Daniel Shakespeare Co. v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Daniel Shakespeare Co. v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead

275 A.D.2d 370, 712 N.Y.S.2d 416, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8709

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedAugust 14, 2000

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 275 A.D.2d 370 (Daniel Shakespeare Co. v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Daniel Shakespeare Co. v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead, 275 A.D.2d 370, 712 N.Y.S.2d 416, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8709 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinion

—In a proceeding to recover damages for a permanent taking of the petitioner’s real property, the appeal is from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCabe, J.), entered September 15, 1999, which, upon the denial of the motion of the Incorporated Village of Hemp-stead to vacate its default in appearing at a trial on the issue of damages, is in favor of the petitioner and against the Village in the principal sum of $825,000.

Ordered that the order and judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the default is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a new trial on the issue of damages.

The Supreme Court erred in denying the motion of the Incorporated Village of Hempstead to vacate its default, as it demonstrated both a reasonable excuse for its default and the existence of a meritorious defense (see, A & J Concrete Corp. v Arker, 54 NY2d 870; Stone v County of Nassau, 272 AD2d 392; Matter of Long Is. Light. Co. v Assessor of Town of Brookhaven, 251 AD2d 332). O’Brien, J. P., Altman, Friedmann and Smith, JJ., concur.

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—In a proceeding to recover damages for a permanent taking of the petitioner’s real property, the appeal is from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCabe, J.), entered September 15, 1999, which, upon the denial of the motion of the Incorporated Village of Hemp-stead to vacate its default in appearing at a trial on the issue of damages, is in favor of the petitioner and against the Village in the principal sum of $825,000.

Ordered that the order and judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the default is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a new trial on the issue of damages.

The Supreme Court erred in denying the motion of the Incorporated Village of Hempstead to vacate its default, as it demonstrated both a reasonable excuse for its default and the existence of a meritorious defense (see, A & J Concrete Corp. v Arker, 54 NY2d 870; Stone v County of Nassau, 272 AD2d 392; Matter of Long Is. Light. Co. v Assessor of Town of Brookhaven, 251 AD2d 332). O’Brien, J. P., Altman, Friedmann and Smith, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

275 A.D.2d 370, 712 N.Y.S.2d 416, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8709, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/daniel-shakespeare-co-v-incorporated-village-of-hempstead-nyappdiv-2000.

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