Opinion issued February 4, 2014.
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-12-00901-CR ——————————— DANIEL SMITH, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 183rd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1354971
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Daniel Smith of murder, and the trial court assessed his
punishment at forty years’ confinement. On appeal, Smith contends that the trial
court erred in admitting three recorded statements that he made to the police, claiming that he gave them while in custody without having received the requisite
statutory warnings. Finding no error, we affirm.
Background
In September 2011, a group of police officers approached Smith while he
was walking across a street and asked him if he would come with them to the
police station. Smith agreed. At the police station, two officers interviewed him in
an interview room. He was not handcuffed during the interview. The officers did
not give Smith any of the warnings pursuant to article 38.22 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, §§ 2(a), 3(a)(2) (West 2005).
Approximately seven minutes into the interview, before Smith had made any
incriminating statements, one of the officers told Smith that he was not in custody
and not under arrest. Smith indicated that he understood. The interview lasted
approximately forty–four minutes. At the end of the interview, the officers asked
Smith if he would return the next day to participate in a lineup. Smith agreed.
After the interview, an officer drove Smith from the police station to Smith’s
home. The next day, an officer picked up Smith and drove him to the station to
participate in the lineup. After the lineup, Smith gave the police two additional
statements.
2 During the jury trial, Smith objected to the admission of his three statements
to the police. The trial court conducted a suppression hearing outside the presence
of the jury and ruled that the statements were admissible. The State proffered, and
the trial court admitted, Smith’s three statements at trial.
Discussion
Smith contends that article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
and article 1, section 10 of the Texas Constitution bar the admissibility of the three
recorded statements, because he gave them while in custody without having
received the requisite warnings.
Standard of review
We evaluate a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard of review. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
The trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the weight and credibility of the
evidence and testimony. Weide v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). Accordingly, we defer to the trial court’s determination of historical facts if
the record supports them. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 493. We review de novo the trial
court’s application of the law to those facts. Id. “[T]he prevailing party is entitled
to ‘the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from that evidence.’” State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 465
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Garcia–Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241
3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). A trial court’s ruling will be sustained if it is “reasonably
supported by the record and correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.”
Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing Willover v.
State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).
Analysis
Article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure bars the admission of an
accused’s statement resulting from a custodial interrogation unless he was advised
of the enumerated rights and voluntarily waived those rights. TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, §§ 2(a), 3(a)(2) (West 2005); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at
444–45, 86 S. Ct. at 1612; Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). The Article 38.22 warnings, however, are required only when a
person is in custody. Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 526. A person is “in custody” only
if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that his freedom of
movement is restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest. Dowthitt v.
State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (citing Stansbury v.
California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529–30 (1994)). In evaluating a
custody determination, we examine the objective factors surrounding a detention;
we do not examine the undisclosed, subjective beliefs of the detaining officer or
the accused. State v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d 367, 372–73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Any
undisclosed subjective belief of the accused that he is guilty of an offense should
4 not be considered; the reasonable person standard presupposes an “innocent
person.” Id. at 373.
The State proffered a video recording of Smith’s first statement.
Approximately seven minutes into the recording, before Smith had made any
incriminating statements, one of the police officers present told Smith that he was
not in custody and not under arrest. Smith responded that he understood. After the
interview, an officer drove Smith from the police station to Smith’s home. This
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Smith was not in custody. Because
Smith was not in custody, the State did not need to advise him of his Miranda
rights. See Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 526.
Relying on Kaupp v. Texas, Smith contends that a reasonable person in his
circumstances would not have believed he was free to leave the police station. 538
U.S. 626, 632, 123 S. Ct. 1843, 1847 (2003). He testified that, as he was walking
across a street, several police officers used their cars to trap him, then exited the
cars and pointed their guns at him. He testified that the police ordered him to lie
down on the ground and handcuffed him. Smith also testified that no one told him
that he had the right to leave, contrary to his acknowledgement in the recorded
statement. Having seen the recorded statement, the trial court was free to
disbelieve Smith’s testimony. See Weide, 214 S.W.3d at 24–25. The facts in
Kaupp are distinguishable from the facts here. There, a group of police officers
5 awakened the defendant in his bedroom in the middle of the night and handcuffed
him. Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 628, 123 S. Ct. at 1845. Here, a group of police officers
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Opinion issued February 4, 2014.
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-12-00901-CR ——————————— DANIEL SMITH, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 183rd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1354971
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Daniel Smith of murder, and the trial court assessed his
punishment at forty years’ confinement. On appeal, Smith contends that the trial
court erred in admitting three recorded statements that he made to the police, claiming that he gave them while in custody without having received the requisite
statutory warnings. Finding no error, we affirm.
