Daniels v. United States Department of Justice
This text of Daniels v. United States Department of Justice (Daniels v. United States Department of Justice) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
GABRYELLE DANIELS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03393 (UNA) v. ) ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ) JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, ) ) Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court for review of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF
No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The Court
grants the IFP Application, and for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses this matter without
prejudice.
Plaintiff, a resident of Texas, sues the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division.
See Compl. at 1. She challenges Defendant’s alleged failures to take action on her civil rights
complaints filed with the agency against the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services.
See id. at 1–4. She contends that these actions constitute violations of her constitutional rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see id. at 1, and she seeks damages and an injunction, see id. at 1–2, 4–5.
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims because it does bear the
authority to compel Defendant to investigate her complaints. See Shoshone–Bannock Tribes v.
Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“In both civil and criminal cases, courts have long
acknowledged that the Attorney General's authority to control the course of the federal
government's litigation is presumptively immune from judicial review.”); Wightman–Cervantes v.
Mueller, 750 F. Supp .2d 76, 80 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[A]n agency's decision whether to prosecute, investigate, or enforce has been recognized as purely discretionary and not subject to judicial
review.”) (citing Block v. SEC, 50 F.3d 1078, 1081–82 (D.C.Cir.1995)) (other citation omitted);
Martinez v. U.S., 587 F. Supp. 2d 245, 248–49 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The FBI’s decision whether or not
to investigate the supposed criminal activity reported by Martinez is a discretionary function[.]”);
Otero v. U.S. Attorney General, 832 F.2d 141, 141–42 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (same). “[A]n
agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a
decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 831 (1985). In fact, 28 C.F.R. § 0.50, explicitly assigns the Assistant Attorney General for
the Civil Rights Division the exclusive discretionary function of “reviewing investigations arising
from reports or complaints of public officials or private citizens,” id. at § 0.50(b), and in no way
imposes “any mandatory duty to investigate or prosecute all complaints of civil rights violations,”
nor does it provide a right of review in federal court, see Patterson v. Harris, No. 22-697, 2022
WL 16758554, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2022); Harris v. Holder, No. 15-00270, 2015 WL 794304,
at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2015) (same), aff’d sub. nom Harris v. Lynch, 627 Fed. Appx. 2 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (per curiam).
Insofar as Plaintiff seeks damages, her claims also fail to survive. First, Plaintiff seeks
relief under § 1983, but that statute does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal
law, Settles v. United States Parole Comm'n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and here,
Plaintiff has sued the federal government. Second, “Congress has not waived immunity for suits
seeking monetary damages that arise under the Constitution.” Bond v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 828 F.
Supp. 2d 60, 74 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Scinto v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 608 F. Supp. 2d 4, 9
(D.D.C. 2009)); see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994). (“[T]he United States simply
has not rendered itself liable . . . for constitutional tort claims.”). Although Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) establishes a private cause of
action for damages against federal officers sued in their individual capacity who commit certain
constitutional violations, see Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001), Bivens does
not extend to federal agencies or to federal officials sued in their official capacity, see Meyer, 510
U.S. at 486; In re Rodriguez, No. 05-5130, 2005 WL 3843612, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2005) (per
curiam); Boling v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 290 F. Supp. 3d 37, 46 (D.D.C. 2017). And even if it did,
Plaintiff has not named any federal officials as defendants.
For all the above stated reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(h)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
Date: December 15, 2025 /s/_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge
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