
more for her losses. She brings claims of breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. Defendant moves for summary judgment,
arguing that Plaintiff’s policy required her to sue within a year of the flood, thus barring her first
two claims, and that the existence of the policy—an express contract—means that the unjust en-
richment claim fails too. Defendant is right on both fronts, so the Court will grant its motion for
summary judgment on all claims.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
On April 21, 2019, a flooding from a burst pipe damaged Plaintiff’s home and personal
property. See ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 3; ECF No. 33-3 at 3, 5. At the time, Plaintiff held a homeowner’s
insurance policy issued by Defendant that covered damage to her house and personal belongings, subject to certain conditions. ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 2; see ECF No. 33-4 at 15–16.1 Among other things,
the policy required her to “[p]repare an inventory of damaged personal property showing the quan-
tity, description, actual cash value and amount of loss” and to “[a]ttach all bills, receipts and related
documents that justify the figures in the inventory.” ECF No. 33-4 at 22. And “within 60 days
after [Defendant’s] request,” Plaintiff had to submit her “sworn proof of loss” setting forth various
information, including “[t]he inventory of damaged personal property.” Id. at 22–23. The policy
also contains another key deadline. It mandated that “[n]o action can be brought unless the policy
provisions have been complied with and the action is started within one year after the date of loss,”
which in this case is April 21, 2019. Id. at 24.
After Plaintiff reported the claim, Defendant contracted a company, 1-800-Packouts, to
remove and store her damaged personal property. ECF No. 34-1 ¶ 3; see ECF No. 34-4. As part
of its investigation, Defendant conducted an “examination under oath” of Plaintiff in October
2019. See ECF No. 34-5. At that point, she had hired an attorney, who was with her during the
examination and has represented her since. ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 9; ECF No. 35-1. The interview
revealed that Plaintiff had not, consistent with her insurance policy, compiled an inventory of the
damaged items. ECF No. 34-5 at 12. The parties thus suspended the examination so that Plaintiff
and her counsel could schedule an inspection with 1-800-Packouts to complete a detailed inven-
tory, in hopes of “eliminat[ing] all of the problems and questions that have arisen on th[e] claim.”
Id. at 35.
On November 1, 2019, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter about her “claim for supplemental
damages.” ECF No. 34-6 at 1. It informed her that Defendant had determined it owed Plaintiff
1 Plaintiff has held that insurance policy since 2012 and renewed it annually. ECF No. 23- 2 at 1; ECF No. 34-5 at 10–11. The policy relevant here was effective from January 26, 2019, to January 26, 2020. ECF No. 23-2 ¶ 2.
2 $26,216.31 for repairs to her house and $6,769.51 for personal-property losses, for roughly
$33,000. Id.2 After adjusting for “prior payment(s)” and other items, the letter explained, the
amount owed and paid was $950. Id. Eleven days later, Defendant emailed Plaintiff’s attorney
the proof-of-loss form that she would need to complete by December 12, 2019. ECF No. 34-10 at
6. Counsel responded that his “client [wa]s working to get the inventory completed” and asked
for a ten-day extension, which Defendant granted. Id. at 5. On December 20, Plaintiff’s attorney
informed Defendant that his client “ha[d] not been able to return to the storage to complete the
inventory of [her] personal property . . . [d]ue to [her] job schedule” but would do so on December
27. Id. at 3. So Defendant granted Plaintiff a “final extension” until January 27, 2020 to document
and submit her inventory list. Id. at 2. Although she submitted a proof-of-loss statement by that
deadline, id. at 2, Defendant promptly told her about several deficiencies, id. at 1. For example,
the statement contained no relevant cost information or photos and did not separate the items she
claimed were damaged during the 2019 flooding from those damaged during earlier flooding. Id.
So Defendant gave Plaintiff yet more time to complete the proof-of-loss statement, until February
18, 2020, noting that “[t]here w[ould] be no additional extensions” beyond that date. Id. Plaintiff
never provided a full inventory of her claimed losses, a failure she attributes to the COVID-19
pandemic. ECF No. 33-3 at 7–8.
