Daniel v. Cantrell

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: July 8, 2004
• Docket: 03-5188
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. No. 03-5188 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0216P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0216p.06 Knoxville, Tennessee, N. Mark Kinsman, BAKER, KINSMAN, HOLLIS, CLELLAND & WINER, Chattanooga, Tennessee, Michael E. Jenne, JENNE, SCOTT & JENNE, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Cleveland, Tennessee, Martha A. Campbell, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, Kent FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT E. Krause, Henry S. Queener III, BREWER, KRAUSE & _________________ BROOKS, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees. Alden J. Daniel, Jr., Wartburg, Tennessee, pro se. ALDEN JOE DANIEL, JR., X Plaintiff-Appellant, - _________________ - - No. 03-5188 OPINION v. - _________________ > , CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant filed this pro ELLIE M. CANTRELL, et al., - Defendants-Appellees. - se appeal from the district court’s order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to the N Video Privacy Protection Act (the Act), 18 U.S.C. § 2710. Appeal from the United States District Court Plaintiff argues that the district court committed error by for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Chattanooga. granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the No. 02-00182—R. Allan Edgar, Chief District Judge. issues whether certain defendants were proper parties under the Act and whether the plaintiff timely filed his claim within Submitted: March 12, 2004 the two-year statute of limitations period of the Act. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the Decided and Filed: July 8, 2004 district court.

Before: MARTIN, CLAY, and CUDAHY, Circuit Judges.* I. BACKGROUND _________________ The plaintiff, Alden Joe Daniel, Jr. (Daniel) was charged COUNSEL with and eventually pleaded guilty to the sexual molestation of three underage girls. Allegedly, part of his modus ON BRIEF: M. Drew Robinson, Cleveland, Tennessee, operandi was showing pornographic movies to the underage Russell S. Baldwin, BASS, BERRY & SIMS, Nashville, girls. Kimbrell Br. at 3. Therefore, as part of the criminal Tennessee, Melinda Meador, BASS, BERRY & SIMS, investigation into his conduct, law enforcement officials sought and were able to obtain his video rental records. On March 27, 2000, Daniel’s state-appointed attorney, James F. * The Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, Senior Circuit Judge of the Logan, filed a motion to suppress the disclosures. The motion United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by argued that these video rental records were obtained in designation.

