Daniels v. Rester

• Court: District Court, E.D. Louisiana
• Decided: September 23, 2020
• Docket: 2:18-cv-05292
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CLARENCE ANTOINE DANIELS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER: 18-5292

JUSTIN RESTER, ET AL. O RDER A ND RE ASONSSECTION: “S”(5)

Before the Court is the motion for summary judgment of the sole Defendant remaining in this matter, Sergeant Justin Rester. (Rec. doc. 65). Plaintiff has filed no 1/ memorandum in opposition to Defendant’s motion. For the reasons that follow, it is ordered that Defendant’s motion is granted and that Plaintiff’s suit is dismissed. This is a 42 U.S.C. §1983 proceeding that comes before the Court upon the consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). (Rec. doc. 39). Following earlier motion practice in this case, all claims against all Defendants were dismissed except for Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim against Sergeant Rester in his individual capacity. (Rec. docs. 29, 34, 45). In his complaint, Plaintiff, an inmate of the B.B. “Sixty” Rayburn Correctional Center (“RCC”) in Angie, Louisiana, complained of an incident that occurred on March 7, 2017 in which Rester allegedly yanked his arm through a “hatch tray” in his cell door, causing swelling to his wrist area and multiple lacerations. (Rec. docs. 1, 7, 19). Rester now moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s remaining excessive force claim. 1 / Johnson v. Colvin As Plaintiff has filed no memorandum in response to DBeefeannd va.n Bta’sr mnhoatriton, timely or otherwise, the Court may proJpoenrelys va.s Lsaurmpeen thteart he has no opposition to it. , No. 14-CV-0401, 2014 WLa 4d1o8p6te7d90 at *1 n. 1 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2014)(citing Local Rule 7.5L auncda s v. Crowe , 473 F.Supp. 2d 739, 741 (E.D. Tex. 2007)); ad, oNpot.e 1d3-CV-0056, 2013 WL 1947243 at *1 n. 1 (E.D. La. Apr. 12, 2013), , 2013 WL 1947188 (E.D. La. May 10, 2013)(same); , No. 11B-rCaVly-2 v7. T5r2a, i2l013 WL 870514 at *1 n. 1 (E.D. La. Feb. 15, 2013), , 2013 WL 870437 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 2013)(same). Of course, a motion like the Before discussing the competent evidence supporting Defendant’s motion, the Court will recall the well-established standards governing Rule 56 motions like the one at hand. Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(c) when no genuine isCseuleo teoxf

