Danny Duran v. City of Covina

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedDecember 11, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-06507
StatusUnknown

This text of Danny Duran v. City of Covina (Danny Duran v. City of Covina) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Danny Duran v. City of Covina, (C.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 || Mildred K. O'Linn (State Bar No. 159055) missy.olinn @ manningkass.com 2 || Craig Smith (State Bar No. 265676) craig saith @marningkass.com 3 || MANNING & KASS ELLROD, RAMIREZ, TRESTER LLP 4||801 S. Figueroa St, 15" Floor Los Angeles, California 90017-3012 5 || Telephone: (213) 624-6900 Facsimile: (213) 624-6999 6 Attorneys for Defendants, City of Covina, 7 || a public entity; David Povero 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION 10

2 DANNY DURAN, Case No. 2:23-cv-6507 ODW (AGRx) District Judge: Otis D. Wright, I; — 12 Plaintiff, Magistrate Judge: Alice G. Rosenberg © = 13 v. . . . > Joint Stipulated Protective Order = 14)|CITY OF COVINA, a public entity;

19 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential,

50 proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to

33 enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this

Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to

35 discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends

only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment

under the applicable legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in

38 Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to

1 || file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the 2 || procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party 3 || seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. 4 1. B. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 5 Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for a 6 || protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace 7 \| officer personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records for 8 || the following reasons. 9 First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of 10 || privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein 2 11 || that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective x 12 || procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 13 |} 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14 || 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies 15 || to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege 16 || law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying 17 || [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes’’); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 18 || 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based 19 || “privacy rights [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); □□□ 20 || Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Defendants 21 || further contend that uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can 22 || threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. 23 Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement 24 || agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official 25 || information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client 26 || privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of 27 || their peace officers — particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files 28 || that contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or

1 || evaluation/analysis, or communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering 2 || legal advice or analysis — potentially including but not limited to 3 || evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or reports, 4 || evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or reports 5 || prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or rendering 6 || legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. 7 || United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 8 || F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. 9 || Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. 10 || Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United 2 11 || States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further x 12 || contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public 13 || entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that 14 || uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; 15 || impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements and 16 || related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling of open 17 || and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that 18 || can erode a public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement any remedial 19 || measures that may be required. 20 Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same 21 || rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to 22 || the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ 23 || compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 24 || 822, 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. 25 Accordingly, Defendants contend that, without a protective order preventing 26 || such, production of confidential records in the case can and will likely substantially 27 ||impair and harm defendant public entity’s interests in candid self-critical analysis, 28 || frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid information from witnesses,

| || preserving the safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and peace 2 || officers’ families and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace officers, 3 || and preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally undermined by 4 || publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information — as can and often does 5 || result in litigation. 6 Plaintiff does not agree with and does not stipulate to Defendants’ contentions 7 || herein above, and nothing in this Stipulation or its associated Order shall resolve the 8 || parties’ disagreement, or bind them, concerning the legal statements and claimed 9 || privileges set forth above. 10 However, Plaintiff agrees that there is Good Cause for a Protective Order so 2 11 || as to preserve the respective interests of the parties without the need to further x 12 || burden the Court with such issues. Specifically, the parties jointly contend that, 13 || absent this Stipulation and its associated Protective Order, the parties’ respective S 14 || privilege interests may be impaired or harmed, and that this Stipulation and its 15 || associated Protective Order may avoid such harm by permitting the parties to 16 || facilitate discovery with reduced risk that privileged and/or sensitive/confidential 17 || information will become matters of public record.

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Related

Koire v. Metro Car Wash
707 P.2d 195 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Tuite v. Henry
181 F.R.D. 175 (District of Columbia, 1998)

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Danny Duran v. City of Covina, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/danny-duran-v-city-of-covina-cacd-2023.