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violation of the Act. It is unclear whether or not this motion The defendants thereafter filed various motions to dismiss was granted; however, between May and August of 2000, Daniel’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Daniel pleaded guilty to one count of rape, five counts of Procedure 12(b)(6). However, because the defendants statutory rape, two counts of sexual battery by an authority attached affidavits and other documents outside of the figure and failure to appear. complaint to their motions, the district court treated their motions to dismiss as a collective motion for summary On June 10, 2002, Daniel filed a pro se complaint in the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). United States District Court for the Eastern District of On January 3, 2003, the district court granted the defendants’ Tennessee alleging that numerous defendants obtained and motion for summary judgment because it reasoned that those disclosed private information regarding his rental of defendants who were not “video service provider[s]” under pornographic videos in violation of the Act. Defendants the Act were not subject to legal liability. See Daniel v. “John Doe #1 and Prime Star, John Doe #2 and G&M Cantrell, 241 F. Supp. 2d 867, 872 (E.D. Tenn. 2003). The Market, and Tim Taylor and Fantasy World,” are retail video court further reasoned that those defendants who were “video stores at which the plaintiff allegedly had accounts and the service provider[s]” were not subject to liability because employees who allegedly made disclosures. Defendants Daniel did not timely file his lawsuit within the applicable Chuck Kimbrell, Tony Alvarez, Stephen Davis Crump, two-year statute of limitations in the Act. Id. at 873 (“The Joseph Victor Hoffer and Jerry Estes are the law enforcement Court finds that the plaintiff had knowledge of the alleged officers and officials who investigated and prosecuted Daniel violation on March 27, 2000, the date he filed the motion to for rape and statutory rape in Bradley County Criminal Court, suppress. To maintain his action, the plaintiff was required to Tennessee. Defendants Lee Ann Stabler and Ellie and file his action on or before March 27, 2002. Because he filed Michael Cantrell are parents of Daniel’s rape victims and also on June 17, 2002, this action against the named video service the plaintiffs in a civil suit against Daniel. Defendant Roger providers is barred by the statute of limitations.”). In Jenne is an attorney who represented Stabler and the Cantrells addition, the court stated that summary judgment was in their state civil litigation and in the criminal prosecution. appropriate against Daniel as to the statute of limitations because Daniel “present[ed] no evidence or reference to a In his complaint, Daniel asserts that video rental store specific incident to demonstrate that such disclosure is owners and their employees disclosed personally identifiable ongoing or that any disclosure occurred after the date the information about his video rentals to defendants Estes, the motion to suppress was filed on his behalf.” Id. Cantrells, Stabler, Jenne, Kimbrell and Alvarez. These defendants then disclosed this information to a Bradley Of course, we could decline to address the merits of County Grand Jury. Daniel alleges that these disclosures Daniel’s appeal because of his failure to file or designate a violated his right to privately rent video tapes under the Act. joint appendix or other certified documents as required by According to Daniel’s complaint, the disclosures began as Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.1 early as January 11, 1998, and were ongoing and continuous up to the last two civil suits against him that were filed in September, 2001. To support this latter contention, Daniel 1 submitted the sworn affidavits of his mother and father. That Rule provides, in relevant part that: “Th e app ellant must prepare and file an appendix to the briefs containing: (A) the relevant docket entries in the proceeding below; (B) the relevant portions of the pleadings, charge, findings, or No. 03-5188 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. 5 6 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. No. 03-5188

However, we will exercise our discretion and address the of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that merits of Daniel’s claims, especially since no decision from there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Anderson this court has interpreted the applicable provisions of the Act v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). and the district court issued a published opinion.2 1. Proper Parties II. DISCUSSION As noted earlier, Daniel brings this suit against (1) various police officers, attorneys, and the parents of one of Daniel’s Because Daniel appeals the district court’s grant of victims, as well as (2) the employees and owners of two video summary judgment to defendants, this court reviews the stores where Daniel rented pornographic videos. There is no district court’s opinion de novo. See Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., dispute that the defendants making up this second category 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is are proper parties under the Act. The only question which we proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to must answer is whether the defendants not associated with the interrogatories, admissions on file, together with the video stores are proper parties under the Act. We believe that affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of based on the plain language of the Act, this first group of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment defendants are not proper parties. as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Although all facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, A. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b) a non-movant “may not rest upon mere allegations or denials Reading Daniel’s complaint broadly, it appears that he may be asserting claims under two sections of the Act: §§ 2710(b) and (d). We discuss section (b) first. Section (b) provides opinion; (C) the judgment, order, or decision in question; and that “[a] video tape service provider who knowingly (D) other parts of the record to which the parties wish to direct the discloses, to any person, personally identifiable information court’s attention. concerning any consumer of such provider shall be liable to Fed. R. App. P. 30 (a)(1) (emphasis added). the aggrieved person for the relief provided in subsection 2 (d).” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (emphasis added). Therefore, The Sixth Circuit Rule on failure to file a joint appendix provides under the plain language of the statute, only a “video tape the following sanctions: service provider” (VTSP) can be liable. The term VTSP is Sanctions. Failure to file a joint appendix, or the filing of a joint defined by the statute to mean “any person, engaged in the appendix substantially out of com pliance with the requirements business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of of this local rule, may result in dism issal of the appea l. This rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or Court, on the motion of a party or on its own motion, may deny similar audio video materials, or any person or other entity to costs to a party who has been responsible for the insertion of whom a disclosure is made under subparagraph (D) or (E) of unnecessary material into, or for the omission of necessary subsection (b)(2), but only with respect to the information material from, the joint appendix. Mo reover, any counsel who so complicates the proceedings in any case b y unreasonably and contained in the disclosure.” Id. at § 2710(a)(4). Daniel does vexatiously failing to comply with the requirements of this local not allege that the defendants in question are engaged in the rule may be required by this Court to satisfy personally any business of rental, sale or delivery of prerecorded video excess costs . . . and may be subject to disciplinary sanctions. cassette tapes. Therefore, the defendants may only be VTSPs 6th Cir. R. 30(m) (emphasis added). No. 03-5188 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. 7 8 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. No. 03-5188

