Daquan Lampkins v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
This text of Daquan Lampkins v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Daquan Lampkins v. Commonwealth of Kentucky) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
RENDERED: MARCH 6, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-0366-MR
DAQUAN LAMPKINS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JULIE KAELIN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 18-CR-002490
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ECKERLE, A. JONES, AND L. JONES, JUDGES.
JONES, A., JUDGE: Daquan Lampkins appeals from the Jefferson Circuit Court’s
order denying his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Kentucky Rule of
Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 11.42. We affirm. BACKGROUND
The history of this case is largely detailed in Lampkins v.
Commonwealth, 701 S.W.3d 99 (Ky. 2024). Briefly stated, Lampkins was
convicted by a Jefferson County jury of two counts of murder, possession of a
handgun by a convicted felon, and violation of a protective order; he received a
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; he appealed; and
the Kentucky Supreme Court ultimately affirmed his conviction.
On January 13, 2025, an unsigned, unsworn RCr 11.42 motion was
then filed in Lampkins’s case before the Jefferson Circuit Court. The handwritten
motion claimed Lampkins’s trial counsel was ineffective for “fail[ing] to
counsel/discuss with [Lampkins] the impact of a mistrial that subjected [Lampkins]
to double jeopardy and structural error.” See Record at 439. On February 13,
2025, the circuit court entered an order summarily denying the motion because, in
violation of RCr 11.42(2) and (3), the motion was unsigned, unverified, and did not
state with the requisite level of specificity grounds for holding Lampkins’s
sentence invalid.
Lampkins timely appealed. Weeks later, on March 31, 2025,
Lampkins then filed a handwritten document styled: “RE: 18-CR-2490
misunderstanding of RCr 11.42 ‘Dismissal,’” in which he stated:
I received this ORDER of 2/13/2025 dismissing an unsigned, not verified, submitted Jan 13, 2025 to Court’s
-2- Clerk which was determind [sic] to be defective and inadmissible one-page RCr 11.42 motion (Thankfully as I wish to properly file on before 3-year deadline Sep. 26, 2027), as I understand such was unheard. I misunderstood thinking my chance at RCr 11.42 had been missed with the “Dismissal” and thus wrote Clerk of Court to Appeal the ORDER. Now knowing I have not exhausted my right of RCr 11.42, I wish to withdrawl [sic] appeal to Dismissal ORDER, please. Lastly, the KYDOC# on ORDER was wrong (I’m #303131; not #361975), causing confusion also. Thank you for your time & consideration!
See Record at 453.
ANALYSIS
Nothing of record indicates the circuit court has taken any action
regarding Lampkins’s March 31, 2025 filing, but the circuit court’s failure to do so
does not affect our jurisdiction to resolve Lampkins’s appeal: That filing was filed
too late to be considered an effective Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”)
59.05 motion;1 and to the extent it could be considered a CR 60.02 motion, a
motion filed pursuant to that rule would not affect the finality of the circuit court’s
judgment, suspend its operation, or otherwise preclude our review. See CR 60.02.
As for the substance of this appeal, Lampkins does not (and cannot)
contest that an unsigned, unverified RCr 11.42 motion – such as the one filed in his
1 Cf. Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 3(E)(2) (providing in part that “If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions under the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, the time to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion: CR 50.02; CR 52.02; or CR 59[.]”).
-3- case on January 13, 2025 – is fatally deficient and warrants summary dismissal.
See RCr 11.42(2). And again, that is precisely what occurred. With that said,
Lampkins’s sole appellate argument is that the circuit court’s February 13, 2025,
order should be set aside on grounds of fraud because, as Lampkins represents, he
did not file the RCr 11.42 motion, and he did not direct anyone to file it on his
behalf.
However, this is an argument Lampkins never advanced below.
Accordingly, we cannot address it now. “When an issue has not been addressed in
the order on appeal, there is nothing for us to review. Our jurisprudence will not
permit an appellant to feed one kettle of fish to the trial judge and another to the
appellate court. An appellant preserves for appellate review only those issues
fairly brought to the attention of the trial court.” Owens v. Commonwealth, 512
S.W.3d 1, 15 (Ky. App. 2017) (internal quotation marks, brackets, citations, and
footnote omitted).
CONCLUSION
In short, Lampkins presents no valid basis for overturning the
Jefferson Circuit Court’s February 13, 2025 order. We therefore AFFIRM.
ALL CONCUR.
-4- BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Daquan Lampkins, pro se Russell Coleman West Liberty, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Joseph A. Beckett Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
-5-
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Daquan Lampkins v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/daquan-lampkins-v-commonwealth-of-kentucky-kyctapp-2026.