Daquan Lajames Saunders v. Commonwealth of Virginia
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Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, Beales and Senior Judge Annunziata UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Salem, Virginia
DAQUAN LAJAMES SAUNDERS MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 1183-12-3 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS OCTOBER 8, 2013 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE Joseph W. Milam, Jr., Judge
Joseph A. Sanzone (Sanzone & Baker, L.L.P., on brief), for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Daquan Lajames Saunders (“Saunders”) appeals his conviction by a jury in the trial court
of first-degree murder, in violation of Code § 18.2-32. Saunders’ single assignment of error is
that the trial court erred in failing to strike the first-degree murder charge because the evidence
was insufficient to prove premeditation to kill. He argues that premeditation requires some time
for reflection, citing McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 281 (1883), and that he did not have
any specific plan to kill the victim. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, we must “‘examine the
evidence that supports the conviction and allow the conviction to stand unless it is plainly wrong
or without evidence to support it.’” Commonwealth v. McNeal, 282 Va. 16, 20, 710 S.E.2d 733,
735 (2011) (quoting Vincent v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 648, 652, 668 S.E.2d 137, 139-40
(2008)).
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. Code § 18.2-32 provides in part that “[m]urder . . . by any willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing . . . is murder of the first degree, punishable as a Class 2 felony.” “‘To
premeditate means to adopt a specific intent to kill, and that is what distinguishes first and
second degree murder.’” Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 480, 485, 384 S.E.2d 95, 98 (1989)
(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 696, 700, 261 S.E.2d 550, 553 (1980)). “‘It is the
will and purpose to kill, not necessarily the interval of time, which determine the grade of the
offense.’” Id. (quoting Akers v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 40, 48, 216 S.E.2d 28, 33 (1975)).
“That intent ‘may be formed only a moment before the fatal act is committed provided the
accused had time to think and did intend to kill.’” Id. (quoting Giarratano v. Commonwealth,
220 Va. 1064, 1074, 266 S.E.2d 94, 100 (1980)); see also Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81,
104, 580 S.E.2d 834, 847 (2003) (“Premeditation is an intent to kill that needs to exist only for a
moment.”); Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 282, 427 S.E.2d 411, 421 (1993) (“Proof
of premeditation . . . will be sufficient, even if the premeditation shown is only slight or
momentary.”). Whether a murder is willful, deliberate, and premeditated is an issue of fact to be
resolved by the jury. Beavers, 245 Va. at 283, 427 S.E.2d at 421. The jury is not required to
accept the defendant’s self-serving statements that he did not mean to kill the victim. Id.
Further, “[p]remeditation and formation of an intent to kill seldom can be proved by
direct evidence. A combination of circumstantial factors may be sufficient.” Rhodes, 238 Va. at
486, 384 S.E.2d at 98. As an appellate court,
we will affirm a conviction of premeditated murder, even though based upon wholly circumstantial evidence, whenever we can say that the reasonable import of such evidence, considered as a whole, is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the criminal agent and that he acted with a premeditated intent to kill.
Id. at 487, 384 S.E.2d at 99.
-2- Even if the victim offers resistance, the evidence can certainly be sufficient to prove
premeditation. In Swann v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 236, 441 S.E.2d 195, 204-05 (1994),
“[t]he evidence that Swann (1) armed himself before looking for a ‘house to rob,’ (2) entered
[the victim’s] house wearing a mask, and (3) aimed and fired the weapon at [the victim] when
[the victim] charged at him, amply supports the verdict [of capital murder].”
In Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 136, 360 S.E.2d 196, 201 (1987), the Virginia
Supreme Court held “as a matter of law, that one who, armed with a deadly weapon, approaches
others intending to rob them, will not be heard to assert that he was provoked by the resistance of
his victims to his criminal enterprise.” The Court stated that the fact-finder was entitled to
consider the circumstances that Barnes was masked and armed with a loaded revolver when he
entered a store with the intent to commit robbery and that he fired shots killing two unarmed men
who were offering resistance. Id.
From these circumstances the trier of fact could well infer that Barnes intended to eliminate all resistance to his criminal enterprise by killing the victims, and perhaps also to eliminate witnesses by killing all present, until he fled the store in a panic. We hold that the evidence fully supports the trial court’s finding that the killings were willful, deliberate, and premeditated.
Id.
In the present case, Saunders approached an acquaintance, Martique Holland, in the
Woodside Village apartment complex in Danville. Saunders showed Holland his handgun and
indicated that “something crazy” was going to happen that night, but he did not specify what that
would be. Saunders told Holland he was going to “hit a lick.”1 Saunders then cased the parking
lot of Woodside Village. He opened the door of a white Lincoln sedan and entered the car.
1 According to the Urban Dictionary, “Hit-a-lick” is a slang phrase meaning to “Find a quick way (or job) to make money, usually illegal.” Urban Dictionary, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=hit+a+lick (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). -3- After he got out of the car, he checked the parking lot again to make sure no one was going to
see him re-enter the car. A surveillance video, admitted into the trial evidence and observed by
the jury, showed these movements by Saunders, as well as his subsequent shooting of the victim.
Shortly after 8:00 p.m., Cheryl Edmonds pulled into the Woodside Village parking lot
and she and her boyfriend, Marcello Waddell, sat in her van talking. While they were sitting
there, Edmonds noticed Saunders getting out of the white Lincoln sedan, which belonged to
Waddell’s cousin. The Lincoln sedan was parked in the same row as the van, about three spaces
down. Upon exiting the vehicle, Saunders had a white bag in his hand and he began walking
across a grassy area away from the car and the parking lot. At that point, Waddell opened the
van door, stepped out, and yelled “Hey.” Saunders turned around, pulled out a gun, and shot
Waddell. Waddell fell on the pavement next to the van and died from the gunshot wound.
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