if personal information was disclosed to them under disclosed as a result of any of these activities. The disclosure subparagraph (D) or (E) of subsection (b)(2). in this case seems to have been made in conjunction with a criminal investigation, which is not included on the list of Subparagraph (D) applies “if the disclosure is solely the disclosures made “in the ordinary course of business.” names and addresses of consumers.” Id. at § 2710(b)(2)(D). Moreover, as such a request is anything but ordinary, it would Moreover, disclosure under subparagraph (D) must be “for not naturally fit into this list and, in fact, would be addressed the exclusive use of marketing goods and services directly to by a different section of the Act. See id. at § 2710(b)(2)(C) the consumer.” Id. at § 2710(b)(2)(D)(ii). For instance, if a (discussing disclosure to a law enforcement agency). In sum, video store provided the names and addresses of its patrons to because Daniel has presented no evidence suggesting that a a movie magazine publisher, the publisher would be disclosure was made under subparagraph (D) or (E) in this considered a VTSP, but only with respect to the information case, the non-video store defendants are not VTSPs under the contained in the disclosure. No disclosure in this case was Act and therefore, are not proper parties to this litigation. made under subparagraph (D). The information provided was not limited to Daniel’s name and address. Instead, the Daniel argues, however, that any person, not just a VTSP, disclosure was of Daniel’s history of renting pornographic can be liable under the Act based on Dirkes v. Borough of videotapes and included the specific titles of those videos. Runnemede, 936 F. Supp. 235 (D.N.J. 1996). Dirkes did Additionally, the disclosure was not for marketing purposes reach this conclusion but only by misreading the Act. The but for purposes of a criminal investigation. Therefore, court in Dirkes was focused on language in the Act stating subparagraph (D) is inapplicable in this case. that “[a]ny person aggrieved by any act of a person in violation of this section may bring a civil action in the United Daniel properly does not argue that the disclosure falls States district court.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(1) (emphasis within subparagraph (E). See Pl.’s Br. at 15 (“[T]he appellant added). Because the statute states that a suit can be based alleged specific information obtained and disclosed by the upon an act of “a person” rather than an act of “a VTSP,” appellees . . . pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(D)(i)(ii), Dirkes found that any person can be liable under the Act. Appellate Record at 1 and 36”). Subparagraph (E) applies Dirkes, 936 F. Supp. at 240. Dirkes, however, ignored the only to disclosures made “incident to the ordinary course of rest of the sentence. A lawsuit under the Act must be based business” of the VTSP. Id. at § 2710(b)(2)(E). The term on an “act of a person in violation of this section . . . .” 18 “ordinary course of business” is “narrowly defined” in the U.S.C. § 2710(c)(1) (emphasis added). The statute makes it statute to mean “only debt collection activities, order clear that only a VTSP can be in violation of section 2710(b). fulfillment, request processing, and the transfer of See § 2710(b)(1) (“A video tape service provider who ownership.” Id. at § 2710(a)(2); see also S. Rep. No. 100-599 knowingly discloses . . . personally identifiable information at 14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342 (noting . . . shall be liable . . . .”). Moreover, if any person could be that the term is “narrowly defined” in the statute). “Order liable under the Act, there would be no need for the Act to fulfillment” and “request processing” are defined in the define a VTSP in the first place. Id. at § 2710(a)(4). More legislative history as the use, by VTSPs, of “mailing houses, tellingly, if any person could be liable under the Act, there is warehouses, computer services, and similar companies for no reason that the definition of a VTSP would be limited to marketing to their customers.” S. Rep. No. 100-599 at 14 “any person . . . to whom a disclosure is made under (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342. Daniel subparagraph (D) or (E) of subsection (b)(2).” Id. (emphasis presents no evidence suggesting that his information was added). Dirkes would have us ignore this limitation and find No. 03-5188 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. 9 10 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. No. 03-5188

