Dao Health v. Shenzhen Lutejiacheng Technology Co., Ltd.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedDecember 12, 2025
Docket1:23-cv-04885
StatusUnknown

This text of Dao Health v. Shenzhen Lutejiacheng Technology Co., Ltd. (Dao Health v. Shenzhen Lutejiacheng Technology Co., Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dao Health v. Shenzhen Lutejiacheng Technology Co., Ltd., (N.D. Ill. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

DAO HEALTH,

Plaintiff, No. 23 C 4885

v. Judge Thomas M. Durkin

SHENZHEN LUTEJIACHENG TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Dao Health alleges that Shenzhen Lutejiacheng Technology Co., Ltd., has infringed three of its patents, including: two for breast milk collection devices (Patent numbers 7,559,915 and 8,118,772); and one for a related valve (Patent number 8,702,646). The parties dispute the meanings of seven terms used in the three patents. See R. 126; R. 134; R. 153. The Court held a claim construction hearing on March 5, 2025. The following is the Court’s resolution of the parties’ disputes. I. “external suction source” Patent ‘915 (claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 15, 16, 18, 33) Patent ‘772 (claims 4, 5, 8)

The first disputed term is “external suction source,” which is used in the two patents for the breast milk collection devices. The parties’ dispute centers on the referent of the word “external,” such that the parties ask the Court to determine the object to which the suction source is external. Shenzhen argues that the term should be interpreted to mean “a suction source that is located outside of the brassiere cup,” whereas Dao Health argues that it means “the suction source is located outside the internal volume of the reservoir.” “The plain claim language [is] the starting point for [the] analysis.” Sumitomo

Dainippon Pharma Co. v. Emcure Pharms. Ltd., 887 F.3d 1153, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The words of a claim “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Here, the term “external suction source” is first used in the first claim of Patent ‘915 in the following context: The invention claimed is:

1. A breast milk collection device to be secured within and supported by an ordinary or nursing brassiere worn by a lactating woman, the collection device comprising:

a funnel shaped adaptor adapted to fittingly and sealingly receive the woman’s breast;

a reservoir having an internal volume, said internal volume adapted to collect said breast milk expressed from said woman’s breast, said internal volume of said reservoir sealed against exposure to the atmosphere;

said adaptor being received within said internal volume of said reservoir;

said internal volume adapted to be detachably connected to an external suction source, said suction source adapted to cyclically apply a vacuum pressure to the internal volume and relieve said vacuum pressure in said internal volume, said cyclical application and relief of said vacuum pressure within the internal volume adapted to encourage the expression of breast milk from said breast; said reservoir adapted to allow the capture and collection of said breast milk in said reservoir.

R. 127-1 at 20 (JA0019) (emphasis added). As described in claim 1, the invention consists of two primary components: (1) a “funnel shaped adaptor”; and (2) a “reservoir having an internal volume.” The first claim provides further that that “adaptor” is “received within [the] internal volume of [the] reservoir,” (emphasis added). Shenzhen does not dispute that the referent of the word “within” is the “internal volume of the reservoir.” Unlike the “adaptor,” which is “within the internal volume,” the claim then provides that the “internal volume” can be “connected to an external suction source,” (emphasis added). It is plainly apparent from the order of these provisions in the claim—i.e., the fact that the provision about the “external suction source” immediately follows the provision about the adaptor being within the internal volume of the reservoir—that the word “external” is intended to be juxtaposed to the word “within.” Their common reference point is the reservoir. In other words, while the location of the “adaptor” is “within the internal volume of the reservoir,” the location of the “suction source” is “external” to the “internal volume of the reservoir.” Shenzhen disagrees with this interpretation because claim 1 initially describes the invention as a “breast milk collection device to be secured within [a] brassiere,” such that, according to Shenzhen, the “external suction source should logically be construed as located outside the brassiere.” R. 126 at 9 (emphases added). This would be a reasonable interpretation if not for the subsequent use of the word “within” noted above. Shenzhen is correct that the first provision of the claim defines the device with respect to its location inside the brassiere. But several provisions later, the claim is

describing, not the location of the device, but the relative locations of the device’s components. As discussed, one of those components (the “adaptor”) is “within” the internal volume of the reservoir, whereas the other component (the “suction source”) is external to the internal volume of the reservoir. The first use of the word “within,” which Shenzhen relies upon, is less relevant than the later use of that word to determining the meaning of “external suction source,” because the description of the

location of the components is more specific that the general location of the device. This means that, with respect to the location of the pump, the patent claims only a pump external to the reservoir, and it does not claim any further location of the pump, such as external to the brassiere. Rather than directly address the most relevant claim language, Shenzhen primarily argues is that the “specification is consistent in distinguishing between pumps that are ‘internal’ as compared to those that are ‘external’ relative to a

brassiere.” R. 126 at 9. The Court disagrees with this interpretation of the specification’s significance and instead finds that the Court’s interpretation of the claim’s plain language is in accord with the specification. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[C]laims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part. [T]he specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.”). The specification summarizes the invention as follows: The present invention is a compact and hands-free human breast milk collection device that fits into a mother’s existing nursing or standard brassiere. The invention can be attached to a regular electric pump or manual pump utilizing suction hoses for active milk collection and also can be used without a pump for passive milk collection.

R. 127-1 at 2 (JA0001). The specification also explains that the invention is intended to address the following needs in the industry: Consequently, a need exists for a breast milk collection device which can fit completely within a woman's standard brassiere. Such a device would be less likely to interfere with breastfeeding from the opposite breast and avoid the isolating, disruptive, and sometimes embarrassing need to disrobe to pump breast milk.

A need also exists for a breast milk collection device that is both powerful and hands-free.

A further need exists for a breast milk collection device that provides a viable solution for passive milk collection while simultaneously breastfeeding.

Furthermore, a need exists for a breast milk pumping and collection device which can help compromised infants breastfeed.

Id. at 16 (JA0015).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Dao Health v. Shenzhen Lutejiacheng Technology Co., Ltd., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dao-health-v-shenzhen-lutejiacheng-technology-co-ltd-ilnd-2025.