On March 5, 2020—about six weeks short of the one-year deadline to file suit—Defendant
sent a letter to Plaintiff “follow[ing] up regarding [her] recent request for [Defendant] to” conduct
2 Defendant contends that it paid Plaintiff $21,483 to repair her house, $6,069 to clean and repair her personal property, and $7,280 to cover her living expenses while repairs were ongoing. ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 4; ECF No. 33-3 at 5–7. Plaintiff disputes that Defendant paid her any money to cover the cleaning and repair of her personal property. ECF No. 34-1 ¶ 4. But any disagreement between the parties over the precise amounts paid to Plaintiff and what losses they were intended cover does not affect the Court’s determination that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred.
3 the inventory for her. ECF No. 34-9 at 1. Defendant declined to do so, noting it was “the insured’s
duty after loss to provide the details needed for [an] investigation.” Id. As Plaintiff failed to meet
her “conditions and duties” under the policy, including by providing “the required documentation
and details,” Defendant could not “proceed with the claim process at this time.” Id. The letter
further noted that Defendant “will wait until [Plaintiff] is able to complete the required Proof of
Loss” for the water damage and “will then be able to complete the meeting that was started on
[October 18, 2019]”—the date of the examination under oath—“and make a final coverage deci-
sion based on what is submitted and reviewed.” Id. The letter also included excerpts of the rele-
vant policy provisions laying out Plaintiff’s “Duties After Loss” and concluded: “At this time, our
investigation is suspended. We will be happy to reopen the claim should the insured comply with
the conditions of the policy and complete the signed proof of loss.” Id. at 2. The record reflects
no further activity by either party until Plaintiff sued more than two years later.
B. Procedural History
On April 20, 2022, Plaintiff sued in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. See
ECF No. 1-1; ECF No. 7 at 2–4.3 A few months later, the case was removed to this Court. ECF
No. 1. Plaintiff brings three claims. First, she alleges Defendant breached the insurance contract
by, among other things, failing to pay for the repairs to her home and for her total loss of personal
property. ECF No. 8 (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 18–20. Second, she claims Defendant breached the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by refusing to accept her claim, delaying adjustment,
and “closing the case without justification.” Id. ¶¶ 21–25. Third, she contends Defendant was
unjustly enriched because it “realiz[ed] substantial premium[s]” while “withh[olding] the
3 Plaintiff first sued the wrong corporate entities. See ECF No. 1-1. She later amended her complaint to name Defendant only. See ECF No. 6 at 1 & n.1; ECF No. 8.
4 insurance payments” it owed her. Id. ¶¶ 26–28. After discovery, Defendant moved for summary
judgment in part based on the contractual one-year limitations period. See ECF No. 20-2 at 4.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment must be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could return a
verdict for the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). A fact is “material”
if it is capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation under the applicable substantive law. An-
derson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judg-
ment, the Court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the [nonmovant]”—here,
Plaintiff—“draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor, and avoid weighing the evidence
or making credibility determinations.” Thompson v. District of Columbia, 967 F.3d 804, 812–13
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). But, in opposing summary judgment, the
nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the ma-
terial facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (cita-
tions omitted). So if the evidence on which the nonmovant relies in opposing summary judgment
is “‘merely colorable’ or ‘not significantly probative’” such that no reasonable factfinder could
rule in that party’s favor based on that evidence, then “summary judgment may be granted.” Brad-
ley v. D.C. Pub. Sch., 222 F. Supp. 3d 24, 28 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–
50). Thus, although at summary judgment the Court does not weigh the evidence or find the facts,
the Court must decide whether the nonmovant’s evidence is probative enough that there is a gen-
uine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Johnson v. Perez, 823 F.3d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir.
2016).
5 III. Analysis
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract and implied-covenant-of-good-faith
claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and that her unjust-enrichment claim is barred by
the express contract between the parties. Plaintiff, for her part, does not dispute the validity of the
statute-of-limitations provision. Nor does she contest that she filed her suit too late. Rather, she
argues that Defendant may not assert the limitations period as a defense. Specifically, she claims
that Defendant’s March 2020 letter suspending its investigation “lulled” her into missing the dead-
line to sue, and that Defendant’s November 2019 letter explaining the payments Defendant issued
was an admission of liability by which Defendant “waived” the limitations period. She also argues
that her implied-covenant-of-good-faith claim survives any contractual bar because Defendant’s
“bad faith” actions occurred during and after the limitations period or because the District of Co-
lumbia suspended all statutes of limitations until March 30, 2021. And as for her unjust-enrich-
ment claim, she appears to ask the Court to look beyond black-letter contract law to give her relief.
