NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0134n.06
No. 24-3267
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Mar 10, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) DANIEL K. WOODIE, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS, INC, ) SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ) OHIO Defendant-Appellee. ) OPINION )
Before: KETHLEDGE, LARSEN, MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
LARSEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which KETHLEDGE, J., concurred. MATHIS, J. (pp. 12–18), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Daniel Woodie, who has nocturnal epilepsy, worked as a systems
technologist for Motorola Solutions from 2013 until his termination in 2021. Woodie sued
Motorola, raising three claims of employment discrimination: failure to accommodate, disability
discrimination, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to Motorola. We
AFFIRM.
I.
Daniel Woodie began working for Motorola Solutions, Inc., as a Federal Systems
Technologist in 2013. Woodie’s work was primarily done outside of the office at customer sites.
Until March 1, 2020, systems technologists traveled about 75% of the time and sometimes had to
work weekends. But beginning in March 2020, Motorola required technologists to travel 80% of
the time. Woodie was unhappy with the additional travel and asked his supervisors on several No. 24-3267, Woodie v. Motorola Solutions, Inc.
occasions to return to the prior arrangement. Woodie initially asked on behalf of all the systems
technologists. He later told a supervisor that the new travel schedule was “not sustainable” and
would lead to the loss of technologists. R. 16-5, PageID 949.
Around July 2019, Woodie informed his immediate supervisor, Wes Pellum, that he had
nocturnal epilepsy. Pellum directed Woodie to the company’s Occupational Health Resources
department (OHR) in the event he needed any accommodations because of the epilepsy. Pellum
also offered to contact OHR for Woodie. Woodie declined an accommodation; he stated that he
didn’t “expect to need any special accommodation[s] but it [was] good to know there is someone
to reach out to if it were needed.” R. 15-1, PageID 320. In June or July 2020, Woodie told
Motorola that he needed a schedule change “because of [his] health.” Id. at 341. Samantha
Heagney, a Human Resources Business Partner, told Woodie that he could “always apply for a
reasonable accommodation if needed” and gave him the company’s Reasonable Accommodation
Policy, which contained instructions on how to file a request. R. 15-5, PageID 664–65. Woodie
declined and said, “I understand that but at the same time I [don’t] really want to be treated
differently. I just wanted to be treated fairly.” Id. at 665.
Beginning in November 2020, Woodie increased his demands for a schedule change. He
asked Mauro Morin, his group leader, for a reduced travel schedule on multiple occasions. Morin
told Woodie to speak with Pellum and another supervisor, Joe Caputo, since Morin didn’t have
control over the schedule. Woodie originally explained that he disliked the schedule because “he
was missing weekends at home,” but he later told Morin that his epilepsy was affecting his
sleeping. R. 14-3, PageID 282–83. As for the latter point, Morin told Woodie that he should direct
any accommodation requests to OHR. During this time, Woodie also asked Caputo twice for a
reduced travel schedule. Caputo told Woodie that he had to work as directed but if he needed an
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accommodation, he should speak to OHR. Woodie never requested an accommodation through
OHR while employed at Motorola.
Throughout his time at Motorola, Woodie’s supervisors had to counsel him on performance
and behavioral issues. Woodie apparently didn’t “understand [his] place” in the company, trying
to do work on projects that were best left for the sales department or a project manager, not a
systems technologist. R. 15-1, PageID 342, 346. Morin also had to speak with Woodie about his
interactions with customers and coworkers. Morin first did so in July 2019, explaining that he had
received a request to remove Woodie from a project because of conflicts with both staff and
customers. Even after these conversations, Woodie continued to clash with coworkers and
customers, resulting in his being removed from three projects. Woodie also clashed with his
supervisors and threatened to quit or find other employment when things weren’t going his way.
In September 2020, and again in December 2020, management had to speak with Woodie about
the need to “understand[] our roles within the teams and how to interact” with others. R. 14-2,
PageID 264–65; R. 15-1, PageID 343. Later, during his deposition, Woodie acknowledged that
his behavior was unacceptable.
After no improvement in Woodie’s behavior, Motorola terminated his employment on May
22, 2021. Motorola classified the termination as without cause, which left open the possibility that
Woodie could be rehired. Woodie received an employment offer from another company the day
after his termination; he began work elsewhere one month later.
Woodie sued Motorola, bringing claims under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA)
and the Ohio Civil Rights Act for failure to provide reasonable accommodations, disability
discrimination, and retaliation. Motorola moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion as to all claims. Woodie now appeals.
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II.
We review de novo the district court’s summary judgment decision. Franklin Am. Mortg.
Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank of Lawrence, 910 F.3d 270, 275 (6th Cir. 2018). “[S]ummary judgment
is warranted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citations omitted).
A.
Woodie first challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Motorola on his
failure-to-accommodate claim.1 On this claim, Woodie “bears the initial burden of making out a
prima facie case.” King v. Steward Trumbull Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 30 F.4th 551, 560 (6th Cir. 2022).
To make a prima facie case, Woodie “must show that (1) [he] was disabled within the meaning of
the statute; (2) [he] was otherwise qualified for [his] position, with or without reasonable
accommodation; (3) the defendant knew or had to reason to know about [his] disability; (4) [he]
requested an accommodation; and (5) the defendant failed to provide the necessary
accommodation.” Id. (citation omitted). Only after an employee requests an accommodation must
the employer start an interactive process to determine if the employee is disabled and whether
accommodations are necessary. Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Educ. of Danville Indep. Schs., 974 F.3d
652, 669 (6th Cir. 2020).
Like the district court, we focus on whether Woodie requested an accommodation under
the ADA. The employee bears “the initial burden of requesting an accommodation.” Gantt v.
Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1046 (6th Cir. 1998). There is some flexibility in how
an employee may do this. King, 30 F.4th at 564. But “[w]e have consistently held that an employer
is not obligated to provide accommodation until the plaintiff had provided a proper diagnosis of
1 The parties treat Woodie’s federal and state law claims as the same, so we do too. -4- No. 24-3267, Woodie v. Motorola Solutions, Inc.
her disability and requested specific accommodation.” Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d at 670 (cleaned
up).
Motorola was not required to provide an accommodation because Woodie never requested
one. Many of Woodie’s requests for a schedule change had nothing to do with his disability.
Woodie was unhappy with the additional travel and asked his supervisors on several occasions to
return to the prior 75% travel arrangement. Woodie initially asked on behalf of all the systems
technologists. He told a supervisor that the new travel schedule was “not sustainable” and would
lead to the loss of technologists. R. 16-5, PageID 949. Another time he explained that he wanted
a reduced travel schedule because “he was missing weekends at home.” R. 14-3, PageID 282–83.
That said, there can be no doubt that Woodie, on several occasions, asked his supervisors
for a reduced travel schedule because of his disability. Woodie testified that he thought “there
were at least four occasions with Mauro Morin and at least two occasions with Joe Caputo” in
which he asked for a reduced travel schedule “[b]ecause of [his] medical condition.” R. 15-1,
PageID 333. Morin recalled Woodie asking for an accommodation because the epilepsy was
affecting his sleep. Caputo also recalled having more than one conversation with Woodie about
his request for a change in the travel schedule because of his disability. So several of Woodie’s
schedule-change requests were tied directly to his disability.
But that doesn’t end the inquiry. Motorola had a policy for submitting a disability
accommodation request. According to the Reasonable Accommodation Policy,
If the accommodation request is disability-related, [the employee] should consult with Occupational Health Resources . . . . Occupational Health Resources is the department responsible for processing requests for accommodation due to a disability. An employee can request an accommodation by completing a Individuals with Disabilities—Request for Accommodation Form or by contacting Occupational Health Resources. Motorola Solutions will engage in the interactive process to clarify the needs of the individual making the request, and ask questions to try to identify the appropriate reasonable accommodation. -5- No. 24-3267, Woodie v. Motorola Solutions, Inc.
R. 15-5, PageID 666. The policy then reiterates that employees seeking an accommodation
“should fill out the appropriate Request for Accommodation Form.” Id. Woodie acknowledges
having read the policy in 2020.
On numerous occasions when Woodie requested a travel change based on his disability,
his supervisors and HR directed him to OHR in the event he need an accommodation. Even before
requesting travel changes, Woodie told Pellum, his immediate supervisor, that he had nocturnal
epilepsy. Pellum directed Woodie to contact OHR if he needed an accommodation, and he offered
to contact OHR for him. Woodie declined. When Woodie asked Morin for a schedule change,
Morin told him that he didn’t have the authority to provide an accommodation for a disability;
such a request had to go through OHR. So he told Woodie to contact OHR. Caputo also told
Woodie he had to go to OHR to request a disability accommodation. Caputo then notified an “HR
person that [he] ha[d] somebody that might be requesting a medical accommodation.” R. 14-2,
PageID 192. Woodie mentioned his medical condition to Heagney, a Human Resources Business
Partner, who told Woodie that he could “always apply for a reasonable accommodation if needed”
and gave him the OHR policy. R. 15-5, PageID 664–65. Woodie again declined.
Woodie was thus aware of Motorola’s process for requesting a disability accommodation.
He was given the policy, and at each turn, his supervisors directed him to contact OHR because
only OHR could determine whether Woodie was disabled and needed an accommodation. Caputo
contacted HR to inform them of a possible pending request, and Woodie discussed his disability
with HR. Despite all of that, at no time in his employment with Motorola did Woodie contact
OHR. Woodie thus failed to request an accommodation sufficient to start the interactive process
under the ADA. See Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d at 670.
-6- No. 24-3267, Woodie v. Motorola Solutions, Inc.
Woodie counters that “[a]n employer’s idiosyncratic accommodation policies and practices
do not vary” the standard for what constitutes an accommodation request. Appellant Br. at 19.
But the lone district court opinion he cites does not support this proposition. See Appellant Br. at
15 (citing Chaniott v. DCI Donor Servs., Inc., 481 F. Supp. 3d. 712 (M.D. Tenn. 2020)). He offers
no caselaw to support his theory that he could sit on his hands and decline to follow Motorola’s
Reasonable Accommodation Policy when his supervisors repeatedly directed him to do so.
Woodie has not met his burden of establishing that he requested an accommodation under
the ADA and thus has not shown that the district court erred by concluding that his failure-to-
accommodate claim failed.
B.
Woodie next challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Motorola on his
disability discrimination claim. Woodie contends that the district court erred by concluding that
there was no direct evidence of discrimination. He points to his testimony that “on the termination
call [Motorola] did mention my repeated requests for schedule changes, including the individual
schedule changes, which . . . effectively is my request for reasonable accommodation.” R. 15-1,
PageID 348. He also points to an email from Brian Sincora, after Woodie was fired, in which
Woodie sought information about his termination. In a previous email, Woodie told Sincora, “I
think we should discuss the ADA aspect of my termination, which I suspect you were unaware of
when this action was taken.” R. 17-1, PageID 1005. In response, Sincora attached a copy of the
Reasonable Accommodation Process and Request form, which he noted had been provided to
Woodie on several previous occasions. Sincora then told Woodie that “[a] request for a reasonable
accommodation follows a specific process;” Woodie “did not follow this process;” and Woodie’s
“repeated requests of your management to change your schedule does not constitute a reasonable
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request.” Id. at 1010. Later, Sincora testified that defendants had explained to Woodie that his
repeated schedule change requests constituted “one of the reasons given” for Woodie’s
termination. Id. at 986.
Woodie says that these statements constitute direct evidence that Motorola fired him “for
requesting accommodations for his disability.” Appellant Br. at 8. That is not so. Direct evidence
is evidence that “requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating
factor in the employer’s actions.” Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 865 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citation omitted). The statements Woodie offers do not fit the bill. They show that Woodie was
fired, in part, for repeatedly requesting a schedule change. But, as explained above, Woodie’s
schedule-change requests did not amount to requests for an accommodation under the ADA.
Indeed, many of them had nothing to do with his disability. And, at every turn, Motorola told
Woodie that if he needed an accommodation, all he needed to do was contact OHR. Woodie
declined. Woodie has not presented direct evidence of discrimination.
