Danius Jackson v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMarch 13, 2024
DocketAT-3330-18-0472-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Danius Jackson v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Danius Jackson v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Danius Jackson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DANIUS JACKSON, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-3330-18-0472-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: March 13, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Danius Jackson , Georgetown, Kentucky, pro se.

Tsopei Robinson , West Palm Beach, Florida, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied his request for corrective action under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA). Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND The appellant filed an appeal alleging that the agency violated his veterans’ preference rights under VEOA in connection with his application for a position as a Police Officer, GS-0083-6, under vacancy announcement number CBAJ-18-10118605-MP, which recruited for vacancies in Clarksville, Murfreesboro, and Nashville, Tennessee. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1. The administrative judge issued a jurisdictional order explaining the applicable burdens under VEOA and ordered the appellant to file evidence and argument establishing the Board’s jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 3 at 1-7. The administrative judge also informed the appellant that, if the appellant established Board jurisdiction, he would adjudicate the appeal after holding a hearing or after allowing for further development of the written record. Id. at 7. The appellant did not respond to the jurisdictional order. Without holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued a decision on the merits, denying the appellant’s request for corrective action. IAF, Tab 6, Initial Decision (ID). The administrative judge found that, although the appellant established Board jurisdiction, he was not entitled to corrective action under 3

VEOA. ID at 4-7. In particular, the administrative judge found that the record reflected that the agency considered the appellant’s application and provided him an opportunity to compete for the position. ID at 6. The appellant has filed a petition for review, which the agency has opposed. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW When an agency accepts applications from individuals outside its own workforce under merit promotion procedures, it must allow “preference eligibles and veterans who have been separated from the armed forces under honorable conditions after 3 years or more of active service” the opportunity to compete. 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1). Here, the agency accepted applications from outside its workforce under merit promotion procedures, and thus, the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) apply. IAF, Tab 5 at 8; see Washburn v. Department of the Air Force, 119 M.S.P.R. 265, ¶¶ 2-5, 11 (2013). The record reflects that the agency found the appellant qualified for the position and referred him to the selecting official, but did not interview him or select him for the position. 2 IAF, Tab 5 at 6, 16, 55-57, 63, 67, 71. Thus, as the administrative judge correctly found, the agency allowed the appellant to compete for the position on the same basis as all of the other candidates. ID at 6. The statute, 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1), requires nothing more. See, e.g., Miller v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 121 M.S.P.R. 88, ¶ 11 (2014) (stating that, in a right to compete VEOA appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1), the Board does not determine whether a preference eligible is qualified for a particular position of Federal employment or whether he should have been selected for the position in question, but rather only assesses whether the 2 Although, as the administrative judge found, it appears that the agency did not make a selection for the vacancy in Clarksville, Tennessee, IAF, Tab 5 at 62-65, the Board has held that an agency’s decision not to fill a particular vacancy does not violate a veteran’s preference rights, see Scharein v. Department of the Army, 91 M.S.P.R. 329, ¶ 10 (2002), aff’d, No. 02-3270, 2008 WL 5753074 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 10, 2008). 4

preference eligible was permitted to compete for the position on the same basis as other candidates), aff’d, 818 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016)

We will consider the appellant’s evidence and argument submitted for the first time on review because the administrative judge failed to issue a close of record order. Because the administrative judge found Board jurisdiction under VEOA and declined to hold a hearing, ID at 1, 4-5, he was responsible for notifying the parties that there would be no hearing, for setting a date on which the record would close, and for affording the parties the opportunity to submit evidence regarding the merits of the appeal before the record closed, Jarrard v. Department of Justice, 113 M.S.P.R. 502, ¶ 11 (2010). Instead, the administrative judge closed the record in this VEOA appeal without affording the parties proper warning or an opportunity to make final submissions. Thus, we find it appropriate to consider the appellant’s arguments and evidence submitted for the first time on review. See Jarrard, 113 M.S.P.R. 502, ¶ 14 n.2. Nonetheless, we find that remand is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and that the agency must prevail as a matter of law. See Waters-Lindo v. Department of Defense, 112 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 5 (2009) (stating that the Board may decide the merits of a VEOA appeal without a hearing where there is no genuine dispute of material fact and one party must prevail as a matter of law).

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Danius Jackson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/danius-jackson-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2024.