Background
In September 2011, a group of police officers approached Smith while he
was walking across a street and asked him if he would come with them to the
police station. Smith agreed. At the police station, two officers interviewed him in
an interview room. He was not handcuffed during the interview. The officers did
not give Smith any of the warnings pursuant to article 38.22 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, §§ 2(a), 3(a)(2) (West 2005).
Approximately seven minutes into the interview, before Smith had made any
incriminating statements, one of the officers told Smith that he was not in custody
and not under arrest. Smith indicated that he understood. The interview lasted
approximately forty–four minutes. At the end of the interview, the officers asked
Smith if he would return the next day to participate in a lineup. Smith agreed.
After the interview, an officer drove Smith from the police station to Smith’s
home. The next day, an officer picked up Smith and drove him to the station to
participate in the lineup. After the lineup, Smith gave the police two additional
statements.
2 During the jury trial, Smith objected to the admission of his three statements
to the police. The trial court conducted a suppression hearing outside the presence
of the jury and ruled that the statements were admissible. The State proffered, and
the trial court admitted, Smith’s three statements at trial.
Discussion
Smith contends that article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
and article 1, section 10 of the Texas Constitution bar the admissibility of the three
recorded statements, because he gave them while in custody without having
received the requisite warnings.
Standard of review
We evaluate a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard of review. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
The trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the weight and credibility of the
evidence and testimony. Weide v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). Accordingly, we defer to the trial court’s determination of historical facts if
the record supports them. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 493. We review de novo the trial
court’s application of the law to those facts. Id. “[T]he prevailing party is entitled
to ‘the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from that evidence.’” State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 465
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Garcia–Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241
3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). A trial court’s ruling will be sustained if it is “reasonably
supported by the record and correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.”
Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing Willover v.
State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).
Analysis
Article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure bars the admission of an
accused’s statement resulting from a custodial interrogation unless he was advised
of the enumerated rights and voluntarily waived those rights. TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, §§ 2(a), 3(a)(2) (West 2005); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at
444–45, 86 S. Ct. at 1612; Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). The Article 38.22 warnings, however, are required only when a
person is in custody. Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 526. A person is “in custody” only
if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that his freedom of
movement is restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest. Dowthitt v.
State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (citing Stansbury v.
California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529–30 (1994)). In evaluating a
custody determination, we examine the objective factors surrounding a detention;
we do not examine the undisclosed, subjective beliefs of the detaining officer or
the accused. State v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d 367, 372–73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Any
undisclosed subjective belief of the accused that he is guilty of an offense should
4 not be considered; the reasonable person standard presupposes an “innocent
person.” Id. at 373.
The State proffered a video recording of Smith’s first statement.
Approximately seven minutes into the recording, before Smith had made any
incriminating statements, one of the police officers present told Smith that he was
not in custody and not under arrest. Smith responded that he understood. After the
interview, an officer drove Smith from the police station to Smith’s home. This
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Smith was not in custody. Because
Smith was not in custody, the State did not need to advise him of his Miranda
rights. See Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 526.
Relying on Kaupp v. Texas, Smith contends that a reasonable person in his
circumstances would not have believed he was free to leave the police station. 538
U.S. 626, 632, 123 S. Ct. 1843, 1847 (2003). He testified that, as he was walking
across a street, several police officers used their cars to trap him, then exited the
cars and pointed their guns at him. He testified that the police ordered him to lie
down on the ground and handcuffed him. Smith also testified that no one told him
that he had the right to leave, contrary to his acknowledgement in the recorded
statement. Having seen the recorded statement, the trial court was free to
disbelieve Smith’s testimony. See Weide, 214 S.W.3d at 24–25. The facts in
Kaupp are distinguishable from the facts here. There, a group of police officers
5 awakened the defendant in his bedroom in the middle of the night and handcuffed
him. Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 628, 123 S. Ct. at 1845. Here, a group of police officers
approached Smith in public and asked him if he would come with them to the
police station, and Smith agreed. Given the totality of the circumstances, we hold
that the trial court did not err in admitting the first recorded statement.
Smith contends that his second and third statements to the police are
inadmissible because they were fruit of the illegally obtained first statement.
Because Smith’s first statement is admissible, this argument is unavailing.
Accordingly, we hold that his second and third statements are also admissible.
Conclusion
Because Smith was not in custody when he made his initial statement to the
police, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting it or the subsequent
statements not otherwise independently challenged. We therefore affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
Jane Bland Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Brown.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 6