that any person can be liable under the Act whether or not a purpose in adopting the Act. One can “prevent the disclosure disclosure was made to him under subparagraph (D) or (E). of private information” simply by cutting off disclosure at its We avoid interpretations of a statute which would render source, i.e., the VTSP. Just because Congress’ goal was to portions of it superfluous. See Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, prevent the disclosure of private information, does not mean 913 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, that Congress intended the implementation of every 667 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Every word in the statute is presumed conceivable method of preventing disclosures. Printing all to have meaning, and we must give effect to all the words to personal information in hieroglyphics instead of English avoid an interpretation which would render words superfluous would also help prevent the disclosure of such information. or redundant.”)); United States v. Perry, 360 F.3d 519, 537 However, nothing in the legislative history suggests that (6th Cir. 2004) (“We may not construe a statute in a manner Congress was encouraging hieroglyphics and, similarly, that renders part of the law superfluous.”).3 nothing suggests that Congress intended that anyone other than VTSPs would be liable under the Act.4 In sum, the Act The court in Dirkes found otherwise because the “clear is clear that only a VTSP can be liable under § 2710(b). intent of the Act,” as demonstrated by its legislative history, Because the non-video store defendants do not fit within the “is to prevent the disclosure of private information.” Dirkes, definition of a VTSP, they are not proper parties. 936 F. Supp. at 240. Where the plain language of a statute is clear, however, we do not consult the legislative history. See B. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(d) In re Comshare Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999) (“When interpreting a statute, we must begin with its It is unclear to this court whether Daniel is asserting a claim plain language, and may resort to a review of congressional under 18 U.S.C. § 2710(d). Nonetheless, in the interests of intent or legislative history only when the language of the completeness we will explain why such a claim must fail. statute is not clear.”) (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n Section 2710(d) states that “[p]ersonally identifiable v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)); Parker v. information obtained in any manner other than as provided in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir. this section shall not be received in evidence in any . . . 1997) (“We have not referred to legislative history in our proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(d). Daniel cannot bring suit discussion of this issue because, where the statutory meaning based on this section, however, because it is a rule of is clear, we do not resort to legislative history.”). In any evidence—not a basis for a private cause of action. This is case, our interpretation of the statute—that only a VTSP can clear for at least two reasons. be liable under § 2710(b)—does not conflict with Congress’

3 Dirkes argues that this interp retation is absurd. “[T]he plain 4 language of the Act does not delineate those parties against whom an Daniel also cites Camfield v. City o f Okla hom a City, 248 F.3d 1214 action under this Act may be maintained. Ta king the Defendants’ (10th. Cir 2001) in support of his argument. Daniel believes Camfield argument to its logical extension, this omission would prevent plaintiffs supp orts his position because in that case, several defendants, unrelated from bringing a cau se of action against anyo ne.” Dirkes, 936 F. Supp. at to video stores, were found liable under the Act. It appears, however, that 240. W e do not know what statute the court in Dirkes was reading, but the defendants in Camfield did not raise this issue on appeal and the court the Act plainly states that an actio n can b e bro ught against a V TS P. See did not discuss it. Therefore, we do not know whether the court in 18 U.S.C. § 2 710 (b)(1 ) (“A vid eo tap e service pro vider who knowingly Camfield or the district court below ever considered the issue, and the discloses . . . personally iden tifiable informatio n . . . shall be liable . . . .”). decision is of little value to us. No. 03-5188 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. 11 12 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. No. 03-5188