Without direct evidence, Woodie bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
disability discrimination. See Hrdlicka v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 63 F.4th 555, 566 (6th Cir. 2023).
If he does so, “the burden shifts to [Motorola] to demonstrate that there was a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the” termination. Id. at 567 (citation omitted). At that point, the
burden shifts back to Woodie to show that this “reason was actually a pretext designed to mask
discrimination.” Id. (citation omitted).
The district court held that Woodie had failed to establish pretext. We agree. Beyond the
repeated requests for a schedule change, Sincora explained that Motorola terminated Woodie’s
employment due to “a combination of growing discontent with his performance, along with
[Woodie] making his desires known that he wanted to depart from the company.” R. 17-1, PageID
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969. Sincora explained that although he “wasn’t directly involved in investigations or matters
related to Mr. Woodie,” “removal from projects, combative behavior, how he communicated with
individuals and otherwise were just some of the issues they had with performance.” Id. Similarly,
shortly after Woodie’s termination, Sincora explained to Woodie that he had been let go because
“[o]n multiple occasions management has provided you with performance feedback” and “[y]our
response to this feedback was to indicate your desire to leave the company.” Id. at 1010. The
record supports these reasons.
As for performance issues, Motorola removed Woodie from several projects between June
2019 and July 2020, due to his inability to work with other employees and customers. In June
2019, a customer dismissed Woodie from a project, complaining to Motorola that, “While I have
tolerated [Woodie’s] ‘greater than thou, I can do no wrong’ attitude for the last couple weeks, he
has become a cancer that is not productive to your own staff, let alone the whole project.” R. 15-
5, PageID 739. What’s more, Woodie pushed his own pet projects because “[a]pparently, he was
not satisfied with Motorola Engineering’s response, so he sought to circumvent his chain of
command.” Id. Woodie was then removed from a project for the United States Customs and
Border Control because Woodie “used ill-advised tact in dealing with the” customer. R. 15-1,
PageID 342. And then Woodie was removed as lead on a project for the United States Secret
Service. According to Woodie’s own testimony, he “was told that [he] was late several times”
(though he disputes the number of times he was late) and “that [he] wasn’t necessarily getting
along with everybody.” Id. at 331. The problems didn’t stop there, and Motorola continually had
to coach Woodie on his communications with coworkers and staff.
What’s more, Woodie repeatedly clashed with his supervisors, routinely offering
disrespectful and insubordinate comments. Woodie now admits that several of these were wrong
-9- No. 24-3267, Woodie v. Motorola Solutions, Inc.
and inappropriate. For example, after he was removed as lead on the Secret Service project, he
threatened to leave the team if his supervisor didn’t reinstate Woodie as lead. Another time he
told a supervisor that he had “an ignorant attitude.” R. 15-1, PageID 339. Woodie admitted at his
deposition that this statement “was probably inadvisable.” Id. In another exchange, Woodie
demanded that the supervisor convince another supervisor “to admit that he made a mistake and
fully retract his actions removing me as lead when he had no business doing so . . . [o]therwise I
am considering my options both inside and outside of Motorola.” Id. According to Woodie’s
testimony, he “was exaggerating a little bit to get their attention.” Id. Also during that exchange,
Woodie threatened that “[u]nless all outstanding issues I have brought up are resolved very shortly
I do not wish to be on the Crown project going forward. I do not appreciate being held hostage on
a project.” Id. He admitted at his deposition: “In hindsight, I would have have—I certainly would
not have written it that way. And quite frankly, reading back through a lot of this I feel really bad
about the way I was acting at the time.” Id. at 340. He admitted, “I certainly would not do that
today.” Id. Another time, Woodie called his boss a “liar.” Id. at 337. He testified, “[T]hat was
an ill-advised but accurate statement” but he wished he “had not made it.” Id.
As for threatening to leave or switch teams, Woodie did so on several occasions. As noted
previously, Woodie made a demand of a supervisor and said that “[o]therwise [he was] considering
my options both inside and outside of Motorola.” Id. at 339. He threatened to leave the team on
another occasion if he didn’t get his way, saying “[i]f anything but” his preferred path forward on
a project is exercised, “I will be leaving [the] team as soon as I am able to do so.” Id. at 345; R.
15-5, PageID 751. Caputo testified that Woodie told him that he was looking for jobs outside of
Motorola “[c]ontinuosly throughout his employment.” R. 14-2, PageID 239. In sum, there is
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ample record evidence to support the reasons given for Woodie’s termination—his performance
and his desire to leave the team.
Woodie counters by arguing that his performance issues and threats to leave the company
were caused by the medication he took for his epilepsy. Yet, Woodie acknowledged at his
deposition that he did not tell Motorola that his epilepsy medication had any bearing on his
performance or the way he communicated with others until after his termination. So this argument
has no bearing on whether the reasons provided by Motorola at the time of the termination were
pretextual.
Woodie also notes that his termination was designated “not-for-cause,” meaning that he
was eligible for immediate rehire. Reply Br. at 18. Yet, Woodie offers no case to support his
theory that it is pretextual for an employer to terminate an employee for performance issues and
his stated desire to leave the company, while still leaving the door open for his eventual return if
the right circumstances presented. Accordingly, the district court didn’t err by concluding that
Woodie had failed to establish pretext and thus dismissing his discrimination claim.
C.
Finally, Woodie challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Motorola on
his retaliation claim. Absent direct evidence of retaliation, Woodie bears the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of retaliation, which includes showing that he “engaged in activity
protected” under the ADA. A.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 711 F.3d 687, 697 (6th
Cir. 2013). Because we conclude above that Woodie did not request an accommodation under the
ADA, he did not engage in protected activity, and his retaliation claim therefore fails.
***
We AFFIRM.
-11- No. 24-3267, Woodie v. Motorola Solutions, Inc.
MATHIS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the
majority that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Motorola Solutions,
Inc. on Daniel Woodie’s discriminatory-discharge and retaliation claims. But because Woodie
requested a reasonable accommodation and genuine fact issues remain about whether Motorola
failed to engage in the interactive process, I would reverse the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Motorola on Woodie’s failure-to-accommodate claim.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees “on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). It also requires an employer
to provide reasonable accommodations for the known physical or mental limitations of a qualified
employee with a disability, unless the employer can show that the accommodation would create
an undue hardship on its operations. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
This court uses a direct-evidence test to analyze failure-to-accommodate claims. Blanchet
v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, 27 F.4th 1221, 1227 (6th Cir. 2022); Fisher v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.,
951 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[C]laims premised upon an employer’s failure to offer a
reasonable accommodation necessarily involve direct evidence (the failure to accommodate) of
discrimination.” (quotation omitted)). Under this framework, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that he
is disabled, and (2) that he is otherwise qualified for the position despite his . . . disability:
(a) without accommodation from the employer; (b) with an alleged essential job requirement
eliminated; or (c) with a proposed reasonable accommodation.” Fisher, 951 F.3d at 417 (internal
quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must, of course, “propose a reasonable accommodation to
succeed.” Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc., 951 F.3d 805, 812 (6th Cir. 2020). If the plaintiff
makes this showing, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that the “challenged job criterion
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is essential, and therefore a business necessity, or that a proposed accommodation will impose an
undue hardship.” Fisher, 951 F.3d at 417 (quotation omitted). The parties do not dispute that
Woodie was disabled and that he was otherwise qualified to work as a systems technologist.
Whether Woodie established a failure-to-accommodate claim boils down to whether he proposed
or requested a reasonable accommodation. See id. A jury could find that he did.
Woodie asked his supervisors to change his work travel schedule to accommodate his
disability. Under the ADA, a reasonable accommodation may include “modified work schedules.”
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). Plaintiffs have the “initial burden of requesting an accommodation.”
King v. Steward Trumbull Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 30 F.4th 551, 564 (6th Cir. 2022) (quotation
omitted). To request a reasonable accommodation, an employee need not “use magic words such
as ‘accommodation’ and ‘disability.’” Fisher, 951 F.3d at 419. Instead, we simply ask whether
“a factfinder could infer that [the interaction] constituted a request for an accommodation.” Id.
(alteration in original) (quotation omitted).
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidance instructs that “[i]ndividuals may
request accommodations in conversation or may use any other mode of communication.”
