Daniel Ratliff v. Martin O'Malley

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 29, 2024
• Docket: 23-35599
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 29 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DANIEL J. RATLIFF, No. 23-35599

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-05358-TLF

v. MEMORANDUM* MARTIN J. O'MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Theresa Lauren Fricke, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 25, 2024** Portland, Oregon

Before: LEE, VANDYKE, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Daniel J. Ratliff appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration’s denial of his application for disability

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The administrative law

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). judge (“ALJ”) determined that Ratliff was not disabled between July 10, 2015, and

May 23, 2019. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

“We review the district court’s order affirming the ALJ’s denial of social

security benefits de novo and will disturb the denial of benefits only if the decision

contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Kitchen v. Kijakazi,

82 F.4th 732, 738 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1270

(9th Cir. 2020)). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and must be more than a

mere scintilla, but may be less than a preponderance . . . .” Id. (quoting Rounds v.

Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015)). The ALJ is

“responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony,

and for resolving ambiguities.” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). If “the evidence

is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision must be

affirmed.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Vasquez v.

Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009)).

1. Ratliff argues that the ALJ erred by improperly evaluating the medical

evidence, but the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s

findings regarding Ratliff’s psychological limitations were supported by, among

other evidence, Dr. Winifred Ju’s finding that Ratliff maintained the ability to carry

2 out simple tasks and consistent reports by Ratliff’s treating physicians that his

memory and cognition appeared normal. The ALJ’s findings regarding Ratliff’s

physical limitations were supported by reports that Ratliff had a normal gait and

could stand or walk for hours at a time.

Ratliff argues that many clinical findings in the record support his alleged

physical and mental limitations. Ratliff largely fails, however, to demonstrate how

this evidence is inconsistent with the ALJ’s findings. As Ratliff concedes, the record

“does not include medical opinions from treating and examining physicians in which

they clearly describe opinions regarding Ratliff’s functional limitations.” While

Ratliff identifies portions of the record that describe his symptoms and the diagnoses

he received, a diagnosis does not itself demonstrate “severe impairment.” See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (requiring an “impairment or combination of impairments”

that is “severe”); Glanden v. Kijakazi, 86 F.4th 838, 843 (9th Cir. 2023) (“An

impairment is severe if it ‘significantly limits’ an individual’s ‘ability to do basic

work activities.’” (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c))). Because “the evidence is

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision must be

affirmed.” Smartt, 53 F.4th at 494 (quoting Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591).

2. Ratliff argues that the ALJ improperly discounted his subjective symptom

testimony. An “ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her

symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.”

3 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Smolen v.

Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Here, the ALJ provided specific reasons for finding that Ratliff’s symptoms

were not as severe as he reported. In particular, the ALJ noted that Ratliff was able

to walk and stand, that Ratliff reported engaging in certain hobbies and chores, that

Ratliff received “mostly routine and conservative mental health treatment,” that his

doctor had described Ratliff’s self-reported “panic attacks” as expressions of

moderate anxiety, and that Ratliff’s providers consistently reported that his memory

and cognition were normal. These justifications are sufficient to support the ALJ’s

findings. See Smartt, 53 F.4th at 496–97. Even if some evidence in the record

suggested that Ratliff was unable to perform simple tasks, the ALJ was entitled to

rely on the other medical evidence in the record indicating fewer limitations. Id. at

494.

3. Ratliff also argues that the ALJ improperly discounted his wife’s lay

witness testimony. Ratliff emphasizes that his wife’s lay witness report was

consistent with his own subjective testimony, and therefore should have bolstered

that testimony. An ALJ may reject a lay witness’s testimony for “germane reasons.”

Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009). Here,

because the ALJ “provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting [Ratliff’s] own

subjective complaints, and because [his wife’s] testimony was similar to such

4 complaints, it follows that the ALJ also gave germane reasons for rejecting her

testimony.” Id.

4. Ratliff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the Department of Veterans

Affairs’ (“VA”) disability rating. “[T]he ALJ ‘must ordinarily give great weight to

a VA determination of disability.’” McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 886 (9th Cir.

2011) (quoting McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002)).

“Nevertheless, because the VA and [Social Security Administration] criteria for

determining disability are not identical, we have allowed an ALJ to give less weight

to a VA disability rating if he gives persuasive, specific, valid reasons for doing so

that are supported by the record.” Valentine, 574 F.3d at 695 (cleaned up).

The ALJ expressly considered the rating and provided specific reasons for

rejecting it. The ALJ noted that the VA psychologists who examined Ratliff merely

“checked a box” indicating that he suffered from impairment, providing little

specificity about the limitations he faced. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111

(9th Cir. 2012) (allowing an ALJ to discount a “check-the-box form” unsupported

by “clinical findings”). And the ALJ explained that the VA psychologists’

evaluations were based on the subjective symptom testimony that the ALJ had

already properly rejected. The ALJ therefore did not err in discounting the VA’s

disability rating. See Valentine, 574 F.3d at 695.

AFFIRMED.