Danielle Parker v. Comcast Cable Communications

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 24, 2018
• Docket: 17-16318
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 24 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DANIELLE PARKER, No. 17-16318

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-05673-TEH

v. MEMORANDUM* COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT, LLC,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Thelton E. Henderson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 17, 2018** San Francisco, California

Before: M. SMITH and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,*** Judge.

Danielle Parker (“Appellant”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. judgment in favor of Comcast Cable Communications Management, LLC,

(“Comcast”) on her claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy;

namely, termination on the basis of disability contrary to the California Fair

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). Appellant contends that there was a

triable issue of material fact regarding Comcast’s knowledge of her purported

disability prior to termination. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

and we affirm.

The facts cited by Appellant are insufficient to establish a prima facie case

of discrimination. See Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 354 (2000)

(adopting the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) burden-

shifting framework for California state-law discrimination claims). Appellant was

unable to prove that Comcast had any knowledge of her purported disability prior

to her termination. Appellant’s medical notes were insufficiently detailed to make

Comcast aware that she may be suffering from a disability. Regardless, Comcast

did not know about or receive the medical notes before making the decision to

terminate Appellant for missing a terminable number of workdays.

Appellant’s other arguments are not well taken. Contrary to Appellant’s

assertions, discriminatory motive is an element Appellant must demonstrate in

order to establish a prima facie case for discrimination under the FEHA. See id.

(2000) (noting that plaintiff must satisfy circumstances that suggest discriminatory

2 motive). By contrast, the district court properly rejected her underlying claims for

failure to provide a reasonable accommodation and failure to engage in the

interactive process based on the finding that Comcast had not been put on notice of

any need to act, not due to any improper requirement that Appellant show a

discriminatory motive. Finally, Appellant abandoned arguments about the changes

Appellant proposed to her deposition transcript because she failed to discuss this

point other than noting it in the “Issues Presented” section of her opening brief.

See Kohler v. Inter-Tel Technologies, 244 F.3d 1167, 1182 (9th Cir. 2001)

(holding that issues raised in a brief’s statement of issues that are unsupported by

argument are deemed abandoned).

AFFIRMED.