First, only § 2710(b) can form the basis of liability. This is Because the following defendants do not fit into the plain because only section (b) includes language relating to definition of a VTSP necessary for liability under section (b) liability. See id. at § 2710(b)(1) (noting that a VTSP “shall be and because section (d) is not the basis for a private cause of liable” for violating the section). Neither section (d) nor action, we affirm the district court in its dismissal of all section (e) contains such language. Further, the structure of claims against Ellie M. Cantrell, Michael Cantrell, Lee Ann the statute make it clear that a civil action may be brought Stabler, Roger E. Jenne, Jerry N. Estes, Joseph V. Hoffer, based on only a violation of section (b). Immediately after Stephen D. Crump, Chuck Kimbrell and Tony Alvarez. section (b), section (c) discusses the rules for bringing a “civil action.” After section (c), sections (d) and (e) discuss 2. Statute of Limitations receiving personal information into evidence and destruction of old records. If these later sections were to be a basis for We next turn to the issue whether the district court’s grant liability, it would make sense that the section on civil actions of summary judgment to the defendants on the statute of would come at the end of the statute, rather than preceding limitations issue was erroneous. Daniel argues that the these sections.5 district court erred in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to whether the statute of limitations Second, section (d) states that personal information not period prescribed by the Act had expired before he filed his properly disclosed “shall not be received into evidence.” Id. complaint with the district court on June 10, 2002. at 2710(d) (emphasis added). As the district court aptly noted, “[t]he decision whether or not to receive documents or In relevant part, the Act authorizes a civil action by a testimony is one that will be made by the person presiding litigant, except that “no action may be brought under this over the relevant proceeding. . . . A private individual is not subsection unless such action is begun within 2 years from the in a position to ‘receive’ video records into evidence.” date of the act complained of or the date of discovery.” Daniel, 241 F. Supp. at 872. If Congress wanted, it certainly 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(3). The district court found that it could could have stated that “no person shall attempt to submit” impute knowledge of the privacy violation to Daniel as of personal information into evidence. Congress, however, did March 27, 2000—the date on which his attorney filed a not use this language. Therefore, it is clear that section (d) is motion to suppress evidence of Daniel’s video rental history. a rule of evidence and cannot be the basis for a private cause The district court’s conclusion is supported by Veal v. Geraci, of action. 23 F.3d 722 (2d Cir. 1994), in which the Second Circuit, based on an agency theory, held that a § 1983 action was barred by the statute of limitations because Veal’s attorney had made a motion to suppress the same evidence more than 5 One might argue that our reading of the statute is problematic three years before the § 1983 action was brought. Daniel because there would be no way to enforce section (e)— the requirement does not argue that Veal was improperly decided, nor does he that old records be timely destro yed. H owever, if the failure to timely cite any case to the contrary. destroy such records resulted in harm to the consumer, he could presu mab ly bring a negligence action against the VTSP and benefit from the existence of section (e) by arguing negligence per se. See J.D. Lee & Tennessee law of agency is in accord. In Smith v. Petkoff, Barry Linda hl, Mo dern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 3:42 (2d ed. 919 S.W.2d 595, 597-98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), the 2003) (“Under the per se rule, the violation of an applicable statute is Tennessee Court of Appeals also held that an attorney’s conclusive proof of negligence, leaving only the question of causatio n to be determined.”). No. 03-5188 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. 13 14 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. No. 03-5188

