IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4){C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. c
RENDERED: AUGUST 29, 2019 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
2019-SC-000115-I
DANIEL POPA; NECC TELECOM, INC. APPELLANTS (CANADA); NECC TELECOM, INC.; PULSE TELECOM, INC. (CANADA); PULSE TELECOM PTY, LTD), SRVR, LLC; QUICKCALL.COM, LLC D/B/A BLUETONE LLC; AND BLUETONE,CONNECT, PTY LTD
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. CASE NO. 2018-CA-001053-MR JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 13-CI-002337
LUCIA TIBERIA POPA; VICENT PETRESCU; APPELLEES SHERBAN APOSTOLINA; RAMONA CEAN; AND RAUL TURCU
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Daniel Popa appeals from the Court of Appeals’ order denying his motion
for interlocutory relief pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR)
65.08. Daniel1 seeks relief from post-judgment trial court orders that he
alleges improperly impose injunctive relief. Because the trial court orders are
merely efforts to enforce the final and appealable judgment and Daniel failed to
post a supersedeas bond under CR 73.04, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
1 The two primary parties share the same surname so they will be referred to in this Opinion by their first names to avoid confusion. f (
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Daniel Popa (Daniel) and Lucia Popa (Lucia), a married couple, operated
several telecommunications businesses together. In 2010, their marriage was
dissolved, and the ownership and control of the companies was divided
between the two individuals. On May 3, 2013, Daniel filed a Complaint against
Lucia, alleging that one of the companies she controlled was not providing his
companies with the software and support they needed, contrary to a
commitment she made in the parties’ marital settlement.2 Daniel named Lucia,
her associates who were managing the companies, and several of the
companies (Lucia and the companies), as defendants in the Jefferson Circuit
Court action. The Complaint also named companies NECC US, SRVR, NECC
Canada and Pulse Australia as defendants. Lucia was a 51% majority
shareholder in three of the named companies.3
After two years of active litigation, it became clear that the only viable
solution was for one party to take complete control and pay the other for
his/her interests in the companies. In September 2015, nearly two and a half
years after the Complaint was filed, the parties entered a 79-page Settlement
2 The marital settlement agreement established that Daniel was a 49% minority shareholder in NECC US, NECC Canada, Pulse Australia and Pulse US. Daniel was a 51% majority shareholder in Pulse Canada. Lucia was a 51% majority shareholder in NECC US, NECC Canada, Pulse Australia and Pulse US, and a 49% minority shareholder of Pulse Canada. The agreement also established that Lucia would serve as CEO and director of NECC US, NECC Canada, and Pulse Australia, and serve as the CEO of Pulse Canada and sole manager of Pulse US for four years. 3 The record is unclear as to whether Lucia was the majority shareholder in SRVR when the Complaint was filed, but as discussed below, this company was purchased from Lucia as part of a later settlement agreement so it appears she either held a majority interest in SRVR or managed the company.
2 Agreement which gave Daniel full control and ownership of the companies in
exchange for making $3.58 million in payments to Lucia over roughly three
years. Daniel also purchased all of Lucia’s ownership interest in three
additional companies — SRVR, Quickcall/Bluetone, and Bluetone Australia (the
Transfer Companies). In the Settlement Agreement, Lucia warranted that the
financial statements delivered to Daniel fairly and accurately represented the
financial condition and operations of the Transfer Companies. Daniel initially
made the $5,000 daily installment payments to Lucia that were provided for in
the Settlement Agreement.
In 2016, Daniel learned that, during Lucia’s ownership and exclusive
control of the companies, the companies incurred approximately $8 million in
unpaid tax liabilities.4 In early 2017, Daniel stopped making payments under
the Settlement Agreement and pursued new claims against Lucia. On
February 16, 2017, Daniel filed a Second Amended Complaint, alleging, among
other things, breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation.
