Danzelle Q. Moses v. Christopher Alexander

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: April 25, 2025
• Docket: 2025-C-0229
• Status: Published

Opinion

DANZELLE Q. MOSES * NO. 2025-C-0229

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO FIRST CITY COURT OF NEW ORLEANS NO. 2022-03692, SECTION “A” HONORABLE ROBBINS GRAHAM ****** Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase ****** (Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase)

Zachary O. Simmons SOUTHEAST LEGAL SERVICES 1340 Poydras Street, Suite 600 New Orleans, Louisiana 70112

Leonid Grinberg BLUESTEAM LAW LLC 4700 Millwood Drive Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70817

COUNSEL FOR RELATOR/PLAINTIFF

WRIT GRANTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED APRIL 25, 2025 TGC RML SCJ

Relator/Plaintiff, Danzelle Moses (hereinafter “Ms. Moses”), seeks review

of the trial court’s March 20, 2025 order denying her “Emergency Motion to

Continue Trial and Reset Scheduling Order.” Based on the application for

supervisory writs and the applicable law, we grant the writ, reverse the trial court’s

March 20, 2025 order and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

Facts and Procedural History

On June 14, 2022, Ms. Moses filed a “Petition for Unfair and Deceptive

Trade Practices, Security Deposit, Penalties, and Attorney’s Fees” naming

Christopher Alexander (hereinafter “Mr. Alexander”) as the sole defendant. The

petition maintains that Ms. Moses signed a one-year residential lease for a property

owned by Mr. Alexander. She contends that Mr. Alexander asked her to vacate the

property to begin repairs resulting from Hurricane Ida. After complying with Mr.

Alexander’s requests, Ms. Moses vacated the property and made a formal demand

of her security deposit. The petition alleges two causes of action: (1) that Mr.

Alexander willfully failed to return her security deposit in violation of La. R.S.

1 9:3251–9:3253 and (2) that his actions constitute unfair and deceptive trade

practices under La. R.S. 51:1401, et seq. – Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and

Consumer Protection Law.

After filing a motion for extension of time, Mr. Alexander answered the

petition on August 8, 2022. On October 16, 2024, the trial court issued a

scheduling order which provided, in pertinent part:

TRIAL IS SET FOR TUESDAY, MARCH 25, 2025

***

Pre-Trial is set for 9:30 a.m. Trial is set for 10:00 a.m. Pre-[T]rial memos are required and due on 3/21/2025 by noon.…Motions to Continue must be filed by 3/14/2025 to be considered. Plaintiff’s Amended Pleading is due 11/18/2024.

On November 14, 2024, Ms. Moses amended her original petition to add a breach

of contract claim. Mr. Alexander failed to answer the amended petition and Ms.

Moses filed a motion for default judgement.1 The trial court granted the motion and

entered a default judgment in favor of Ms. Moses on February 26, 2025. However,

the trial court, sua sponte, vacated its prior judgment on March 7, 2025 stating that

Ms. Moses failed to establish a prima facie case, to obtain a default judgment, by

competent and admissible evidence. Ms. Moses subsequently re-filed her motion

for default and requested a hearing.2 According to the writ application, the trial

court informed Ms. Moses, via a telephone call on March 17, 2025, that the trial

date would be maintained in accordance with its October 16, 2024 scheduling

order. Ms. Moses filed an emergency motion to continue the March 25th trial on

1 In support of her motion, Ms. Moses attached her lease agreement with Mr. Alexander and an

affidavit attesting to the events leading up to her leaving rental property. 2 Ms. Moses attached a rule to show cause order to her second motion for default. The second

motion is currently pending before the trial court.

2 March 20, 2025 which the trial court denied. This application for emergency

supervisory writs followed.

Discussion

The narrow issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in denying

Ms. Moses’ emergency motion to continue trial. This Court reviews a motion to

continue trial under the abuse of discretion standard. Doe v. Lewis, 2020-0320, p. 3

(La.App. 4 Cir. 12/30/20), 312 So.3d 1165, 1169 (citation omitted).

Ms. Moses argues the trial court erred in denying her emergency motion to

continue trial because Mr. Alexander failed to answer her amended petition. She

maintains that since Mr. Alexander failed to answer her amended petition, a trial

on the merits is not appropriate. We agree. La. C.C.P. art. 1571 provides that a trial

court “shall” not assign ordinary proceedings for trial until after an answer is filed.

The requirements of La. C.C.P. art. 1571 are mandatory. See James v. Maison

Orleans II, Inc., 2004-1132, pp. 7-9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/11/05), 913 So.2d 115, 119-

20 (citations omitted). Any judgment entered, not in compliance with the

provisions of the La. C.C.P 1571(4), prohibiting the assignment of ordinary

proceedings for trial before an answer is filed, are null and void and must be set

aside. Id.

A status conference was held and a scheduling order setting trial for March

25, 2025 was issued. The scheduling order required all motions to continue be filed

by March 14, 2025. However, after the trial court issued its scheduling order, Ms.

Moses amended her petition to add a breach of contract claim.3 Mr. Alexander

failed to answer Ms. Moses’ amended petition. “[N]o valid judgment may be

3 It appears the parties contemplated that Ms. Moses would be filing an amended petition as

evidenced by the inclusion of a November 18, 2024 deadline for the filing of an amended petition in the trial order.

3 rendered against a party with whom issue has been joined by way of answer,

default or waiver.” Burton v. Belt, 2021-0571, p. 11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/18/22), 340

So.3d 1176, 1183 (citations omitted). Although Ms. Moses filed her emergency

motion to continue trial on March 20, 2025 – after the deadline set forth in the

scheduling order – a trial on the merits could not be held as Mr. Alexander failed to

file an answer. We therefore find the trial court abused its discretion in maintaining

the March 25, 2025 trial date and denying Ms. Moses’ emergency motion to

continue trial. See La. C.C.P. art. 1571(4). Accordingly, the writ application is

granted and the trial court’s March 20, 2025 order is reversed. This matter is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

WRIT GRANTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED