Daniel Sanchez Martinez v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 30, 2025
• Docket: 07-24-00341-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00341-CR

DANIEL SANCHEZ MARTINEZ, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 207th District Court Comal County, Texas 1 Trial Court No. CR2020-066C, Honorable Gary L. Steel, Presiding

July 30, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

A jury found Daniel Sanchez Martinez, Appellant, guilty of two counts of

aggravated sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child by contact. 2

On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial.

We affirm.

1 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by the

Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. 2 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.11, 22.021. BACKGROUND

In 2019, nine-year-old Paige 3 made an outcry of sexual abuse against Appellant,

her step-grandfather. Appellant was indicted with two counts of aggravated sexual

assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child. The case proceeded to a jury

trial in September of 2024.

During a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Paige testified that she told the

prosecutor that one of her cousins, A.L., was asleep in her bedroom at the time Appellant

assaulted Paige in the living room. Appellant asserted that the State had failed to disclose

this statement, which was inconsistent with Paige’s previous statement that A.L. was with

her in the living room at the time of the first assault. Following arguments to the court,

Appellant’s counsel moved for a mistrial based on the State’s failure to disclose material

evidence, which the trial court denied.

ANALYSIS

In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his motion for mistrial because the State violated Brady v. Maryland

and the Michael Morton Act by failing to disclose favorable, material evidence of a prior

inconsistent statement made by Paige. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88, 83

S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963) (prosecution has burden to timely disclose

exculpatory or mitigating evidence); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(h)

(same). The State has a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence that is material to a

3 To protect the identity of the minor victim, we refer to her by a pseudonym. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10.

2 defendant’s case. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. A Brady violation occurs when the State

fails to disclose evidence which is favorable to the accused that creates a probability

sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Thomas v.

State, 841 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc). Similarly, under article

39.14, the State must “disclose to the defendant any exculpatory, impeachment, or

mitigating document, item, or information in the possession, custody, or control of the

state that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant or would tend to reduce the

punishment for the offense charged.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(h).

Favorable evidence includes exculpatory evidence as well as impeachment evidence.

Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Johnston v. State, 917

S.W.2d 135, 138 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref’d) (Brady violation occurs when

prosecutor fails to disclose evidence that may impeach credibility of State’s witness where

witness’s credibility is material to accused’s guilt or innocence).

When previously withheld evidence is disclosed at trial, the defendant has an

opportunity to request a continuance. Williams v. State, 995 S.W.2d 754, 762 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.). A defendant’s failure to request a continuance waives

any Brady violation. Young v. State, 183 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, pet.

ref’d); Gutierrez v. State, 85 S.W.3d 446, 452 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d);

Williams, 995 S.W.2d at 762. A motion for mistrial based on a Brady violation is

appropriate only when a continuance is denied. Cohen v. State, 966 S.W.2d 756, 763–

64 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998, pet. ref’d). Likewise, a defendant’s failure to request a

continuance also waives any violation under article 39.14(h). See O’Kane v. State, No.

3 04-16-00526-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 6927, at *8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 26,

2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Appellant did not request a continuance at any time after Paige testified regarding

an inconsistent statement to prosecutors. Therefore, even if we assume without deciding

that the State had a duty to disclose the challenged evidence, we must conclude that

Appellant waived any violation of Brady and any violation of article 39.14. See Zule v.

State, 802 S.W.2d 28, 33 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburgh 1990, pet. ref’d) (holding

Brady claim waived where defense counsel moved for mistrial but not for continuance).

CONCLUSION

Having found no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judy C. Parker Justice

Do not publish.