IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JAMEL DANIELS, § § Defendant Below, § No. 474, 2014 Appellant, § § v. § Court Below—Superior Court § of the State of Delaware, STATE OF DELAWARE, § in and for New Castle County § Cr. ID No. 0107003610 Plaintiff Below, § Appellee. §
Submitted: October 28, 2014 Decided: December 8, 2014
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, RIDGELY, and VALIHURA, Justices.
ORDER
This 8th day of December 2014, upon consideration of the appellant’s
opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to
the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Jamel Daniels, filed this appeal from the Superior
Court’s denial of his second motion for postconviction relief. The State of
Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is
manifest on the face of Daniels’ opening brief that his appeal is without merit. 1
We agree and affirm.
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). (2) The record reflects that, in June 2003, a Superior Court jury found
Daniels guilty of Murder in the First Degree and Possession of a Firearm During
the Commission of a Felony. Daniels was sentenced to life imprisonment for
murder and an additional twenty years for the weapons offense. This Court
affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment on direct appeal. 2
(3) Daniels, represented by counsel, filed his first motion for
postconviction relief on March 19, 2008 and a supplemental motion on April 30,
2010. In his motions, Daniels argued that: (i) his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to retain an expert to conduct an independent examination of
DNA evidence on a cigarette butt found at the crime scene, failing to pursue the
discovery of exculpatory evidence, and failing to insist on a speedy trial; (ii) the
State failed to disclose that the DNA evidence was weak, failed to correct a
witness’ testimony concerning the accreditation of the Office of the Chief Medical
Examiner’s (“OCME”) laboratory, failed to produce recordings in which Daniels’
co-defendant Lou Price 3 did not implicate Daniels in the murder, failed to turn over
the statement of a witness who heard Price implicate two other individuals people
for the murder, and committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument;
2 Daniels v. State, 859 A.2d 1008 (Del. 2004). 3 Both Daniels Price were indicted for the murder of Kensworth Griffith, but were tried separately.
2 (iii) his right to a speedy trial was violated; and (iv) his appellate counsel provided
ineffective assistance by only raising the prosecutorial misconduct claim on appeal.
On September 22, 2010, the Superior Court denied Daniels’ postconviction
motion. The Superior Court concluded that the ineffective assistance of counsel
claims were without merit and that the other claims were procedurally barred under
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) (“Rule 61”) and without merit. Daniels filed a
pro se appeal and we affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. 4
(4) Daniels filed his second motion for postconviction relief on August 1,
2013. In this motion and supporting memorandum, Daniels argued that: (i) his trial
counsel was ineffective because Daniels could not be convicted for Murder in the
First Degree under the State’s theory of the case and the jury instructions under 11
Del. C. §§ 271 and 274; (ii) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide
contrary serological and ballistic evidence; (iii) his trial and appellate counsel were
ineffective for excluding the testimony of a witness who heard Price implicate two
other individuals people for the murder; (iv) his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained after Daniels was illegally
arrested in a drug bust conducted by Pennsylvania police the night after Griffith’s
4 Daniels v. State, 2011 WL 1900438 (Del. May 16, 2011).
3 murder; 5 (v) Pennsylvania police did not have probable cause to arrest Daniels
because he was only a passenger of the car driven by the individual who was
caught selling drugs; (vi) one of Daniels’ trial attorneys was reported to smell of
alcohol during the trial and suffered from Alzheimer’s; (vii) a witness committed
perjury in testifying about the accreditation of the OCME laboratory; (viii) the
Superior Court improperly excluded or his counsel failed to include testimony of a
witness who heard Price identify other individuals for the murder of Griffith; and
(ix) the State’s confusing or mislabeled production of materials relating to a prison
informant’s communications with Price about Price’s motive for killing Griffith,
which was different than the motive that multiple witnesses testified to at trial, was
a violation of Brady v. Maryland.6
(5) On August 1, 2014, the Superior Court denied Daniels’ second
postconviction motion. The Superior Court found that Daniels’ claims were
procedurally barred under Rule 61(i) and without merit. This appeal followed.
5 Daniels, Price, and two other individuals who testified that Daniels and Price shot Griffith at Daniels’ trial were all arrested after Price sold drugs to an undercover police officer. At that time, Price was already a suspect in Griffith’s murder. A search of the car driven by Price and occupied by Daniels revealed evidence that linked Griffith to the car. 6 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4 (6) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for
abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo. 7 The procedural requirements of
Rule 61 must be considered before addressing any substantive issues.8
(7) Daniels does not dispute that his claims were untimely under Rule
61(i)(1), repetitive under Rule 61(i)(2), procedurally defaulted under Rule 61(i)(3),
and previously adjudicated under Rule 61(i)(4). To overcome these procedural
hurdles, Daniels primarily argues that he pled a colorable claim of a miscarriage of
justice under Rule 61(i)(5) based on the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel,
appellate counsel, and postconviction counsel. Daniels contends that his counsel
was ineffective because: (i) because they failed to investigate and present favorable
evidence; (ii) Daniels could not be convicted of Murder in the First Degree under
the State’s theory of the case and the jury instructions under 11 Del. C. §§ 271 and
274; (iii) they failed to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained after Daniels
was illegally arrested in Pennsylvania or advance an argument based on the illegal
arrest; and (iv) they failed to challenge the testimony of a State witness who
committed perjury regarding the accreditation of the OCME laboratory and who
was overseen by the recently terminated director of the OCME. Daniels also
claims that the State failed to turn over exculpatory material referring to a prison
7 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 8 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
5 informant’s communications with Price about Price’s motive for killing Griffith.