None of her arguments holds water.
A. Plaintiff’s Breach-of-Contract Claim is Time-Barred, and No Exception to the Strict Enforcement of Contractual Limitations Periods Applies
Courts generally recognize the validity of contractual provisions limiting the period within
which an insurance-policy holder can sue. See Nkpado v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 697 F. Supp. 94,
98 (D.D.C. 2010). Indeed, under District of Columbia law, which governs this dispute, limitations
periods are “strictly” enforced. Ketten v. United States, No. 21-cv-2437 (RMM), 2024 WL
1908660, at *4 (D.D.C. May 1, 2024) (citing East v. Graphic Arts Indus. Joint Pension Tr., 718
A.2d 153, 156 (D.C. 1998)). Still, a defendant’s actions may allow a plaintiff to overcome such a
bar. But as explained below, neither exception applies here, and Defendant is entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim.
6 1. Defendant Did Not “Lull” Plaintiff into Missing the Deadline to Sue
Under the so-called “lulling doctrine,” a defending insurance company may be “estopped”
from asserting a statute-of-limitations defense if it “has done anything that would tend to lull the
plaintiff into inaction, and thereby permit the limitation prescribed by the statute to run.” Bailey
v. Greenberg, 516 A.2d 934, 937 (D.C. 1986) (citation omitted); see 1426 Wisconsin LLC v. Trav-
elers Indem. Co. of Am., 110 F. Supp. 3d 259, 264 (D.D.C. 2015). That is, the defendant “must
have done something” amounting to “an affirmative inducement . . . to delay bringing action”—
for instance, by making “misleading representations” on which the plaintiff then relied detrimen-
tally. Bailey, 516 A.2d at 937, 939 n.5. This estoppel exception is a “narrow[]” one, and courts
are especially “reluctant to find that a claimant has been misled by an insurance company” if she
was represented by counsel, as Plaintiff was here. Id. at 937, 939.
Nothing in the record suggests Defendant lulled or induced Plaintiff to delay filing suit.
Nor did Defendant make any misleading representations that could have made Plaintiff think the
limitations period would not apply to her. Plaintiff knew since the flooding that she had a potential
claim against Defendant. Cf. Gardner v. Eerie Ins. Co., 639 F. Supp. 3d 135, 143 (D.D.C. 2022)
(rejecting argument that limitations period could have started only when insurance company con-
veyed it would stop making payments because “the limitations provision starts at the time of loss”).
And by November of that year, she was “on notice” that Defendant’s estimated payments would
come up short of what she had hoped for. Martinez v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 2d 52,
60–61 (D.D.C. 2006). Yet she sat on her right to sue.
True, there were delays in Defendant’s processing of her claim. Putting aside that Plaintiff
need not have waited for that process to play out to file suit, though, those delays were caused by
Plaintiff’s own non-compliance with the terms of her policy. She had to “[p]repare an inventory
7 of [all her] damaged personal property showing the quantity, description, actual cash value and
amount of loss” along with “all bills, receipts, and related documents that justify the figures in the
inventory.” ECF No. 33-4 at 22. As of October 19, 2019, when Plaintiff was examined under
oath, she had not done so. See ECF No. 34-5 at 12. On November 1, 2019, Defendant timely
provided her with its calculation of the reimbursable damages related to her home and personal
property—amounts that she believed were inadequate. See ECF No. 34-6. Thus, Plaintiff had
more than five months before the expiration of the one-year contractual limitations period to as-
sess, with help from counsel, whether to sue. She didn’t. Still, after Defendant informed her that
a “detailed inventory” was “the most important document” to “mov[e]” her claim along, ECF No.
34-5 at 12, 34, it then twice extended the deadline to provide the proof-of-loss form when counsel
said his client could not visit the storage facility given her job schedule. No. 34-10 at 2–3, 5. And
when Plaintiff, through counsel, submitted a deficient form in late January, Defendant again gave
her more time. Id. at 1. But Plaintiff still failed to submit the documents necessary to “make a
final coverage decision.” 4 ECF No. 34-9 at 1.
