Daniels v. Langensand

96 S.W.2d 911, 96 S.W.2d 111, 231 Mo. App. 777, 1936 Mo. App. LEXIS 200
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 6, 1936
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 96 S.W.2d 911 (Daniels v. Langensand) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Daniels v. Langensand, 96 S.W.2d 911, 96 S.W.2d 111, 231 Mo. App. 777, 1936 Mo. App. LEXIS 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936).

Opinion

*781 HOSTETTER, P. J.

This is a suit for damages for personal injuries claimed to have been sustained by plaintiff in a collision between his automobile and a milk wagon drawn by a horse, which ivas driven by George Ahrens, an employee of the defendant.

The collision occurred between 12:30 and one o’clock on- the morning of June 7, 1925, on South Jefferson Avenue some seventy-five or 100 feet south of its intersection with Miami Street, in the city of St.' Louis, Missouri, which intersection was controlled by electric traffic signals. ;

Jefferson Avenue was a brick paved street, running generally in a north and south direction, about sixty feet wide from curb to curb and containing a.double set of street car tracks about fifteen feet wide in all located in the center of the street, thus leaving a space of about fifteen feet between the outermost rail on either side and the curb. Miami Street is an east and west street, and Winnebago Street is the next street south of Miami, which also intersects Jefferson Avenue, and the block between these two intersecting streets is about 600 feet long. The next street south of Winnebago is Chippewa, and farther south is Keokuk-Street.

Plaintiff’s original petition, which was filed on the 9th of September, 1925, charged that he “was run over and against” by the milk wagon and sustained serious and permanent injuries and his machine damaged in the sum of $200 on account of defendant’s negligence and asked for $5000 damages.

*782 On May 27, 1927, plaintiff filed an amended petition.

• On April 10, 1929, plaintiff filed bis second amended petition in which he asked judgment for $15,000 damages. On June 5, 1933, plaintiff amended his second amended petition by interlineation.

On April 11, 1929, a trial was concluded in which the jury returned a verdict for $1250 in favor of plaintiff, which was set aside by the trial court on the ground that it was against the weight of the evidence.

The petition, as finally amended, was substantially as follows:

That on June 7, 1925, plaintiff was driving and operating an automobile northwardly on south Jefferson Avenue, at or near its intersection with Miami Street, and that defendant’s agent and servant, driving a horsedrawn milk wagon along said street, suddenly turned said milk wagon to the left, whereby it collided with and struck plaintiff’s automobile, thereby injuring him through the negligence of defendant’s agent and servant.

Seven specific charges of negligence were set out, viz.:

1. Failure to give signal of the turning;

2. Failure to exercise ordinary care to discover plaintiff’s automobile on the street;

3. Failure to stop, slacken speed, turn or swerve so as to avoid the collision;

4. Failure to have the vehicle under control so as to be readily stopped;

5. Failure to observe the humanitarian doctrine;

6. Violation of City Ordinance No.- 32926, Section 3, Par. H.;

7. Violation of Section 3, Par. K. of same ordinance.

Defendant’s answer consisted of a general denial and a plea of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff, viz.; (a) the driving of his automobile in excess of twenty-five miles per hour in violation of statute and of city ordinance, thereby creating presumption of negligence; (b) failure to drive automobile as close to right hand side of street in violation of statute and city ordinance; (c) failure to give warning of approach of automobile; (d) violation of humanitarian rule.

Defendant also set up his counterclaim, asking judgment for $100 damages to the milk wagon and $50 damage to the horse, on account of alleged negligence of defendant, catalogued as follows:

1. Excessive speed.
2. Failure to sound horn.
3. Failure to discover horse and milk wagon.

4. Failure to stop, slacken speed, turn or swerve automobile so as to avoid collision.

5. Negligently swerving and turning automobile thereby causing collision.

*783 6. Failure to keep movement of automobile under control.

7. Violation of humanitarian rule.

8. Driving in excess of twenty-five miles an hour for distance of one block, in violation of statute and city ordinance, thereby creating a presumption of negiigence.

9. Failing to keep automobile as close to right curb' as practical, in violation of statute and city ordinance.

Eeply was a general denial of answer and counterclaim.

The cause was tried a second time and concluded on September 21, 1933, and the jury brought in a verdict in favor of plaintiff on his cause of action for $4304.11 and in favor of defendant on his counter claim for $88, which the trial court refused to accept and, after further deliberation, nine jfirors brought in a verdict in' favor of plaintiff on his cause of action for $3358, and in favor of plaintiff on defendant’s counterclaim, upon which a judgment was rendered and, after an unavailing motion for a new trial, an appeal was duly perfected by defendant to this court.

Plaintiff’s version of the accident is as follows:

“The accident occurred between 12:30 and 1 in the morning, at Jefferson and Miami. At that time I lived at 3507 Caroline Street. At the time of the accident I was going home from my work. My last stop had been on Broadway, one block south of Itaska, to service an electric sign om a windmill there. I was alone at the time. ’ I was driving my Chevrolet automobile, touring car. I entered Jefferson avenue at Chippewa. Jefferson avenue there has car tracks in the center. It is around fifty or sixty feet wide. I had headlights burning on my car. I saw the milk wagon before the accident, going north in the car track, practically on the northbound car track. At the time I first observed it I was about a block away from it, about Winnebago. At that time I would jüdge I was going between twenty and twenty-five. I seen the stop sign at the intersection of Miami just about the same time I observed the milk wagon. It had the red light, said ‘Stop.’ I slackened my speed to about fifteen miles an hour. The stop sign turned and put the green light on, and I put on the gas to go around the milk wagon. The two wheels of my automobile on the right side were in the northbound car track until I got within fifteen or twenty feet of the milk wagon; then I went to turn out to go around him, and just as I did he swerved his horse right in front of me.
“Q. Where was the back end of this wagon with respect to your automobile ? A. I guess I was around fifteen or twenty feet behind him.
• “Q. You turned to your left, did you? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. About how fast were you going in miles per hour? A. I would judge about twenty miles.

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Bluebook (online)
96 S.W.2d 911, 96 S.W.2d 111, 231 Mo. App. 777, 1936 Mo. App. LEXIS 200, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/daniels-v-langensand-moctapp-1936.