Any claims that Daniels raised in the Superior Court, but failed to argue in his
opening brief are waived. 9
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JAMEL DANIELS, § § Defendant Below, § No. 474, 2014 Appellant, § § v. § Court Below—Superior Court § of the State of Delaware, STATE OF DELAWARE, § in and for New Castle County § Cr. ID No. 0107003610 Plaintiff Below, § Appellee. §
Submitted: October 28, 2014 Decided: December 8, 2014
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, RIDGELY, and VALIHURA, Justices.
ORDER
This 8th day of December 2014, upon consideration of the appellant’s
opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to
the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Jamel Daniels, filed this appeal from the Superior
Court’s denial of his second motion for postconviction relief. The State of
Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is
manifest on the face of Daniels’ opening brief that his appeal is without merit. 1
We agree and affirm.
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). (2) The record reflects that, in June 2003, a Superior Court jury found
Daniels guilty of Murder in the First Degree and Possession of a Firearm During
the Commission of a Felony. Daniels was sentenced to life imprisonment for
murder and an additional twenty years for the weapons offense. This Court
affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment on direct appeal. 2
(3) Daniels, represented by counsel, filed his first motion for
postconviction relief on March 19, 2008 and a supplemental motion on April 30,
2010. In his motions, Daniels argued that: (i) his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to retain an expert to conduct an independent examination of
DNA evidence on a cigarette butt found at the crime scene, failing to pursue the
discovery of exculpatory evidence, and failing to insist on a speedy trial; (ii) the
State failed to disclose that the DNA evidence was weak, failed to correct a
witness’ testimony concerning the accreditation of the Office of the Chief Medical
Examiner’s (“OCME”) laboratory, failed to produce recordings in which Daniels’
co-defendant Lou Price 3 did not implicate Daniels in the murder, failed to turn over
the statement of a witness who heard Price implicate two other individuals people
for the murder, and committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument;
2 Daniels v. State, 859 A.2d 1008 (Del. 2004). 3 Both Daniels Price were indicted for the murder of Kensworth Griffith, but were tried separately.
2 (iii) his right to a speedy trial was violated; and (iv) his appellate counsel provided
ineffective assistance by only raising the prosecutorial misconduct claim on appeal.
On September 22, 2010, the Superior Court denied Daniels’ postconviction
motion. The Superior Court concluded that the ineffective assistance of counsel
claims were without merit and that the other claims were procedurally barred under
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) (“Rule 61”) and without merit. Daniels filed a
pro se appeal and we affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. 4
(4) Daniels filed his second motion for postconviction relief on August 1,
2013. In this motion and supporting memorandum, Daniels argued that: (i) his trial
counsel was ineffective because Daniels could not be convicted for Murder in the
First Degree under the State’s theory of the case and the jury instructions under 11
Del. C. §§ 271 and 274; (ii) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide
contrary serological and ballistic evidence; (iii) his trial and appellate counsel were
ineffective for excluding the testimony of a witness who heard Price implicate two
other individuals people for the murder; (iv) his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained after Daniels was illegally
arrested in a drug bust conducted by Pennsylvania police the night after Griffith’s
4 Daniels v. State, 2011 WL 1900438 (Del. May 16, 2011).
3 murder; 5 (v) Pennsylvania police did not have probable cause to arrest Daniels
because he was only a passenger of the car driven by the individual who was
caught selling drugs; (vi) one of Daniels’ trial attorneys was reported to smell of
alcohol during the trial and suffered from Alzheimer’s; (vii) a witness committed
perjury in testifying about the accreditation of the OCME laboratory; (viii) the
Superior Court improperly excluded or his counsel failed to include testimony of a
witness who heard Price identify other individuals for the murder of Griffith; and
(ix) the State’s confusing or mislabeled production of materials relating to a prison
informant’s communications with Price about Price’s motive for killing Griffith,
which was different than the motive that multiple witnesses testified to at trial, was
a violation of Brady v. Maryland.6
(5) On August 1, 2014, the Superior Court denied Daniels’ second
postconviction motion. The Superior Court found that Daniels’ claims were
procedurally barred under Rule 61(i) and without merit. This appeal followed.