That Defendant offered to resume its investigation and ascertain her entitlement to more
insurance proceeds should she “comply with the conditions of the policy and complete the signed
proof of loss,” id. at 2, speaks to Defendant’s willingness to accommodate her circumstances de-
spite her many delays. But it did not in any way “signal . . . that the limitations period would not
apply to” her. Gardner, 639 F. Supp. 3d at 142. As noted above, Plaintiff could have sued at any
point during that process; any continued investigation into her claim to insurance proceeds was
separate from her duty to timely file suit. In other words, extending the former does not pause the
4 Plaintiff apparently never submitted a comprehensive proof-of-loss form. To date, she has submitted only a “partial” inventory. ECF No. 33-3 at 8.
8 latter.5 Defendant accommodated Plaintiff at every step in processing her claim; it was Plaintiff’s
“own inaction [that] kept [her] from filing a timely complaint.” Martinez, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 58
(quoting P’ship Placements, Inc. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 722 A.2d 837, 842 (D.C. 1998)).
Plaintiff’s main argument is that Defendant’s March 5, 2020, letter informing her that the
“investigation” into her claim was “suspended” lulled her into inaction. See ECF No. 34 at 8–9.
She argues that letter “reasonably” led her to “believe that the statute of limitation would not bar
her claim because” Liberty “suspended the claim until” she provided “additional information” and
because it “did not advise [her] that she must bring her claim within one year.” Id. at 9. That is
nonsense, especially for a claimant represented by counsel.
To begin, the policy included that statute of limitations, and an insurance company’s “fail-
ure to call the [insured’s] attention to the Policy’s expressly delineated limitations provisions,” as
another court in this District has explained, is “surely not . . . an affirmative inducement” under
District of Columbia law. Martinez, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 58 (emphasis added). And the letter makes
no “representation,” let alone a “misleading” one, on which Plaintiff reasonably could have relied
in deciding not to sue within one year. Bailey, 516 A.2d at 939 n.5. The letter does not, for
instance, ask her to hold off on taking legal action. Nor does it suggest that Defendant was pre-
pared to pay her claim or “settle[d] amicably” any dispute about the amount of money owed. Id.
at 939 (citation omitted). To the contrary, the March letter states that, from Defendant’s perspec-
tive, it would take no further action because Plaintiff “failed to provide the details necessary for
5 That is why it is irrelevant that Defendant “continued [to] adjudicate[e] . . . [Plaintiff’s] 2015 and 2018 claims without any issue regarding the contractual limitation period”—a “c[ourse] of conduct” Plaintiff argues further led her to “believe that the limitation period was not an issue.” ECF No. 34 at 9. Plaintiff does not contend that she ever sued Defendant over her prior claims. If anything, Defendant’s continued adjudication of those claims shows that the claim-evaluation pro- cess operates independently of any contractual limitation on filing suit.
9 [an] investigation.” See ECF No. 34-9 at 2 (concluding that the “investigation [was] suspended”
and Defendant may “reopen” it if she complied with the terms of her policy (emphasis added)).
As Defendant puts it, the letter “shows that it was Plaintiff, not Defendant, who caused the delay
in adjusting the claim.” ECF No. 35 at 1-2. And in any event, as discussed above, that process is
separate from Plaintiff’s right to sue. It would make no sense if the law allowed Plaintiff, repre-
sented by counsel, to extend her time to sue—in theory indefinitely—by failing to comply with
the terms of her policy to provide proof of her damages. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to raise a mate-
rial issue of fact as to whether Defendant lulled her into not suing earlier. Bailey, 516 A.2d at 939.
2. Defendant Did Not “Waive” the Statute-of-Limitations Defense
Similarly, an insurance company may “waive[] its ability to invoke the limitations period,”
impliedly by “conced[ing] liability” and having “some discussion[s] of a settlement offer.” Bailey,
516 A.2d at 938–39 & n.5; Gardner, 639 F. Supp. 3d at 142. That rule sensibly “prevent[s] insur-
ance companies from avoiding payment of claims by entering into prolonged negotiations and then
withdrawing” once the limitations period has run. Martinez, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 60 (cleaned up
and citation omitted). But “investigat[ing]” an insurance claim is “not synonymous” with “ini-
tiat[ing]” settlement discussions, so an ordinary “claim evaluation process does not waive the in-
surer’s right to assert” the limitations period as a defense. Gardner, 639 F. Supp. 3d at 142 (quot-
ing 1426 Wisconsin, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 269).