mCoartpe.r iva.l Cfaactrt eetxtists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. , 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986). Although all inferences drawn from the evidence are to be resolved in theS pneolnlm-maonv va.n St’hs aflaavlaor, he may not rest on the mere th allegations or denials in his pleadings. , 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5 Cir. 1993). Rather, once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who bears the burden of proof at triaKl,a tnos as hRoewin wsuirtha n“c’sei gvn. ifCicoanngt. pMroorbtagtaivgee’ Ceovripd.e onfc eT”e xtahsat there exists a triable factual issue. In re: Municipal Bond th Reporting Antitrust Litig., 20 F.3d 1362, 1371 (5 Cir. 1994)(quoting th , 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5 Cir. 1982)). That burden is not satisfied by “… ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ … by ‘conclLuistotlrey v a. lLleiqguaitdio Anisr,’ C…o rbpy. ‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ … or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence.” , th 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5 Cir. 1994)(en banc)(citations omitted). Rather, the nonmovant “… must adduce admissible evidence which creates a fact issue concerning the existence of every essentiaMl caottmerp oonf eLnetw oifs vtihllaet Ppraorptyer’st iecsa,s eIn; cn.aked assertions of an actual dispute will th not suffice.” , 849 F.2d 946, 950 (5 Cir. 1998). The insufficiency of the proof must be suPchhil ltihpas t Oitil wCoou vld. OpKreCv eCnotr pa. rational finder of fact from th findincge rfto. rd ethneie dnon-moving party. , 812 F.2d 265, 272-73 (5 Cir.), , 484 U.S. 851, 108 S.Ct. 152 (1987). Among the arguments advanced by the Defendant in support of his motion for summary judgment is his entitlement to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly establisLhyetlde svt. aBtuextoarry C oour nctoyn, Tsteitxuatsional rights of which a reasonable person th would have known.” Gobert , v5.6 0C aFl.d3wd e4ll04, 409 (5 Cir. 2009)(citation th and internal Aqnudoetartsioonn vm. aCrrkesig hotmointted); , 463 F.3d 339, 345 (5 Cir. 2006)(citing , 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038 (1987)). In determining whether a governmental official is entitled to qualified immunity, the appropriate inquiry is: (1) whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and (2) whether the official’s actions vioIlda.ted that Hrioghpte tvo. tPheelz eerxtent that an objectively reasonable person would have known. (citing , 5P3e6a rUso.Sn. 7v3 0C,a 1ll2a2h aSn.Ct. 2508 (2002)). Those two prongs may be considered in either order. , 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818 (2009). In the sBurmowmna rvy. jCuadlglamheannt context, qualified immunity shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff. th , 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5 Cir. 2010). Thus, in order to rebut Sergeant Rester’s qualified immunity defense here, Plaintiff must establish that: (1) the Defendant’s allegedly wrongful conduct amounted to excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment and (2) a genuIdin. e issue of material fact exists regarding the reasonableness of the Defendant’s conduct. It is well-established that the unnecessary and wanton inflictionH oufd spoanin v c. oMncsMtitilulatens cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. , 503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct. 995, 998 (1992). In evaluating a claim of alleged use of excessive force by a prison official, the Supreme Court has opined that “... the core judicial inquiry is … whether force was applied in a good-faiItdh. effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” , 503 U.S. at 6-7, 112 S.Ct. at 999. In order to prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must first prove up a subjective component by establishing that “… the defendanMt oasclteeyd mv. alWicihoiutesly and sadistically in an ‘unnecessary and th wanton inflictiHonu dsoofn pain.’” , 464 Fed.Appx. 206, 211-12 (5 Cir. 2010)(quoting , 503 U.S. at 8, 112 S.Ct. at 1000). To make this determination, a court should consider: (1) the extent of the injury suffered; (2) the need for the application of force; (3) the relationship between the need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the respoBnasilbdlwe ino ffvi.c iSatla; ladnedr (5) any efforts made to temper the th sHeuvdesroitny v.o Mf caM filolarcneful response. , 137 F.3d 836, 839 (5 Cir. 1998); th , 962 F.2d 522, 523 (5 Cir. 1992). In addition to the subjective component, a plaintiff must also establish an objective component, which requires that a prisoner demonstrate that the alleHguedds ownrongdoing was objectively “harmful enough” to establish a constitutional violation. , 503 U.S. at 8, 112 S.Ct. at 999. Not every mIadle. volent touch, push, or shove by a prison official gives rise to a federal dcea umsein oimf iasction. at 9, 112 S.Ct. at 1000. “Thusp, rai mpaar tfayc’si eclaim must allege more than a uMsoe solef yphysical force in order to stateE aa son v. Holt case of an Eighth Amendment violation.” de m, 4in6i4m Fised.Appx. at 212 (citing , 73 F.3d 600, 604 th n. 24 (5 Cir. 1996)). “The use of physical force is excluded from ‘coInds.titutional rHeucdosgonnition,’ unless it is of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’’ (quoting , 503 U.S. at 9-10, 112 S.Ct. at 1000). Although there is no categorical requirement that the physical injury be sigLnaicfeicya vn.t G, saelvrieosutos,n o Cro munotrye Sthhearnif fm’s iDnoerp,t .“… it is clear that some physical injury is required.” , No. 06-CV-0441, 2008 WL 624615 at *6 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2008). If a prisoner fails to establish either the sMuobsjelecytive or objective components, “… there is not a valid Eighth Amendment claim.” , 464 Fed.Appx. at 212. RCC Directive #3.1.13 provides that “… handcuffs will be applied to offenders

behind their back with the thumbs up, palms out, and the keyhole pointed out.” (Rec. doc. 65-6, p. 3). The Directive goes on as follows: When applying handcuffs behind the back of cellblock offenders, the officer will give the offender instructions to place his back to the cell door and place his hands through the cell trap with his thumbs up and palms out. The officer will place one cuff on one of the offender’s wrists with the double bar up and the keyhole facing out. Control of the handcuffs will be maintained while the other bracelet is applied in the same manner. The officer will ensure that the handcuffs are not placed too tightly on the offender’s wrists by placing his/her little finger between the handcuffs and the inside of the offenders’ wrist and then tightening the cuffs until snug. The handcuffs will then be double locked.

Restraints will be removed in reverse order. Id. 2/ at p. 4.

The Court has carefully reviewed the central pieces of evidence supporting Defendant’s motion, namely, two segments of video footage taken from surveillance cameras situated within RCC which capture the incident in question and the events immediately preceding and following it. In the first clip, Sergeant Rester can be seen first restraining and then escorting Plaintiff from the shower area of Sleet 4L back to his cell located on the same tier. In compliance with Directive #3.1.13 set forth above, Plaintiff dutifully turned around and placed his back to the cell door of the shower area, placed his hands through the trap in the cell door, and the handcuffs were successfully applied to his wrists by Rester, at which point Plaintiff steps away, turns, and faces the cell door. The See shower cell door is then opened and Rester begins escorting Plaintiff to his cell, cell number 8. (Ex. B). Once Plaintiff and Rester arrived at cell number 8, Plaintiff entered the cell and