Around the same time, Daniel sought to formally realign the parties, naming all
companies involved in this litigation as plaintiffs, and leaving Lucia and her
associates as the only defendants. Daniel asserted that since Lucia breached
the representations and warranties in the Settlement Agreement, he was no
4 Given the limited record on appeal, it is not entirely clear as to which company/companies had outstanding tax liabilities. While some of the companies were initially owned by Daniel, and others (the Transfer Companies) later came under his control by virtue of the Settlement Agreement, all companies will hereinafter be referred to as “the companies” because, due to the nature of this appeal, determining which specific company or group of companies is referred to is not necessary.
3 ' ' r
longer obligated to make the daily installment payments and sought return of
the amounts he had already paid.
Over the next few months, the parties engaged in ongoing discovery
efforts. Lucia filed a motion on December 8, 2017, to enjoin Daniel from
transferring customers and also seeking other relief. Lucia sought court
intervention based on her perception that Daniel: 1) was moving customers
from one of the Transfer Companies to a business he controlled outside the
court’s jurisdiction; 2) was allowing the companies to essentially go insolvent;
and 3) was not paying taxes to an even greater extent than when she controlled
the companies. The trial court conducted a temporary injunction hearing on
January 29, 2018. This hearing was conducted off the record, at Daniel’s
urging, based on his concerns that proprietary financial information would
likely be presented and cause injury to the companies. Daniel testified first,
followed by an expert appointed by the trial court to review the unpaid tax
allegations and advise the court.
The expert testified that during the time Lucia was in control of the
companies, the tax problems were caused by the telecommunications customer
invoices, which had a line item stating what charges were for taxes and fees
but the amounts reflected were not forwarded to the taxing authorities. She
also stated that Daniel did not fix the problem once he took control of the
companies, and that the invoices he utilized stated that all taxes were included
in the customer charges, but that the companies still failed to fulfill their tax
obligations.
4 I (
Lucia was scheduled to testify after the expert, but given that all involved
anticipated that her testimony would be lengthy, the trial court adjourned the
hearing for the day. When the parties returned the following morning, the trial
court announced that after considering the situation overnight, it would be
entering an order dismissing Daniel’s breach of contract claims.
In its February 2, 2018 order, the trial court made the following rulings
relevant to this appeal: (1) all further proceedings must be conducted on the
record;5 (2) Daniel cannot prove that Lucia committed a material breach
because Daniel has acted in a manner which proves that he does not care
whether his companies have paid their taxes, meaning the payment or non
payment of taxes was not a material fact Daniel relied on in executing the
Settlement Agreement; and (3) Daniel has unclean hands because he
acknowledged that his businesses are not paying taxes, thereby precluding the
court from relieving him of the obligation to complete his payments for the
businesses based on Lucia’s alleged failure to pay taxes.
On February 15, 2018, Daniel filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus with
the Court of Appeals (2018-CA-000256), seeking to prohibit the trial court from
enforcing the February 2 order and to compel the trial court to disqualify
Lucia’s attorneys. On the same day, Daniel also filed a motion for intermediate
5 In the early stages of this litigation, the parties (or at least Daniel) requested that much of the filings and discussions regarding the failure to pay taxes, a large underlying issue in the case, be kept off the record in order to avoid providing insider information to competitors and to not impair the companies’ ability to resolve the problem. Unfortunately, the trial court obliged but it later recognized that this was improper and declined to continue the practice.
5 relief pursuant to CR 76.36(4), arguing that he would suffer immediate and
irreparable injury before his petition for writ would be heard. The Court of
Appeals denied the motion, stating that Daniel failed to show immediate and
irreparable injury. Notably, the Court of Appeals stated that in the event the
trial court entered a final judgment, Daniel would be able to pursue post
judgment remedies, such as posting a supersedeas bond.
While the petition for writ was pending before the Court of Appeals, Lucia
filed a motion for final judgment on March 22, 2018. The trial court entered its
Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment on May 3, 2018,
disposing of the case on the merits. The final judgment provided that: (1) Lucia
was entitled to immediate judgment against Daniel in the amount of
$1,525,000, to be paid within ten days of entry, and if not paid within ten days,
Daniel would owe the full amount of the remaining purchase price from the
Settlement Agreement, totaling $1,749,964.20 plus prejudgment interest; (2)
Daniel was enjoined and prohibited from transferring any other customers from
the Transfer Companies to Apela (a company not involved in this case); (3)
Daniel provide an itemization of all bank accounts of the Transfer Companies
to ensure Lucia receives payments as contemplated by the Settlement
Agreement; (4) Lucia’s monitoring rights be restored in accordance with the
Settlement Agreement, and (5) Daniel not be permitted to participate in Lucia’s
monitoring rights or frustrate them in any way.
After entry of the final judgment, Daniel filed his direct appeal to the
Court of Appeals on July 9, 2018 (2018-CA-001053, the present case), but did
6 not post a supersedeas bond pursuant to CR 73.04. Lucia began conducting
post-judgment discovery and efforts to collect the overdue payments from
Daniel in the trial court. In her brief on this appeal, Lucia states that the
discovery revealed that Daniel was ignoring the orders in the final Judgment,
moving revenue from the Transfer Companies to undisclosed bank accounts
and concealing money from Lucia.
On September 17, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on Lucia’s motion
to hold Daniel in contempt for his post-judgment conduct. The trial court
heard arguments from both sides regarding the contempt allegations, primarily
hearing testimony about the Transfer Companies having established new bank
accounts in other states and using the accounts to avoid the May 3,. 2018
Judgment. The trial court determined in lieu of taking additional proof on the
banking issues, it “would consider implementing alternative remedies to ensure
appropriate oversight of the Transfer Companies’ operations during such time
as the May 3, 2018 Judgment remains in force, and until such time as Daniel
and the Transfer Companies may supersede the Judgment through the posting
of security or otherwise.” Ultimately the trial court appointed Jay Hatfield,
Chief Financial Officer of the Transfer Companies, to fill a receiver-type role to
satisfy concerns regarding the operation of the Transfer Companies.
Importantly, the trial court noted that it “has the authority to enforce its own .
judgments and to remove any obstructions to such enforcement,” citing the
May 3, 2018 final judgment. Akers v. Stephenson, 469 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Ky.
1970).
7 Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order on September 25,
2018, providing the following: (1) all revenue and checks received by Daniel’s
companies must be processed through Fifth Third Bank, BB&T, or Bank of
Montreal and not through any other financial institution, and Lucia shall have
full access to those accounts; (2) Daniel shall not open any new accounts at the
Bank of Montreal; (3) all rights of Lucia per the Settlement Agreement shall be
restored, including her right to a $5,000 payment from Daniel each day, and
she shall have the ability to transfer funds if the daily payments are not met;
(4) Lucia must approve of any payments/transfers greater than $5,000 to any
payee; and (5) Hatfield shall continue to provide Lucia reports as part of her
monitoring rights.
On October 29, 2018, the parties again appeared before the court to
address Lucia’s efforts to collect the amounts owed to her, but unpaid by
Daniel. The trial court entered an order on October 31, 2018, noting that the
ongoing dispute was not typical of a post-judgment/collection process and that
the purpose of the order was to enforce the parties’ Settlement Agreement and
bring this matter to a close. The court stated that most viable companies post
a supersedeas bond to prevent debt collection efforts (e.g., garnishment of bank
accounts) from posing a threat to ongoing, day-to-day company operations,
while, conversely, most companies in financial distress seek the protection of
bankruptcy courts. The trial court noted that, Daniel having elected to do
neither, the purpose of the order was to “set out in detail the ground rules for
this unfortunate cat-and-mouse contest.”
8 ( (
The October 31, 2018 order in part replaced some paragraphs of the
September 29 order, and set out the following: (1) pursuant to the Settlement
Agreement, the Transfer Companies shall only utilize the above-listed banks, or
any bank approved in advance by Lucia and the Transfer Companies’ funds
shall not be diverted to any other collection mechanism; and (2) Lucia’s
monitoring rights shall continue. Lucia also moved to be installed as the CEO,
per the Settlement Agreement, to address her contentions that Daniel was
inappropriately transferring company funds, but the trial court declined to
utilize that remedy at the time.
On November 5, 2018, Daniel filed a motion for interlocutory relief
pursuant to CR 65.08 in the Court of Appeals. Daniel argued that (1) since the
final judgment had been appealed to the Court of Appeals, the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to impose new and different injunctions; (2) because the
final judgment contains an award of money damages for the complete unpaid
amount of the parties’ contract, any injunctive order for specific performance is
duplicative and contrary to law; and (3) the final judgment’s injunctions and
the post-appeal injunctions were improperly entered without any evidentiary
hearing on the merits.
On the same day, Daniel filed a motion seeking emergency “relief from
injunctions entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court, including the injunctions in
the trial court’s May 3, 2018 final judgment as well as additional injunctions
imposed in Orders entered on September 25, 2017, and October 31, 2018.”
His motion was presented under CR 65.08(7), which states that “[i]f a movant
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will suffer irreparable injury before the Court of Appeals may hear the motion,
the movant may request emergency relief . . . Daniel argued that the trial
court’s orders after the final judgment “eviscerated” his right to appeal, and
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose the subsequent injunctions.
As a result, he alleges he will suffer irreparable harm because the enforcement
of the trial court orders will allow Lucia to seize the companies’ capital in
collecting the judgment, thereby destroying the companies.
Lucia responded to the interlocutory appeal and the motion for
emergency relief, stating that Daniel has provided no evidence that the
companies would suffer irreparable harm. She also noted that Daniel has had
every opportunity to post a supersedeas bond to stay the effect of the trial
court’s final judgment but has failed to do so. Additionally, she stated that
Daniel has shown no just cause for extraordinary relief because he waited six
months after the final judgment was entered to seek interlocutory and
emergency relief. While his motion was pending with the Court of Appeals, the
trial court entered an order on December 3, 2018, finding Daniel in contempt
of the October 31, 2018 order. The trial court imposed a civil fine of $10,000
per calendar day for every day of noncompliance with the provision of the order
requiring Daniel to deposit funds from the companies’ operations only in
certain banks.
On December 11, 2018, the Court of Appeals denied Daniel’s motion for
intermediate relief pursuant to CR 65.08(7). The Court of Appeals determined
that Daniel’s argument lacked evidentiary support, and that “raw speculation
10 (
is woefully insufficient to show ruinous injury.” Gilbert v. McDonald-Burkman,
320 S.W.3d 79, 86 (Ky. 2010). On February 19, 2019, the Court of Appeals
denied Daniel’s motion for interlocutory relief pursuant to CR 65.08. The
Court of Appeals reasoned that Daniel’s actions were interfering with Lucia’s
ability to collect on the judgment, and that in its subsequent orders the trial
court was not ordering the parties to take any actions inconsistent with the
final judgment. Citing Chesley v. Abbott, 503 S.W.3d 148 (Ky. 2016), the Court
of Appeals observed that Lucia’s actions were legitimate efforts to seek the trial
court’s assistance in collecting the outstanding judgment, rendering CR 65.08
inapplicable.
Daniel now appeals to this Court, seeking relief from the alleged
injunctive measures imposed by the trial court. Finding the trial court’s post
judgment orders to be legitimate efforts to enforce the judgment, we affirm the
Court of Appeals.6
6 As a threshold argument, Lucia states that assuming the orders are injunctions, Daniel did not comply with CR 65.08(1) and (3), which states that a party may “move the circuit court to grant, suspend or modify injunctive relief during the pendency of the appeal.” A party adversely affected by the trial court’s ruling on such motion may move the Court of Appeals for relief. However, given the nature of this appeal, we do not have the trial court record available and therefore are unable to confirm whether Daniel made such a motion in the trial court before pursuing interlocutory relief. Given our ultimate resolution of this appeal, Lucia’s procedural argument is immaterial.
11 ANALYSIS
I. The trial court maintained jurisdiction to enter the post judgment orders because the orders constitute efforts to enforce the final judgment and Settlement Agreement between the parties.
Daniel asserts that the trial court imposed the following three
injunctions: (1) prohibiting his companies from transferring customers or
customer accounts to third-party companies; (2) requiring his companies to
disclose their bank account information within ten days of the final judgment;
and (3) requiring his companies to provide Lucia with continuing access to
financial and banking information. He also argues that after he filed a notice of
appeal, the pendency of that appeal deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to
impose these “new and different” injunctions.
Daniel notes that a trial court is generally without jurisdiction to take
any action that would change or modify a judgment that is the basis of a
pending appeal. While it is true that “once a notice of appeal is filed the trial
court no longer retains jurisdiction to rule on motions for injunctive relief. .
the post-judgment orders in this case were merely trial court efforts to enforce
the final judgment. Linden v. Griffin, 436 S.W.3d 521, 523 (Ky. 2014). A trial
court is empowered “to enforce its own judgments and to remove any
obstructions to such enforcement.” Akers, 469 S.W.2d at 706. The trial court
orders subsequent to the final judgment did not modify or change anything in
the final judgment. Rather, the orders were the court’s attempts to enforce the
judgment by requiring Daniel to pay Lucia, as the parties agreed to in their
September 2015 Settlement Agreement. 12 c c .
To support the denial of interlocutory relief, the Court of Appeals relied
on Chesley. In Chesley, the Court of Appeals denied Chesley’s motion for
interlocutory relief under CR 65.07, and upon review this Court held that since
the trial court order was not an injunction, interlocutory relief was not proper.
Id. at 149. The case involved attorneys who misappropriated funds and
breached fee contracts in a national product liability case involving the drug
fen-phen. Id. at 150. The former clients brought a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty against the lawyers, and ultimately the trial court determined
that Chesley and the other attorneys were jointly and severally liable to their
clients for $42 million. Id. at 151. After being permanently disbarred in
Kentucky, and retiring from his Ohio law practice, Chesley transferred $59
million to his former law firm, to be held in trust during the winding up of his
practice. Id. His former clients filed a motion with the trial court to transfer
Chesley’s interest in the trust to satisfy the $42 million judgment, and
ultimately in June 2015 the trial court ordered the trustee to make the
payments. Id. at 152, Chesley immediately requested relief from the Court of
Appeals under CR 65.07 and his motion was denied. Id.
On appeal, this Court determined that as a prerequisite for obtaining
relief under CR 65.07 or 65.09, the order at issue must be an injunction. Id.
Chesley argued that the trial court erred by ordering him to transfer funds held
in a foreign jurisdiction, and that the order amounted to a temporary
injunction because it was entered prior to the adjudication of all outstanding
claims. Id. at 153. This Court disagreed, holding that the trial court’s June
13 ' {
2015 order required Chesley to comply with the unpaid final judgment on the
fiduciary duty claim and did not occur during the pendency of the case. Id. at
153. Although there were other claims against Chesley that had yet to be
resolved, the fiduciary duty claim was complete and a judgment was entered
accordingly. Therefore, the June 2015 order was “a post-judgment order in
furtherance of Respondent’s efforts to collect on the outstanding judgment. . .”
rather than an injunction. Id. at 154.
“A temporary injunction generally functions to hold the status quo until
the merits of an action can be decided. Although the circuit court may grant a
temporary injunction, it is only empowered to do so during the pendency of the
action.” Id. at 153 (internal citations omitted). Although Chesley sought relief
under CR 65.07, and Daniel sought relief under CR 65.08, the two cases share
similarities. Daniel and Chesley both had monetary judgments entered against
them, which specifically stated that they were final and appealable orders. Id.
at 153. After filing a motion to reconsider and a motion to vacate the
judgment, which were both denied, Chesley appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Id. As in Daniel’s case, Chesley “declined to post a supersedeas bond to stay
enforcement of the judgment pending his appeal.” Id. Because of his failure,
the trial court later entered the order requiring him to transfer his trust
interest to satisfy the money judgment — a post-judgment collection effort on a
nearly year-old judgment. Id.