Nothing in the record suggests that Defendant discussed a settlement with Plaintiff or oth-
erwise waived the limitations period; indeed, it was Plaintiff’s own inaction that probably created
a barrier to any such talks. Defendant paid Plaintiff the damages it determined adequate based on
its findings. Defendant also invited Plaintiff to submit proof of her losses to justify a higher
amount. And when she failed to do so, Defendant suspended its investigation. What else could it
10 have done? In any event, there is no evidence in the record of settlement discussions. And as
noted, a claim investigation does not amount to “initiation of settlement discussions,” which might
give an insured reason to believe that strict compliance with the contractual limitations period is
not required. 1426 Wisconsin LLC, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 269. This case is thus far afield from
circumstances where an insurer “enter[s] into prolonged negotiations and then withdraw[s] after
the . . . limitation[s] period has passed.” Martinez, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 60 (quotation omitted).
Plaintiff leans on Defendant’s November 1, 2019, letter “addressing the issue of supple-
mental damages” to argue, it appears, that the parties were indeed engaged in something like set-
tlement talks, with the sole issue being the amount of money owed after itemization of her losses.
See ECF No. 34 at 3, 8. But that letter suggests nothing of the sort. In it, Defendant informed
Plaintiff that it “issued a payment” related to the flooding incident in the amount of $950.01, an
amount representing $26,216.31 for her “Dwelling/Home” and $6,769.51 for her “Personal Prop-
erty” less prior payments, depreciation, deductibles, and money “paid when incurred.” ECF No.
34-6 at 1. To be sure, Defendant accepted that the flooding incident was covered by the insurance
policy, and it also acknowledged its obligation to pay damages. But at no point did Defendant
“indicat[e] that further payment was forthcoming” or that the payment “w[as] for the purpose of
settlement.” 1426 Wisconsin LLC, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 270 (citation omitted). So no “reasonable
insured”—let alone her attorney—“could . . . have read” that letter as stating that Defendant was
“waiv[ing] . . . the limitations period” or “intend[ing] to pay the remainder of the claim[s].” Id.
Because Plaintiff points to no other evidence to back her argument that Defendant waived the
statute of limitations, this exception to the limitations period does not apply.
B. Plaintiff’s Claim for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith is Also Time-Barred “Every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” Sundberg
11 v. TTR Realty, LLC, 109 A.3d 1123, 1133 (D.C. 2015). At root, this covenant means “neither party
shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party
to receive the fruits of the contract.” Allworth v. Howard Univ., 890 A.2d 194, 201 (D.C. 2006)
(citation omitted). But this claim is time-barred under the same contractual limitations provision
that forecloses Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim, which broadly prohibits any “action” to “be
brought . . . within one year after the date of loss.” ECF No. 33-4 at 24 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff presses three arguments against applying the limitations period, but none per-
suades. First, she argues that Defendant waived this defense and “concede[d] that [her] claim for
breach of the implied covenant . . . is proper” because it did not state in its motion “that the con-
tractual statute of limitations applies” to that claim. ECF No. 34 at 11. Her argument is a non-
starter. Defendant states that Plaintiff brings “three” claims, ECF No. 33-2 at 2, and then proceeds
to argue that (1) her “claims” are barred by the statute of limitations and (2) her unjust-enrichment
claim fails because an express contract exists, see id. at 4, 7 (emphasis added). This is not the stuff
of waiver. And considering Plaintiff then proceeds to argue why the statute-of-limitations bar
should not apply to the claim for breach of the implied covenant, Defendant’s motion seems to
have been clear enough. Cf. Schaefer v. EPA, No. 20-CV-2702 (CRC), 2023 WL 2663015, at *4
(D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2023) (“Although a party’s failure to raise an issue in its opening brief usually
constitutes waiver, the Court has discretion to consider such arguments where the other party had
the opportunity to respond.”).