Requesting Reasonable Accommodation, Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation
and Undue Hardship under the ADA (October 17, 2002)1 [hereinafter “EEOC Guidance”].
“Medical documentation is not required,” and “[a] plaintiff’s own requests, whether written or
oral” will suffice. King, 30 F.4th at 564.
1 https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-reasonable-accommodation-and-undue-hardship- under-ada#requesting.
-13- No. 24-3267, Woodie v. Motorola Solutions, Inc.
Woodie testified that, starting in November 2020, he requested a reduced travel schedule
multiple times because of his disability. Indeed, both of Woodie’s supervisors admitted that he
asked for work modifications because of his epilepsy. A reasonable jury could find that Woodie’s
conversations with his supervisors were accommodation requests. See Fisher, 951 F.3d at 419. In
my view, this should end the inquiry into whether Woodie requested a reasonable accommodation.
True, there were times that Woodie asked to modify his schedule without referencing a
disability. But a reasonable jury could still find that Woodie requested a reasonable
accommodation.
The majority, however, says that Woodie never requested an accommodation because he
did not follow Motorola’s accommodation policy. But Woodie’s failure to follow Motorola’s
policy goes to Woodie’s participation in the interactive process; it does not impact whether he
requested an accommodation. Indeed, the majority cites Kirilenko-Ison v. Board of Education of
Danville Independent Schools, 974 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 2020), to support its conclusion that Woodie
failed to request a reasonable accommodation. But its reliance on Kirilenko-Ison is misplaced.
Kirilenko-Ison does not hold that a plaintiff can only request an accommodation if he
follows his employer’s internal policy for doing so. Instead, it discusses the interactive process,
which occurs after a plaintiff requests an accommodation. See id. at 659–60, 669–70. In
Kirilenko-Ison, the employer asked the plaintiff to provide medical documentation “during the
interactive process.” Id. at 669. We held that “when a plaintiff voluntarily withdraws from the
interactive process based on a defendant’s request for verification, the plaintiff fails to show that
the defendant denied her requests for accommodations.” Id. at 670. We did not suggest that the
plaintiff failed to request an accommodation. See id. Instead, we concluded that the plaintiff did
“not demonstrate[] a genuine factual dispute as to the [defendant’s] failure to participate in the
-14- No. 24-3267, Woodie v. Motorola Solutions, Inc.
interactive process in good faith.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, too, Woodie’s failure to follow
Motorola’s accommodation policy is relevant—not to whether he requested an accommodation—
but to whether he caused a breakdown in the interactive process.
Once Woodie requested a reasonable accommodation, Motorola “ha[d] a duty to engage in
an interactive process.” Fisher, 951 F.3d at 421 (quotation omitted). This duty “requires the
employer to initiate an informal, interactive process, in order to identify the precise limitations
resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those
limitations.” Bennett v. Hurley Med. Ctr., 86 F.4th 314, 331 (6th Cir. 2023) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). This process is mandatory and both
parties must participate in good faith. Bennett, 86 F.4th at 331.
To establish Motorola’s failure to engage in the interactive process, Woodie must prove
that a reasonable accommodation was (1) “possible” and (2) “could have been identified had [the
defendant] engaged in the interactive process.” Id. (citation omitted). Courts should also “attempt
to isolate the cause of the breakdown [in the interactive process] and then assign responsibility.”
Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). Thus,
if Woodie caused the breakdown in the process, he cannot recover for Motorola’s failure to
accommodate or failure to engage in the interactive process. See id. at 871–72.
There is a genuine factual dispute about whether Motorola caused the breakdown in the
interactive process. Woodie repeatedly requested a reasonable accommodation from his
supervisors starting in November 2020. Yet no one at Motorola ever engaged with him to
determine an appropriate accommodation, even though Motorola had “a duty [to] inquire further.”
Root v. Decorative Paint, Inc., No. 23-3404, 2024 WL 4024426, at *4 (6th Cir. Sept. 3, 2024).
-15- No. 24-3267, Woodie v. Motorola Solutions, Inc.
