Daquashaila Areone Jackson v. Iowa District Court for Polk County

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: September 17, 2025
• Docket: 24-0321
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0321 Filed September 17, 2025

DAQUASHAILA AREONE JACKSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR POLK COUNTY, Defendant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Tabitha Turner, Judge.

Daquashaila Jackson petitions for a writ of certiorari challenging the district

court’s notice of firearm prohibition. WRIT ANNULLED.

Nicholas A. Jones, Assistant Des Moines Adult Public Defender, Des

Moines, for plaintiff.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for defendant.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and

Doyle, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025). 2

CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Daquashaila Jackson challenges the district court’s entry of a firearms

prohibition notice after she pled guilty to assault causing bodily injury. She alleges

the district court’s entry of the notice constituted an illegal sentence in violation of

article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution and the Second Amendment to the

United States Constitution. Because we find the firearms prohibition notice was

notice of a collateral consequence of the sentence and not part of the sentence

itself, we annul the writ of certiorari.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Jackson pled guilty to assault causing bodily injury. She entered a written

guilty plea and requested a deferred judgment. The district court granted Jackson

a deferred judgment. The court entered a judgment and sentencing order, an

extended no-contact order, and a notice of firearms prohibition. The notice

informed Jackson that she is prohibited from possessing firearms because she

“[h]as been convicted within the previous three (3) years of any serious or

aggravated misdemeanor defined in [Iowa Code] Chapter 708 . . . .”

Jackson filed a motion to correct illegal sentence. She argued deferred

judgments are not convictions and further argued that Iowa Code section 724.8(5)

(2024) is unconstitutional under article I, section 1A of the Iowa constitution. The

district court denied Jackson’s motion without analyzing the constitutional claim.

So, Jackson filed a motion to enlarge or reconsider. The district court summarily

denied that motion without further analysis, simply stating it had provided “a

thorough reasoning for the ruling.” 3

Jackson petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The supreme court granted the

petition and transferred the case to this court.

II. Analysis

Jackson challenges the district court’s entry of a firearms prohibition notice

arguing it violates article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution and the Second

Amendment to the United States Constitution. At the threshold, the State argues

this issue is not properly before us because the firearm prohibition was not a part

of Jackson’s sentence but rather a notice of a collateral consequence. Our

supreme court has twice addressed this threshold question. See State v. Smith,

17 N.W.3d 355, 361–63 (Iowa 2025); State v. Kieffer, 17 N.W.3d 651, 660–62

(Iowa 2025).

In Smith, the district court’s sentencing order contained a general notice that

convicted felons may not possess firearms in Iowa. 17 N.W.3d at 362.

Subsequently, the district court issued a separate notice of firearm prohibition

under Iowa Code section 724.31A.1 Id. Smith only appealed the final judgment

and sentence order, and the supreme court concluded “the subsequent notice of

firearm prohibition is not before us.” Id. at 363. As for the general notice in the

sentencing order, the court found the notice did not specifically preclude Smith

from possessing firearms. Id. at 363–64. Thus, the court reasoned, “the notice of

1 The Iowa Legislature repealed section 724.31A, effective July 1, 2025. See 2025 Iowa Acts ch. 104, § 2; Iowa Const. art. III, § 26 (“An act of the general assembly passed at a regular session of a general assembly shall take effect on July 1 following its passage unless a different effective date is stated in an act of the general assembly.”). But the prohibition here occurred in 2024, when section 724.31A was still in force. 4

firearm prohibition is not a term of Smith’s sentence properly before us on direct

appeal.” Id. at 364.

In Kieffer, the supreme court reached the opposite conclusion, where the

district court’s order stated that a notice of firearm prohibition would be entered as

a separate order and extended the no-contact order. 17 N.W.3d at 661. The

separate no-contact order contained a paragraph specifically prohibiting the

defendant from possessing firearms and requiring him to immediately deliver all

firearms to the sheriff. Id. at 663. The defendant would be subject to contempt of

court for violating the no-contact order. Id. In that case, the supreme court

concluded the firearm prohibition was a term of the defendant’s judgment and

sentence order that could be addressed on direct appeal. Id.

We find that this case is controlled by Smith as the firearms prohibition was

a statutory notice of a collateral consequence. See 17 N.W.3d at 363–64. Here,

the district court’s sentencing order stated, “notice is hereby given that defendant

is prohibited from acquiring a pistol or revolver.” The court’s order specifically

noted Jackson “is ineligible for a permit to carry, or to carry, a dangerous weapon

under §§ 724.8, 724.8B” because she was “convicted of a serious or aggravated

misdemeanor under Chapter 708.” Then, the court filed the notice of firearm

prohibition with its sentencing order.

Unlike Kieffer, the no-contact order in this case did not specifically prohibit

Jackson from possessing firearms. See 17 N.W.3d at 663. Therefore, Jackson

would not be subject to contempt for failure to comply with the firearms prohibition.

Cf. id. (finding the defendant “could be held in contempt of the order” if he

possessed firearms in violation of the no-contact order). Instead, Jackson was 5

ordered not to possess firearms in the district court’s sentencing order only

because doing so would violate Iowa Code section 724.8B. See Iowa Code

§ 724.31A (stating “[t]he clerk of the district court shall also notify the person of the

prohibitions imposed” because of a judgment prohibiting the individual from

acquiring a firearm). That difference is dispositive. Unlike the no-contact order in

Keiffer, the notice provided to Jackson “does not have any independent force” and

therefore is not part of his sentence. See 17 N.W.3d at 663 n.3.

We conclude the firearm prohibition in this case was not part of Jackson’s

sentence, and therefore we do not reach the merits of Jackson’s constitutional

challenges.

III. Conclusion

Because we find the firearms prohibition is not part of the sentence, we

annul the writ of certiorari.

WRIT ANNULLED.