Second, Plaintiff points to Defendant’s “bad faith actions that were arbitrary and capri-
cious,” including “the way the claim was adjusted,” its “refusal to inspect and value the personal
properties,” and its “decision to deny payment of the 1-800-packout storage fees.” ECF No. 34 at
11. All of this puts the cart before the horse. The Court need not—indeed cannot—consider the
12 merits of Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied covenant if she cannot clear the contractual
statute-of-limitations bar. Plaintiff cites no authority exempting this kind of claim from the ordi-
nary rules.6
Plaintiff’s third argument fares no better. She appears to suggest that, even assuming the
limitations period applies, the District of Columbia’s COVID-19-related emergency orders tolled
it. See ECF No. 34 at 4–5, 11. Specifically, on March 18, 2020, the D.C. Superior Court ordered
that “all statutory and rules-based time limits in the D.C. Code” be “tolled” in response to the
Covid-19 pandemic until May 15, 2020. See Amended Order, D.C. Super. Ct. (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.dccourts.gov/superior-court/covid-orders. The Superior Court extended the tolling
period repeatedly until June 10, 2022. See Amended Order, D.C. Super. Ct. (June 10, 2022),
https://www.dccourts.gov/superior-court/covid-orders. But the D.C. Superior Court orders evi-
dently do not “provide for the tolling of contractual limitations period[s].” Gardner, 639 F. Supp.
3d at 143 (emphasis added).
C. The Existence of An Express Contract Precludes Plaintiff’s Unjust-Enrich- ment Claim Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant was unjustly enriched because it “realized substantial
premium[s]” while “withh[olding] the insurance payments” it owed her. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26–28.
But unjust enrichment is a quasi-contractual theory of recovery that “presupposes” no “express,
enforceable contract” exists. Plesha v. Ferguson, 725 F. Supp. 2d 106, 112 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing
6 Plaintiff also hints at “actions” Defendant took “after the contractual limitation period” that, she presumably argues, rise to the level of a breach of the implied covenant of good faith. ECF No. 34 at 11. She asserts these actions occurred as late as July 2020. Id. But any claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith based on those actions would be time-barred as well, because she filed suit in April 2022. And she does not argue that her implied-covenant-of-good- faith claim is somehow independent of her contractual claim or subject to a different statute of limitations.
13 Vila v. Inter-Am. Inv. Corp., 570 F.3d 274, 279 (D.C. Cir. 2009)); see Jordan Keys & Jessamy,
LLP v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 870 A.2d 58, 63 (D.C. 2005). It provides a remedy when
“justice warrants a recovery as though there had been a promise.” Jordan Keys & Jessamy, 870
A.2d at 63 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 324 (6th ed. 1990)). Because an express contract
governed the parties’ conduct and Plaintiff has not challenged its validity or enforceability, De-
fendant is entitled to summary judgment on her claim for unjust enrichment.
Plaintiff acknowledges the “general rule” that an express contract bars an unjust-enrich-
ment claim but argues that courts may still “allow” such a claim in various circumstances, such as
“when the express contract does not fully address a subject matter.” ECF No. 34 at 12. She
provides no legal authority for this proposition. But she argues her claim “is based on the premi-
ums she paid to cover her loss,” which Defendant “unjustly retain[ed]” without “cover[ing] dam-
ages to her personal property.” Id. In her view, the “claim for unjust enrichment . . . is based on
equitable principles” and “is not contingent upon the niceties of the law of contracts and is not
based on breach of contract.” Id. at 13. But Plaintiff does assert breach of contract by challenging
Defendant’s refusal to do what she says her policy required. So the “niceties” of contract law do
apply and preclude her claim here. See Glasgow v. Camanne Mgmt. Inc., 261 A.3d 208, 215–16
(D.C. 2021) (“[C]ourts will not displace the terms of a contract and impose some other duties not
chosen by the parties.” (cleaned up and citation omitted)).7
7 To the extent Plaintiff argues that her lawsuit is not an “action” for purposes of the limi- tations provision because it is an equitable action, she fails to recognize that “[t]here is one form of action—the civil action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 2; accord D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 2.
14 IV. Conclusion
For all the above reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
A separate order will issue.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: January 24, 2025