Daniels v. Menard Correctional Center

District Court, S.D. Illinois·Decided April 2, 2021·No. 3:19-cv-00394·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DARRIAN DANIELS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 19-cv-394-RJD ) JOHN BALDWIN and JACQUELINE ) LASHBROOK, ) ) Defendants.

ORDER DALY, Magistrate Judge: This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment on Exhaustion filed by Defendants John Baldwin and Jacqueline Lashbrook (Doc. 76). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED. Background Plaintiff Darrian Daniels, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff set forth the following claims in his Amended Complaint (Doc. 42): Count One: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendants Dumstorff and Mills for assaulting Plaintiff on November 30, 2018.

Count Six: Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Lashbrook and Baldwin for ignoring Plaintiff’s complaints that he was denied yard, showers, legal calls, and food trays by Dumstorff and Mills before the assaults on November 30, 2018.

Count Seven: Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Lashbrook and Baldwin for ignoring Plaintiff’s complaints that he was being threatened by Dumstorff and Mills prior to the assault on November 30, 2018. Page 1 of 7 On September 10, 2020, Defendants Dumstorff and Mills were dismissed without prejudice by an order of the Court finding Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to these Defendants prior to filing this lawsuit (Doc.71). Thus, Plaintiff now proceeds in this action only on claims Six and Seven against Lashbrook and Baldwin. Lashbrook and Baldwin move for summary judgment asserting Plaintiff also failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his lawsuit against them. Lashbrook and Baldwin assert the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) only received two grievances, dated December 11, 2018 and October 30, 2019, from Plaintiff since November 2018. Defendants remark that although the October 30, 2019 grievance concerned the issues in this lawsuit, it was not timely filed. This grievance was submitted as an emergency grievance, but the warden found an emergency was not substantiated on November 1, 2019 (see Doc. 82 at 3). The ARB received this grievance on November 14, 2019, along with a handwritten letter from Plaintiff, and denied the same on November 19, 2019 (see Doc. 82 at 2). In its response, the ARB indicated that the grievance was not submitted in the timeframe outlined in Department Rule 504, noting no dates

were given within the timeframe to file a grievance (see id.). Defendants do not set forth any argument as to Plaintiff’s December 11, 2018 grievance. In response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff asserts the October 30, 2019 grievance does not have “anything to do with these Defendants at the time the claims arose” in his complaint. Plaintiff explains Lashbrook was not the warden and Baldwin was not the director at the time. Plaintiff argues, however, that this grievance evidences his efforts to file grievances on the issues in the complaint. Plaintiff further explains that his October 30, 2019 grievance was filed for another case, Daniels v. Brown, et al. Plaintiff explains his December 11, 2018 grievance was a resubmission of a previously Page 2 of 7 filed grievance. Plaintiff asserts this was his third attempt at submitting this grievance due to his transfer to Stateville Correctional Center, and that he only modified the grievance by writing the date of December 11, 2018 at the top. Plaintiff asserts he sent this grievance directly to the ARB because his complaints occurred in Stateville, but he was currently incarcerated at Menard (see Doc. 82 at 8). This grievance was received by the ARB on December 14, 2018, and returned on

December 17, 2018 because it was not submitted within the timeframe outlined in Department Rule 504 (see Doc. 82 at 7). Plaintiff asserts he never received this response from the ARB. In response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff states that his first properly filed grievance, dated November 30, 2018, was ignored by Menard administration and due to “unconstitutional conduct,” he was made to submit a handwritten copy of this grievance on notebook paper. Plaintiff asserts he did not receive a proper response to this grievance so he moved to the next stage of administrative review and submitted a copy to the ARB. Plaintiff asserts his grievance was ignored and never returned. Plaintiff writes that his November 30, 2018 grievance was filed within 60 days of the incident and set forth as many details as possible, including specific names,

dates, and facts. Legal Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary Page 3 of 7 judgment is made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In considering a summary judgment motion, the district court views

the facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Exhaustion Requirements Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), prisoners are required to exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing lawsuits in federal court. “[A] prisoner who does not properly take each step within the administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] suit filed by a prisoner before administrative remedies have been exhausted must be dismissed; the district court lacks discretion

to resolve the claim on the merits, even if the prisoner exhausts intra-prison remedies before judgment.” Perez v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). “[A]ll dismissals under § 1997e(a) should be without prejudice.” Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004).

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Daniels v. Menard Correctional Center, (S.D. Ill. 2021).

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