Rester ordered the cell door to be closed. Plaintiff initially complied with the Directive by turning around and placing his back and cuffed wrists to the cell door to allow Rester to remove the handcuffs through the cell trap. After Rester had successfully removed the handcuffs from Plaintiff’s left wrist, Plaintiff suddenly and without warning began to turn around and attempted to pull his right handcuffed wrist from Rester’s control and into his cell. At that point, in an effort to maintain control of the handcuffs, Rester immediately pulled the handcuffs that remained attached to Plaintiff’s right wrist through the tray hatch and attempted to go to a sitting position to use his body weight to counter the resistance

being offered by Plaintiff. Within mere seconds, Rester is able to gain control over Plaintiff’s right arm and he stands up to begin his second attempt to remove the handcuffs. Sergeant Nathaniel Graham arrives on the scene shortly thereafter and assists Rester by gaining control of Plaintiff’s left arm and bringing it through the bars. Once that was accomplished, Rester continues his attempt to remove the handcuff remaining on Plaintiff’s right wrist only to discover that the key had broken due to Plaintiff’s resistance. Sergeant Graham can then be seen using his cuff key to remove the remaining cuff from Plaintiff’s right wrist. The handcuffs were fully removed from Plaintiff’s right wrist and all force

stopped immediately. Based upon a review of the video, it does not appear that Plaintiff was in any apparent pain or distress. From the time that the door to Plaintiff’s cell was closed until the handcuffs were fully removed from his wrists was less than one minute. (Ex. C). Following the incident, Plaintiff, Rester, and Sergeant Graham were all evaluated by Nurse Luper for a post use of force exam. The records documenting that evaluation reveal that Plaintiff suffered only abrasions/redness to his right upper arm with no injuries to his

wrist or multiple lacerations as alleged by Plaintiff in his complaint. (Rec. doc. 65-9, pp. 4- 5). Plaintiff was subsequently seen by medical personnel on MaIdrc.h 9 and 22, 2017 for unknown pWaiilnk itnos hvis. rGiaghdtd yarm and was treated only with Motrin. ( at pp. 2, 3). In , 559 U.S. 34,H 3u8d,s o1n30 S.Ct. 1175, 1178-79 (2010) the Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier holding in that courts evaluating Eighth Amendment excess force claim must focus on the nature of the force applied rather than a certain quantum of injury. Nevertheless, the “absence of sBearlidowusin injury,H” uthdes ofnirst of the five factors identified by the Fifth Circuit in cases such as aWndi lkins , remains a relevant

consideration in evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim. , 559 U.S. at 3d7e- m38in, i1m3i0s S.Ct. at 1178. The Fifth Circuit has thus found “straPirne”s ttoo na vp.r Hisiocnkesr’s arm to be a injury excluded from constitutional recognition. , 721 Fed.Appx. 342, 344- th 45 (5 Cir. 2018). Injuries falling within this category also incluMdeo smleoymentary blindness, cuts and abrasions in and around tLheee e vy.e ,W ainlsdo nan infected eye, , 464 Fed.Appx. at th 213; a “busted lip” and headaches, Siglar , v2. 3H7i gFhetdo.wAeprpx. 965, 966 (5 Cir. 2007); th and, a sore, bruised ear lasting three days. , 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5 Cir. 1997). Other courts have similarly concluded that alledgea tmioinnsi moifs swBaenllginmg oann dv . pLaainn cteo the hand which was treated with ice and painkillers were , , No. 18-CV-0019, 2019 WL 5653731 at *5 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2019), and that for a particular injury to be constitutionally significant and actionable, it would have to be more than a sore muscle, an aching back, a scratch, an abrasion, or a bruise of the type which would not Luong v. Hatt otherwise force a free-world person tSoe es eaelks op rSopfievsesyio vn.a Wl milseodnical care. , 979 F.Supp. 481, 486 (N.D. Tex. 1997). , No. 17-CV-0094, 2019 WL 5095629 at *9 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 27d, e2 m01in9i)m(cisontusions and three small lacerations treated

with Dermabond and Tylenol were ). The objective findings in the medical records supporting Defendant’s motion do not evince injuries consistent with the alleWgaitlibounrsn sve.t Sfhoartnhe in Plaintiff’s complaint, which may thus be considered to be Wimepsslaouns ivb. leO.g lesby , 193 F.3d 517, 1999 WL 706141 at th th *1 (5 Cir. 1999)(citing , 910 F.2d 278, 281-82 (5 Cir. 1990). Because Plaintiff has failed to submit any summary judgment evidenced ec omnitnriomviesrting the Defendant’s evidence and establishing that he suffered more than a physical injury as a result of the March 7, 2017 incident (or that Rester’s use of force was repugnant to the conscience Moof smleaynkind), summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is warranted here. , 464 Fed.Appx. at 213 (in summary judgment context, PWlaiinlstoifnf vb.e Tarasy leovridentiary burden to show that injurcieerst w. deernei eodbjectively “harmful enough”); th , 100 Fed.Appx. 282, 283 (5 Cir), , 543 U.S. 965, 125 S.Ct. 413 (2004). Having carefully viewed the video evidence, the Court is also left with the inescapable conclusion that the brief use of force employed by Rester, which lasted less than one minute, was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain and restore discipline and was not done maliciously or Hsauddissotincally to cause harm and resulted in an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. , 503 U.S. at 6-8, 112 S.Ct. at 999-1000. For these reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted and Plaintiff’s suit is dismissed. Judgment will be entered accordingly2. 3rd September New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2020. MICHAEL B. NORTH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE