F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 25 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
DAVID DANIEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-6281 (D.C. No. 97-CV-570) TED MERRITT; STEVE SPELLMAN; (W.D. Okla.) MIKE MAXEY; DAVE BRALEY,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY , McKAY , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. David Daniel, appearing pro se , appeals from the district court’s order
granting Mike Maxey’s and Dave Braley’s [hereinafter “defendants”] 1 motions to
dismiss and for summary judgment on his state prisoner civil rights action
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we affirm.
We review a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim de novo , accepting the facts pleaded as true. See Sutton v. Utah State
Sch. for the Deaf & Blind , 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999). We will
uphold a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal only if it appears “beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief.” Id. (quotation omitted). We also review the grant of summary
judgment de novo ,
applying the same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When applying this standard, we examine the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. If there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, then we next determine if the substantive law was correctly applied by the district court.
1 Mr. Daniel’s suit against Ted Merritt and Steve Spellman was dismissed by stipulation after settlement.
-2- Kaul v. Stephan , 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted).
Background
The relevant facts are not disputed. Mr. Daniel was serving a state
sentence for escape from a penal institution in 1994 when he was released to live
and work in the community pursuant to the Oklahoma Pre-Parole Conditional
Supervision Program (PPCS). In February 1995, he was charged with two counts
of possession of a controlled dangerous substance and possession of drug
paraphernalia, which ultimately resulted in his reclassification. See R. Vol. I
Doc. 36, at 2-3. In March 1995, however, he was released on bail pending
resolution of the drug charges and allowed to return to PPCS status. See id. at 3.
On April 11, 1995, he was formally removed from the PPCS program, arrested by
defendants Ted Merritt and Steve Spellman, and returned to prison. Mr. Merritt
and Mr. Spellman alleged that he attempted to escape by unbuckling his seatbelt
during this transport to jail, and a new criminal charge for attempted escape was
filed. See id. at 4. This charge was later dismissed by the state district attorney.
Mr. Daniel was convicted of the drug charges that lead to his removal from PPCS.
He subsequently filed this suit.
-3- Discussion
In his complaint, Mr. Daniel alleges that defendants violated his
constitutional rights when, as administrators for the Oklahoma Department of
Corrections (DOC), they (1) did not provide him a hearing before removing him
from the PPCS; (2) knew of and approved his false arrest, false imprisonment,
and malicious prosecution by Mr. Merritt and Mr. Spellman; and (3) conspired
with Mr. Merritt and Mr. Spellman to use DOC disciplinary procedures and false
charges to harass and intimidate him.
1. Qualified immunity . The district court granted defendants’ motion to
dismiss Mr. Daniel’s PPCS claim on the basis of qualified immunity because
“[t]he law governing federal due process rights of PPCS inmates was not clearly
established in this sense until August 30, 1995, when the Tenth Circuit decided
Harper v. Young , 64 F.3d 563 (10th Cir. 1995), aff’d sub nom., Young v. Harper ,
117 S. Ct. 1148 (1997).” R. Vol I. Doc. 42, at 4. On appeal, Mr. Daniel argues
that the law regarding removal of inmates from PPCS was clearly established in
Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778
(1973). We disagree. In Morrissey and Gagnon , the Court held that individuals
on parole or probation are entitled to due process hearings under the Fourteenth
Amendment when either parole or probation are revoked. See Morrissey ,
408 U.S. at 483; Gagnon , 411 U.S. at 782. PPCS is “ a penal status similar to,
-4- although more restrictive than, parole that allows convicts to live and work in
society.” Harper , 64 F.3d at 564. At the time of defendants’ alleged acts, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Barnett v. Moon , 852 P.2d 161
(Okla. Crim. App. 1993), and Harper v. Young , 852 P.2d 164 (Okla. Crim. App.
1993) [hereinafter designated as Harper I ], had held that removal from PPCS
impinged only upon an inmate’s interest in his “degree of confinement,” which is
an interest to which the procedural protections set out in Morrissey did not
attach. See Harper I , 852 P.2d at 165. In our Harper decision, we disagreed
with that conclusion and, for the first time, applied the due process requirements
outlined in Morrissey and Gagnon to participation in PPCS. See 64 F.3d at 566.
Therefore, at the time of Mr. Daniel’s removal from PPCS, such removal without
a hearing was not a clearly established constitutional deprivation. We affirm
summary judgment in favor of defendants on this claim.
2. False arrest and imprisonment . Mr. Daniel’s claim for false arrest
and imprisonment is related solely to Mr. Merritt’s and Mr. Spellman’s
allegations that he tried to escape during transport. The district court correctly
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 25 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
DAVID DANIEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-6281 (D.C. No. 97-CV-570) TED MERRITT; STEVE SPELLMAN; (W.D. Okla.) MIKE MAXEY; DAVE BRALEY,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY , McKAY , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. David Daniel, appearing pro se , appeals from the district court’s order
granting Mike Maxey’s and Dave Braley’s [hereinafter “defendants”] 1 motions to
dismiss and for summary judgment on his state prisoner civil rights action
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we affirm.
We review a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim de novo , accepting the facts pleaded as true. See Sutton v. Utah State
Sch. for the Deaf & Blind , 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999). We will
uphold a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal only if it appears “beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief.” Id. (quotation omitted). We also review the grant of summary
judgment de novo ,
applying the same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When applying this standard, we examine the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. If there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, then we next determine if the substantive law was correctly applied by the district court.
1 Mr. Daniel’s suit against Ted Merritt and Steve Spellman was dismissed by stipulation after settlement.
-2- Kaul v. Stephan , 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted).
Background
The relevant facts are not disputed. Mr. Daniel was serving a state
sentence for escape from a penal institution in 1994 when he was released to live
and work in the community pursuant to the Oklahoma Pre-Parole Conditional
Supervision Program (PPCS). In February 1995, he was charged with two counts
of possession of a controlled dangerous substance and possession of drug
paraphernalia, which ultimately resulted in his reclassification. See R. Vol. I
Doc. 36, at 2-3. In March 1995, however, he was released on bail pending
resolution of the drug charges and allowed to return to PPCS status. See id. at 3.
On April 11, 1995, he was formally removed from the PPCS program, arrested by
defendants Ted Merritt and Steve Spellman, and returned to prison. Mr. Merritt
and Mr. Spellman alleged that he attempted to escape by unbuckling his seatbelt
during this transport to jail, and a new criminal charge for attempted escape was
filed. See id. at 4. This charge was later dismissed by the state district attorney.
Mr. Daniel was convicted of the drug charges that lead to his removal from PPCS.
He subsequently filed this suit.
-3- Discussion
In his complaint, Mr. Daniel alleges that defendants violated his
constitutional rights when, as administrators for the Oklahoma Department of
Corrections (DOC), they (1) did not provide him a hearing before removing him
from the PPCS; (2) knew of and approved his false arrest, false imprisonment,
and malicious prosecution by Mr. Merritt and Mr. Spellman; and (3) conspired
with Mr. Merritt and Mr. Spellman to use DOC disciplinary procedures and false
charges to harass and intimidate him.
1. Qualified immunity . The district court granted defendants’ motion to
dismiss Mr. Daniel’s PPCS claim on the basis of qualified immunity because
“[t]he law governing federal due process rights of PPCS inmates was not clearly
established in this sense until August 30, 1995, when the Tenth Circuit decided
Harper v. Young , 64 F.3d 563 (10th Cir. 1995), aff’d sub nom., Young v. Harper ,
117 S. Ct. 1148 (1997).” R. Vol I. Doc. 42, at 4. On appeal, Mr. Daniel argues
that the law regarding removal of inmates from PPCS was clearly established in
Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778
(1973). We disagree. In Morrissey and Gagnon , the Court held that individuals
on parole or probation are entitled to due process hearings under the Fourteenth
Amendment when either parole or probation are revoked. See Morrissey ,
408 U.S. at 483; Gagnon , 411 U.S. at 782. PPCS is “ a penal status similar to,
-4- although more restrictive than, parole that allows convicts to live and work in
society.” Harper , 64 F.3d at 564. At the time of defendants’ alleged acts, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Barnett v. Moon , 852 P.2d 161
(Okla. Crim. App. 1993), and Harper v. Young , 852 P.2d 164 (Okla. Crim. App.
1993) [hereinafter designated as Harper I ], had held that removal from PPCS
impinged only upon an inmate’s interest in his “degree of confinement,” which is
an interest to which the procedural protections set out in Morrissey did not
attach. See Harper I , 852 P.2d at 165. In our Harper decision, we disagreed
with that conclusion and, for the first time, applied the due process requirements
outlined in Morrissey and Gagnon to participation in PPCS. See 64 F.3d at 566.
Therefore, at the time of Mr. Daniel’s removal from PPCS, such removal without
a hearing was not a clearly established constitutional deprivation. We affirm
summary judgment in favor of defendants on this claim.
2. False arrest and imprisonment . Mr. Daniel’s claim for false arrest
and imprisonment is related solely to Mr. Merritt’s and Mr. Spellman’s
allegations that he tried to escape during transport. The district court correctly
dismissed the causes of action for false arrest and imprisonment against
defendants because Mr. Daniel “neither alleges nor shows any personal
involvement in this matter by defendants.” R. Vol. I Doc 42, at 5.
-5- 3. Malicious prosecution . The district attorney dismissed the criminal
prosecution for attempted escape on grounds that it would “‘best meet the ends of
justice’ because ‘prosecuting witnesses [were] no longer employed by D.O.C.’”
Id. at 6. A § 1983 plaintiff claiming malicious prosecution must make an initial
showing that the criminal charge related to the malicious prosecution case was
terminated in his favor. See Neely v. First State Bank , 975 P.2d 435, 437
(Okla. 1998). The district court relied on a Second Circuit case holding that
dismissal of a criminal charge “in the interests of justice” “‘cannot provide the
favorable termination required as the basis for a claim of malicious prosecution’”
under § 1983. R. Vol. I Doc. 42, at 6 (quoting Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff ,
63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995)).
On appeal, Mr. Daniel argues that the common law of torts determines the
contours of a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, citing Taylor v.
Meacham , 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 (10th Cir. 1996). He argues that criminal
proceedings are also terminated in favor of an accused by “the formal
abandonment of the proceedings by the public prosecutor,” Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 659(c), and that he therefore established a termination in his favor
sufficient to satisfy a prima facie showing by demonstrating that the district
attorney abandoned the proceedings against him for a reason consistent with his
innocence. The State inexplicably failed to brief the issue of favorable
-6- termination other than to postulate that the district court correctly followed
Singer .
Even if we were to assume that the proceedings were terminated in
Mr. Daniel’s favor, however, we conclude that Mr. Daniel cannot state a § 1983
cause of action for malicious prosecution against defendants because he can state
no facts showing that either defendant was personally involved in his prosecution
for attempted escape 2 . See Anthony v. Baker , 955 F.2d 1395, 1399 & n.2
(10th Cir. 1992) (stating that action for malicious prosecution “attempts to hold
the complaining witness liable for his role in initiating a baseless prosecution”
and that “[t]he term ‘complaining witness’ describes the person (or persons) who
actively instigated or encouraged the prosecution of the plaintiff . . . [,thus p]roof
of the defendant’s role in instituting the criminal prosecution of the plaintiff is an
essential element of a malicious prosecution claim”) (emphasis added) (quotation
and citation omitted). Although Mr. Daniel alleges on appeal that defendants
“knew the escape charge was false yet they did nothing to prevent it,” see
Appellant’s Br. at 21, he concedes that defendant Maxey actually “threw out the
[administrative] misconduct [charge] alleging that Mr. Daniel had tried to attempt
2 Although the district court made no alternative findings or holdings on this issue, the magistrate recommended dismissal on the additional ground that defendants were not personally involved in the acts leading to the malicious prosecution claim. See R. Vol. I Doc. 36, at 16.
-7- to escape . . . because [Mr. Maxey] did not feel that unbuckling a seat belt
constituted a misconduct for an escape attempt.” See R. Vol. I, Doc. 22,
Attach. F-1, 2 (Affidav. of Mike Maxey); Appellant’s Br. at 21. Mr. Daniel also
does not contradict Mr. Maxey’s sworn statement that “Officer Merritt and
Officer Spellman took it upon themselves to have an ‘Attempted Escape’ charge
filed in Canadian County.” R. Vol. I, Doc. 22, Attach. F-2. He further alleges no
basis for Mr. Maxey’s authority as an assistant district supervisor of
probation/parole to interfere in a probation officer’s decision to file charges in
this situation.
Mr. Daniel alleges absolutely no facts implicating defendant Braley 3 in the
decision to charge Mr. Daniel with attempted escape. We therefore affirm the
grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on the malicious prosecution
charge. See Medina v. City & County of Denver , 960 F.2d 1493, 1495 n.1
(10th Cir. 1992) ( “We are free to affirm a district court decision on any grounds
for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds
not relied upon by the district court.”) (quotation omitted) .
4. Conspiracy . The district court held that the conspiracy claim against
defendants should be dismissed because Mr. Daniel failed to state facts showing
3 Mr. Braley was a records officer at the probation office at the time. See R. Vol. I, Doc. 22 at Attach. I-1.
-8- defendants’ involvement in the alleged conspiracy. Mr. Daniel’s baseless and
conclusory arguments on appeal do not assist his claim. The fact that defendants
agreed that Mr. Daniel should be returned to prison from the PPCS program after
he was charged with illegal possession of drugs does not aver an unlawful
agreement. Contrary to Mr. Daniel’s claims, there is no evidence that either
defendant issued false disciplinary reports, and neither defendant engaged in
filing the allegedly false attempted escape charge. We affirm the grant of
summary judgment on the conspiracy claim.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED .
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge
-9-