Danielczuk v. Ansonia Brd., Apport. Txn., No. Cv98062818 (Jan. 12, 2000)

2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 568
Connecticut Superior Court·Decided January 12, 2000·No. No. CV98062818·Unpublished

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
The plaintiffs, members of the Board of Aldermen ("Aldermen") for the city of Ansonia, seek a declaratory judgment from the court as to a dispute with the defendant, the Ansonia Board of Apportionment and Taxation ("Board"). Specifically, the plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment as to the right of the Aldermen to set salaries of certain city employees which salaries, in turn, must be funded by the Board. The Aldermen ask that the court decide whether the Board has the right to reduce estimates submitted by the Aldermen.

"An action for declaratory judgment is a special proceeding."Wilson v. Kelley, 224 Conn. 110, 121, 617 A.2d 433 (1992). See Practice Book § 17-55. "The purpose of a declaratory judgment action . . . is to secure an adjudication of rights where there is a substantial question in dispute or a substantial uncertainty of legal relations between the parties." Mannweiler v. LaFlamme,233 Conn. 27, 33, 653 A.2d 168 (1995). A declaratory judgment "may be employed in a justiciable controversy where the interests are adverse, where there is an actual bona fide and substantial question or issue in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations which requires settlement, and where all persons having an interest in he subject matter of the complaint are parties to the action or have reasonable notice thereof." Pamela B. v. Ment,244 Conn. 296, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). A declaration by the court has the force of a final judgment. Doe v. Roe, 246 Conn. 652, 661 n. 19, ___ A.2d ___ (1998); C.G.S. § 52-29.

A declaratory judgment action is the proper vehicle for relief in matters concerning the operation of government. Doe v. Heintz,204 Conn. 17, 31, 526 A.2d 1318 (1987). The dispute before the court is a matter appropriate for a declaratory judgment.

The parties have agreed to a stipulation of facts (Exhibit 12) which are substantially as follows:

The Board of Aldermen is the legislative body for the City of Ansonia and the defendant Board of Apportionment and Taxation is the body responsible for establishing the annual municipal budget for the City. On February 17, 1998, in accordance with the budget CT Page 570 procedure set forth in the Ansonia Charter, the Aldermen submitted an estimated budget to the Board. This budget contained salaries for certain municipal employees.1 Subsequently, the Aldermen adopted resolutions setting salaries of these municipal officials in accordance with the salaries contained in the estimated budget.

On April 21, 1998, the Board directed a communication to the Aldermen requesting information concerning the data they utilized to determine salary increases for non-union personnel such as the employees for whom the Aldermen had previously set salaries. The Aldermen failed to respond to this request and provided no documentation or evidence to the Board to support the salaries set forth in the resolutions before the final budget was approved by the Board on May 18, 1998. The budget approved by the Board did not contain funding for the salaries set by the resolutions of the Aldermen.2

The Ansonia City Charter (Charter) enumerates certain powers and responsibilities given to both the Aldermen and the Board. As to the Aldermen, the Charter, § 93, provides that the Aldermen have the power to "prescribe the salaries and compensation of all officers and employees of said city not expressly designated by the provisions of this Act, which salaries, so fixed, shall be neither raised nor diminished to take effect during any official term; to provide for the appointment or election of such employees as are not otherwise provided for and as may be required for the proper transaction of the business of the city, and to prescribe their duties and compensation." Additionally, § 133 of the Charter states that "[a]ny provision of the city Charter or ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding and subject only to the provisions of the statutes or Constitution of the State of Connecticut, the salaries of all city officials and employees, may be established or altered at any time by resolution of the board of aldermen.

As to the Board, the Charter allows that body to levy taxes and set mill rates and "hear all parties who may desire to be heard relative to any alterations in said estimates, appropriations, and tax rates, and may make any alterations in said estimates, appropriations, and tax rates, and such additional appropriations as it shall deem proper." Charter, § 42. In furtherance of its duties imposed by the city charter, the Board has full power "to require the different city officers to furnish all the information which they may posses, and to exhibit to said board CT Page 571 all books, contracts, reports, and other papers and documents in their respective departments, or in their possession, requisite, in the opinion of said board, to enable said board to discharge the duties imposed upon it by this Act . . ." Charter, § 41.

Reading these provisions together, one might be of the opinion that there is a conflict as to the powers and respective roles of the Board and the Aldermen. While the Aldermen are given the exclusive power to establish the salaries of city officials, the Board, at least is given the power to make any alterations in the estimated budget containing the salaries submitted by the Aldermen.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Danielczuk v. Ansonia Brd., Apport. Txn., No. Cv98062818 (Jan. 12, 2000), 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 568 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).

2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 568 (Danielczuk v. Ansonia Brd., Apport. Txn., No. Cv98062818 (Jan. 12, 2000)) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Risi v. City of Norwalk
134 A.2d 514 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1957)
Scalo v. Mandanici
425 A.2d 1272 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1979)
MacIora v. City of New Britain
200 A.2d 732 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1964)
Nevers v. Anderson
517 A.2d 648 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1984)
Nevers v. Anderson
517 A.2d 620 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1986)
Doe v. Heintz
526 A.2d 1318 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1987)
Wilson v. Kelley
617 A.2d 433 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1992)
Mannweiler v. LaFlamme
653 A.2d 168 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1995)
Dos Santos v. F. D. Rich Construction Co.
658 A.2d 83 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1995)
Pamela B. v. Ment
709 A.2d 1089 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1998)
Doe v. Roe
717 A.2d 706 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1998)