Daniels v. Dunson

2023 Ohio 4686

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 22, 2023
• Docket: 29873
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Daniels v. Dunson, 2023-Ohio-4686.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

KEITH DANIELS : : Appellee : C.A. No. 29873 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2023 CV 03710 : DORIAN DUNSON : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :

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OPINION

Rendered on December 22, 2023

DORIAN DUNSON, Pro Se Appellant

KEITH DANIELS, Pro Se Appellee

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EPLEY, J.

{¶ 1} Dorian Dunson, pro se, appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery County

Court of Common Pleas, which issued a civil stalking protection order (CSPO) against

him after a full hearing. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be

affirmed. -2-

I. Procedural History

{¶ 2} On July 17, 2023, Keith Daniels sought a CSPO against Dunson, claiming

that Dunson had threatened him with violence twice during the prior week. Daniels also

alleged that Dunson had called his workplace with threats and that he could not go outside

without Dunson staring at him. Daniels asked for and received an ex parte CSPO, which

indicated that a full hearing would be held on August 1, 2023. Dunson was served with

the ex parte CSPO on July 19, 2023.

{¶ 3} Both parties appeared for the August 1 hearing. Two days later, the trial

court issued a CSPO, effective until December 31, 2024. In its factual findings, the court

stated that it found Daniels credible and that he had established by a preponderance of

the evidence that Dunson had engaged in a pattern of conduct which reasonably caused

Daniels to fear physical harm. The court specified that on July 13, 2023, Dunson had

yelled at Daniels in a rage and stated that he would “put hot lead” in him; Daniels

understood the threat to mean that Dunson would shoot him. In addition, on July 15,

2023, Dunson had again yelled at Daniels in a rage, retrieved a sword or machete from

inside his apartment, and then brought it outside to where Daniels was standing and

swung it at him. The court ordered, among other things, that Dunson stay at least 50

feet away from Daniels. The court noted that the two men were neighbors in an

apartment complex and that Dunson’s physical presence within his apartment would not

be a violation, although Dunson could not be in any common areas with Daniels.

{¶ 4} Dunson appeals from the trial court’s order. He has not stated any

assignments of error as required by the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure, but we infer -3-

that he is challenging the issuance of the CSPO as against the manifest weight of the

evidence. On appeal, Dunson argues that Daniels lied in his petition, and he disputes

the trial court’s factual finding that he came at Daniels with a sword. According to

Dunson, he stood on his front porch, pointed his machete at Daniels, and called him a

thief and a liar. Dunson claims that, with Daniels’s permission, he had placed firearms

in the glove compartment of Daniels’s vehicle and those firearms disappeared. Dunson

asks that we lift the protection order and require Daniels to return his firearms.

II. Law and Analysis

{¶ 5} R.C. 2903.214 provides for the issuance of protection orders for persons who

are victims of menacing by stalking. See Clements v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

29311, 2022-Ohio-1959, ¶ 8. The petitioner may request an ex parte order, and a

hearing must be held as soon as possible, but no later than the next day that court is in

session after the petition is filed. R.C. 2903.214(D)(1). If an ex parte order is issued,

the court generally must schedule a full hearing within 10 days of the ex parte hearing.

R.C. 2903.214(D)(2)(a).

{¶ 6} To merit a civil protection order under R.C. 2903.214, “the petitioner need not

prove that the respondent intended to cause actual harm to the other person; instead, the

evidence must show that the respondent knowingly engaged in a pattern of conduct that

caused the other person to believe that the respondent will cause physical harm or that

caused mental distress to the other person.” Stump v. Hoagland, 2d Dist. Miami No.

2014-CA-26, 2015-Ohio-2434, ¶ 5, quoting Walker v. Edgington, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2007-

CA-75, 2008-Ohio-3478, ¶ 23. -4-

{¶ 7} “In weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful of the

presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-

Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 21. Because the trier of fact sees and hears the

witnesses, we must defer to the factfinder’s decisions whether, and to what extent, to

credit the testimony of particular witnesses. Stump at ¶ 7, citing Seitz v. Harvey, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 25867, 2015-Ohio-122, ¶ 41. The fact that the evidence or testimony

is subject to different interpretations does not mean the judgment is against the manifest

weight of the evidence. E.g., Peterson v. Booth, 2023-Ohio-1301, 213 N.E.3d 251, ¶ 30

(2d Dist.).

{¶ 8} In this case, no transcript of the full hearing has been filed, as required by

App.R. 9(B). Without a written transcript, we have no record of the evidence presented

at the hearing, and we cannot speculate about what was said. In short, we have no basis

upon which to review the trial court’s factual findings or legal conclusions. See Farley v.

McKenzie, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29217, 2022-Ohio-281, ¶ 6. Rather, “we are

constrained to presume the regularity of the trial court’s proceedings and that the

evidence before the trial court supported the trial court’s judgment.” (Citations omitted.)

Payne v. Payne, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27584, 2017-Ohio-8912, ¶ 7. Given the

limited record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in issuing the CSPO

against Dunson.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 9} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.

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TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.