True, Woodie’s supervisors told him to contact Motorola’s human resources department
about filing a formal request, which he did not do. Even so, our precedent and EEOC Guidance
both suggest that the ADA required Motorola to do more than just refer Woodie to human
resources. We have held that an employer participates in the interactive process in good faith
when “it readily meets with the employee, discusses any reasonable accommodations, and suggests
other possible [accommodations].” Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 203 (6th Cir.
2010). For example, in Bennett, the employer engaged in the interactive process when it
“repeatedly engaged with [the plaintiff’s] suggested accommodations[] [and] consulted with
medical experts” about the accommodations as well. 86 F.4th at 332.
On the other hand, in Fisher, the employer initially engaged with the plaintiff in identifying
a reasonable accommodation. 951 F.3d at 421. But “as [the plaintiff’s] need for accommodation
became even more apparent,” the employer failed to take “any steps that evidenced good-faith
participation in the interactive process, such as proposing counter accommodations.” Id. at 422.
We reversed the grant of summary judgment because “a factfinder could conclude that [the
defendant] [bore] the responsibility for its failure to respond to [the plaintiff’s] renewed requests
for accommodation.” Id.
And in Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., the employer said it would set up a
meeting to discuss the plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation request, but never did so. 542 F.3d
1099, 1110 (6th Cir. 2008). We concluded that a genuine dispute of fact existed about who was
responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process. Id.
No one at Motorola ever engaged with Woodie to discuss his reasonable accommodation
requests. Instead, his supervisors ignored his requests or only told him to contact human resources.
In fact, Motorola engaged with Woodie even less than the employers did with the plaintiffs in
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Fisher and Talley. Thus, a genuine factual dispute exists about whether Motorola breached its
“duty [to] inquire further.” See Root, 2024 WL 4024426, at *4.
Moreover, Woodie’s failure to follow Motorola’s accommodation policy did not excuse
Motorola from engaging in the interactive process. Motorola argues that this case is like Wilson
v. Ohio Department of Mental Health & Addiction Services, No. 23-3994, 2024 WL 3814047 (6th
Cir. Aug. 14, 2024). In Wilson, when the plaintiff requested an accommodation, the employer
asked her to complete paperwork identifying her requested reasonable accommodation and
establishing medical support for it. Id. at *3. The plaintiff refused to do so because she had
completed other paperwork that she believed covered the same information. Id. We held that the
failure to provide medical documentation supporting a reasonable accommodation request
“amounts to a voluntary withdrawal that precludes [the plaintiff’s] claim that the [employer] failed
to accommodate her.” Id. at *4 (citation omitted). We emphasized that the defendant “did not
cause a breakdown in the interactive process by establishing a process that [the plaintiff] simply
did not like.” Id. Here, though, after Woodie started requesting an accommodation because of his
disability, Motorola never asked that he provide medical documentation to support his claim or
otherwise engage with him about his disability and proposed accommodation. Instead, his
supervisors simply ignored his requests or referred him to human resources.
An employee’s failure to file a formal accommodation request does not end the interactive
process. True, “an employer may ask the individual to fill out a form or submit the request in
written form,” and can also ask that the employee provide “reasonable documentation” related to
his disability. See EEOC Guidance, at ¶ 3; Tchankpa, 951 F.3d at 813. And where the employee’s
disability or need for accommodation “is not obvious,” the employee is not entitled to an
accommodation if he refuses to provide such documentation. EEOC Guidance, at ¶ 6. That said,
-17- No. 24-3267, Woodie v. Motorola Solutions, Inc.
“the employer cannot ignore the initial request,” id. at ¶ 3, and “failure by the employer to initiate
or participate in an informal dialogue with the individual after receiving a request for reasonable
accommodation could [still] result in liability for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation,”
id. at ¶ 6. That is exactly what Motorola did here—ignore Woodie’s initial requests for an
accommodation just because he never filled out a form.
All in all, a reasonable jury could find that Motorola failed to engage in the interactive
process. As a result, there is a genuine factual dispute about whether Motorola violated the ADA
by failing to discuss Woodie’s reasonable accommodation request with him.
In sum, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Motorola on Woodie’s
failure-to-accommodate claim. Because the majority holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
-18-