Daniel W Colbert v. Department of Transportation

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJuly 10, 2024
DocketPH-0752-19-0359-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Daniel W Colbert v. Department of Transportation (Daniel W Colbert v. Department of Transportation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Daniel W Colbert v. Department of Transportation, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DANIEL W. COLBERT, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-0752-19-0359-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DATE: July 10, 2024 TRANSPORTATION, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Daniel W. Colbert , Naples, Florida, pro se.

Kyle L. Joseph , Esquire, El Segundo, California, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify the correct jurisdictional standard for a nonpreference eligible individual in the excepted service, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND The agency appointed the appellant to an Airway Transportation System Specialist position in the excepted service effective September 28, 2018. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 19. On the Standard Form 50 documenting the appellant’s appointment, the agency stated that the appointment was subject to the completion of a 1-year trial period. Id. at 20. On June 26, 2019, the agency terminated the appellant for failure to demonstrate fitness for continued employment with the Federal service. Id. at 4-6. The appellant appealed his termination to the Board, claiming that the termination was for false reasons. IAF, Tab 1 at 2. Without holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 10, Initial Decision (ID) at 1. Despite incorrectly advising the appellant of his jurisdictional requirements in an acknowledgment order, IAF, Tab 2, the administrative judge provided the appellant with the correct jurisdictional burden for a preference eligible and a nonpreference eligible in the 3

excepted service in the initial decision, ID at 3-4. The administrative judge then found that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that he was an “employee” with Board appeal rights under chapter 75. ID at 4. The appellant filed a petition for review, predominantly challenging the merits of his probationary termination, and the agency has responded. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 4.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Winns v. U.S. Postal Service, 124 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶ 7 (2017), aff’d sub nom. Williams v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 892 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The appellant bears the burden of proving Board jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Tolbert v. Small Business Administration, 104 M.S.P.R. 418, ¶ 6, aff’d, 245 F. App’x 964 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). However, if an appellant makes a nonfrivolous allegation that the Board has jurisdiction, he is entitled to a hearing on the jurisdictional question. 2 Tolbert, 104 M.S.P.R. 418, ¶ 7. Only an “employee,” as defined under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, subchapter II, can appeal to the Board from an adverse action such as a termination. Ramirez-Evans v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 297, ¶ 9 (2010); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(1), 7512(1), 7513(d). A nonpreference eligible individual 3 in the excepted service is an “employee” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 7511 only if one of the following is true: (1) he is not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service; or (2) he has completed 2 years of current continuous

2 A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). An allegation generally will be considered nonfrivolous when, under oath or penalty of perjury, an individual makes an allegation that is more than conclusory, is plausible on its face, and is material to the legal issues in the appeal. Id. 3 The appellant has not alleged that he is preference eligible. 4

service in the same or similar positions in an Executive agency under other than a temporary appointment limited to 2 years or less. 5 U.S.C § 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) -(ii); Ramirez-Evans, 113 M.S.P.R. 297, ¶ 9. The administrative judge found that the appellant was not an “employee” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)(i). ID at 4. The appellant has not challenged this finding on review and we agree with the administrative judge. Section 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) only applies to individuals serving under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service, and there is no indication that the appellant was serving in that type of appointment. See Ramirez-Evans, 113 M.S.P.R. 297, ¶ 9; see also Forest v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 47 F.3d 409, 411-12 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding that section 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) only covers excepted service individuals under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service, provided that they are not serving a probationary or trial period under such an appointment). The administrative judge also correctly identified the standard set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)(ii) in the initial decision. ID at 3.

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Related

Tolbert v. Small Business Administration
245 F. App'x 964 (Federal Circuit, 2007)
Warren S. Forest v. Merit Systems Protection Board
47 F.3d 409 (Federal Circuit, 1995)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Williams v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.
892 F.3d 1156 (Federal Circuit, 2018)

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Daniel W Colbert v. Department of Transportation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/daniel-w-colbert-v-department-of-transportation-mspb-2024.