5 Daniels, Price, and two other individuals who testified that Daniels and Price shot Griffith at Daniels’ trial were all arrested after Price sold drugs to an undercover police officer. At that time, Price was already a suspect in Griffith’s murder. A search of the car driven by Price and occupied by Daniels revealed evidence that linked Griffith to the car. 6 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4 (6) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for
abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo. 7 The procedural requirements of
Rule 61 must be considered before addressing any substantive issues.8
(7) Daniels does not dispute that his claims were untimely under Rule
61(i)(1), repetitive under Rule 61(i)(2), procedurally defaulted under Rule 61(i)(3),
and previously adjudicated under Rule 61(i)(4). To overcome these procedural
hurdles, Daniels primarily argues that he pled a colorable claim of a miscarriage of
justice under Rule 61(i)(5) based on the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel,
appellate counsel, and postconviction counsel. Daniels contends that his counsel
was ineffective because: (i) because they failed to investigate and present favorable
evidence; (ii) Daniels could not be convicted of Murder in the First Degree under
the State’s theory of the case and the jury instructions under 11 Del. C. §§ 271 and
274; (iii) they failed to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained after Daniels
was illegally arrested in Pennsylvania or advance an argument based on the illegal
arrest; and (iv) they failed to challenge the testimony of a State witness who
committed perjury regarding the accreditation of the OCME laboratory and who
was overseen by the recently terminated director of the OCME. Daniels also
claims that the State failed to turn over exculpatory material referring to a prison
7 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 8 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
5 informant’s communications with Price about Price’s motive for killing Griffith.
Any claims that Daniels raised in the Superior Court, but failed to argue in his
opening brief are waived. 9
(8) To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant
must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different.10 Conclusory and unsupported claims of prejudice are insufficient to
establish ineffective assistance; a defendant must make and substantiate concrete
claims of actual prejudice.11 Daniels does not make or substantiate any concrete
claims of actual prejudice in support of his conclusory claim that his counsel failed
to investigate and present favorable evidence. Multiple witnesses testified that
Daniels was Price’s right-hand man, there was eyewitness testimony that Daniels
shot Price, and Daniels’ DNA appeared on a cigarette butt at the scene of the
murder. Daniels identifies nothing his counsel should have discovered that raises a
reasonable probability of a different outcome.
9 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 14(b)(vi)(A)(3); Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 10 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-92 (1984). 11 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d at 1196.
6 (9) As far as his claim that his counsel failed to recognize or argue that he
could not be convicted of Murder in the First Degree, Daniels is mistaken in his
belief that he could only be convicted under an accomplice theory of liability. The
State requested jury instructions on accomplice liability, but Daniels’ counsel
objected. The Superior Court found there was no evidentiary basis for accomplice
liability instructions because the State presented evidence at trial that both Price
and Daniels shot Griffith.
(10) In arguing that his counsel should have moved to suppress evidence
obtained after Price was illegally arrested in Pennsylvania or make an argument
based on his illegal arrest, Daniels ignores the events leading to the identification
of his DNA on a cigarette butt at the scene of the murder and his identity as one of
the shooters. Multiple witnesses identified Price as a suspect in Griffith’s murder
and Daniels as Price’s right-hand man. Police also determined that Price and
Daniels smoked cigarettes, but that the other individuals in Price’s car the night
after the shooting did not smoke cigarettes. Based on this information, police
obtained a search warrant for a blood sample from Daniels and matched the sample
to DNA on the cigarette butt. There was also eyewitness testimony that Daniels
shot Griffith. Daniels has thus failed to substantiate any concrete allegations of
actual prejudice resulting from the lack of a motion to suppress or argument based
on illegal arrest (even assuming there was a basis for such a motion or argument).
7 (11) Daniels’ claim that his counsel should have challenged the credibility
of an OCME witness who testified in 2003 because she was overseen by someone
who was terminated in 2014 was not raised in the Superior Court and will not be
considered for the first time on appeal.12 Daniels also claims that his counsel failed
to challenge the witness’ alleged perjury regarding the accreditation of the OCME
laboratory. This claim is not supported by the record. The accreditation issue was
raised by Daniels’ counsel in his first postconviction motion and rejected by the
Superior Court.
(12) The emails offered by Daniels in support of this claim suggest, at
most, that the OCME laboratory was accredited by Forensic Quality Services
rather than National Forensic Science Technology. Daniels has not substantiated
any concrete claims of actual prejudice that he suffered as a result of his trial
counsel and appellate counsel not discovering this minor mistake. Under these
circumstances, Daniels’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims do not constitute a
colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice under Rule 61(i)(5).
(13) Turning to Daniels’ Brady claim, it appears from the record that
materials relating to a prison informant’s communications with Price were turned
over to Daniels’ counsel. The materials reflect that one of Price’s reasons for
killing Griffith was that Griffith knew of another murder committed by Price. At
12 Supr. Ct. R. 8.
8 trial, multiple witnesses testified that Price killed Griffith because Griffith owed
him money. Given the testimony that Daniels was Price’s right-hand man and shot
Griffith, it is highly unlikely that evidence of Price having another motive to kill
Griffith would have had any impact on the outcome of the trial. Daniels thus fails
to state a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice based on this evidence.
(14) To the extent Daniels tries to argue that all or some of his claims
should be reconsidered in the interest of justice under Rule 61(i)(4), he fails to
offer any arguments in support of this claim. An appellant must state the merits of
an argument in his opening brief or that argument will be waived. 13 Daniels fails
to state the merits of this argument and has therefore waived it. 14
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that motion to affirm is GRANTED
and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen L. Valihura Justice
13 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 14(b)(vi)(A)(3). 14 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d at 1152.