knowledge of the facts and circumstances of a case are Daniel argues that there were communication problems automatically imputed to the client. The court held: between him and his attorney. However, Veal suggests, and the other cited cases confirm, that the existence of such [A] person generally is held to know what his attorney communication problems between principal and agent would knows and should communicate to him, and the fact that not affect the imputation of knowledge. Id. at 725 the attorney has not actually communicated his (“[W]hether or not Veal himself heard Geraci’s testimony, knowledge to the client is immaterial. So, the facts Veal’s attorney plainly had knowledge of the conduct giving constituting knowledge, or want of it, on the part of an rise to Veal’s present claim, and under traditional principles attorney, are proper subjects of proof, and are to be of agency the attorney’s knowledge must be imputed to ascertained by testimony as in other cases; but when Veal.”). In any case, Daniel does not present any evidence to ascertained, the constructive notice thereof to the client support his claim that there were serious communication is conclusive, and cannot be rebutted by showing that the problems between him and his attorney. attorney did not in fact impart the information so acquired. Daniel also argues that the district court erred in not considering sworn affidavits from his parents indicating that Id. (quoting 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 182 (1980)); the defendants continued to violate his rights under the Act accord Lane-Detman, L.L.C. v. Miller & Martin, 82 S.W.3d until July 17, 2001, by disclosing personally identifiable 284, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (same); see also Moody v. information about his video rentals. We have carefully Moody, 681 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tenn. 1984) (“Counsel’s reviewed these affidavits. They show only that Daniel’s knowledge must be attributed to his client, if the actions of parents sought and were provided with a copy of his file from the court are to have any efficacy.”); Roberts v. State, 546 the Bradley County District Attorney’s Office and from his S.W.2d 264, 265 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (“A client is implied former attorney, James Logan. These files contained to have notice of facts transmitted to his attorney in the matter personally identifiable information under the Act. But there and course of his employment for such client.”). Since there are three reasons why these affidavits are of no help to Daniel. is no dispute that Daniel’s criminal attorney knew of the First, as discussed supra, the Bradley County District alleged privacy violations as of March 27, 2000, it follows, as Attorney’s Office and James Logan are not VTSPs.6 a matter of Tennessee law, that Daniel also knew of the Therefore, their disclosures are not independently actionable alleged violations as of that date. and would be relevant only for statute of limitations purposes if they led Daniel to discover an actionable violation of the Act. Because Daniel had already “discovered” the actionable violations (under Veal), subsequent disclosures by non- VTSPs are not relevant for purposes of the statute of limitations. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(3). Second, it is plain

6 Daniel also argues that his claims fall within the statute of limitations of the Act, based on a “subsequent disclosure” made in September 2001. However, this “disclosure” was also prepared by non- VT SPs and therefore is not releva nt for statute of limitations purposes. No. 03-5188 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. 15 16 Daniel v. Cantrell, et al. No. 03-5188

from their affidavits that the disclosure to Daniel’s parents III. was at Daniel’s own behest. Disclosures made to the CONCLUSION consumer or with his consent are not actionable under the Act. Id. at §§ 2710(b)(2)(A) and (B). Finally, as a matter of For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of equity, Daniel cannot ask his parents to retrieve his file from the district court.7 these defendants and then expect us to hold them liable for complying with his own request. The district court’s opinion here makes it clear that it considered the parents’ affidavits. Daniel, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 873 (“It appears from the complaint and amended complaint that Daniel refers to the ongoing discussion of his video rentals by persons other than those qualifying as video service providers.”). Even if the district court had failed to consider the parents’ affidavits, it is our duty to review the evidence independently. We have done so and have found nothing that supports Daniel’s contentions. Second, the district court did not give short shrift to Daniel’s argument that he was unaware that his attorney had filed a motion to suppress. The district court properly found that Daniel’s knowledge, or lack thereof, was irrelevant because the knowledge of his agent is imputed to him, as discussed in Veal. We know of no good reason to depart from the well-established rule that the knowledge of an agent is imputed to his principal. Therefore, we find ourselves in agreement with the district court.

7 Daniel has filed a motion to sanction/disbar attorney Roger Jenne. This motion is DENIED. He has also filed a motion to issue an order to the District Attorney’s Office to destroy video records of Ald en D aniel. This relief was found to be inappropriate in the very case upon which Daniel relies. See Camfield , 248 F.3d at 1234 (“Camfield implies that the civil action provision o f the VPP A, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c), provides statutory authority for expungement of his [personally identifiable information] from OCPD’s records, but that section do es not expre ssly grant such relief. Moreover, although the VPP A provides that a court may award ‘such other preliminary and equitable relief as the court determines to be appropriate,’ 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(2)(D), this language has not been construed to provide the relief Camfield seeks.”). Therefore, this motion too is DE NIE D.