In Daniel’s case, the final judgment was entered on May 3, 2018, making
Lucia’s collection and enforcement efforts over a year old. The trial court’s
14 f (
subsequent orders were not seeking to impose any new or different orders, but
rather to enforce the final judgment that had already been entered. Although
Daniel claims there are outstanding issues in this case, such as breach of
contract claims against Lucia, the trial court was simply seeking to enforce the
Settlement Agreement between the parties and require Daniel to make the
payments owed to Lucia.
Daniel attempts to distinguish Chesley from his case by stating that the
orders against Chesley did not include any injunctive relief under CR 65,
thereby leading this Court to conclude appeal under CR 65.09 was improper.
503 S.W.3d at 152-54. Daniel states that the final judgment in his case
contains injunctive orders and that the post-judgment orders include new and
different injunctions than the final judgment. But all orders contained in the
final May 3, 2018 judgment are in furtherance of the Settlement Agreement,
and all additional orders were made in furtherance of the final judgment. As
stated above, the trial court determined that Daniel engaged in business
practices to deplete the companies’ assets and transfer funds outside of the
court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the directives in both the final judgment and
the post-judgment orders were necessary to enforce the Settlement Agreement.
Daniel further argues that he was never provided with a “full and fair
opportunity” to present his case opposing “temporary or permanent injunctive
relief on the merits,” but having reviewed the record on this appeal, we
disagree.
15 I
As in Chesley, Daniel failed to post a supersedeas bond, claiming that
posting such a bond would cause the companies to endure financial hardship,
and cause irreparable injury including complete destruction of the companies
in this litigation. While a party pursuing appeal is not required to post a
supersedeas bond, the bond would best protect all parties’ interests while the
appeal is pending.
Generally a supersedeas bond is posted at or near the time that the notice of appeal is filed. Both the appellant and a “good and sufficient surety” sign the bond. The bond stays execution of the judgment and is conditioned on the “satisfaction of the judgment in full... if the judgment is affirmed” on appeal. In other words, it is simply a promise by an appellant and the surety to pay the judgment if it is affirmed. Because of the risk they take, sureties naturally charge a fee for executing a supersedeas bond. A party, however, does not need to post a supersedeas bond to take an appeal from a judgment. The failure to post a bond, however, leaves the party who obtained the judgment free to execute on it, though the party who executes on a judgment during the pendency of an appeal of the judgment does so at his or her own risk because, if the judgment is reversed, any benefits obtained by virtue of the execution must be restored to the adverse party.
Elk Hom Coal Corp. v. Cheyenne Res., Inc., 163 S.W.3d 408, 419-20 (Ky. 2005).
Since Daniel did not post a supersedeas bond to secure the judgment amount,
Lucia is free to execute on the judgment and collect the amount owed to her.
This is exactly what she has done. All orders entered after the final May 3
judgment have been authorized attempts to enforce the court’s orders — to
collect for Lucia what she is owed by Daniel.
16 ' c
Although the complete trial court record is not available for review on
this appeal, the trial court orders attached to the briefs make it very clear that
Daniel has engaged in questionable business practices, delayed the litigation
through procedural tactics, and moved customers and funds around to avoid
paying the judgment. Given the lengthy history of this case and the allegations
and trial court findings of improper business actions, the trial court’s specific
and limited post-judgment orders were necessary and proper.7
CONCLUSION
In sum, the trial court orders simply seek to enforce a judgment that is
entirely based on the Settlement Agreement that Daniel voluntarily entered into
with Lucia. Without posting a supersedeas bond, Daniel cannot stay the
enforcement of the judgment while his several appeals are pending. Lucia is
entitled to collect on the judgment, and the trial court is empowered to aid in
the collection efforts. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ denial of
interlocutory relief.
Minton, C.J.; Buckingham, Hughes, Keller, VanMeter, and Wright, JJ.,
sitting. All concur. Lambert, J., not sitting.
7 Lucia alternatively argues that Daniel has failed to establish “extraordinary cause” for relief pursuant to CR 65.09(1). We have found the post-judgment orders are not injunctions and thus CR 65.08 and 65.09 are not applicable.
17 ( c
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:
Jill F. Endicott Robert Kenyon Meyer Jeremy Stuart Rogers Marisa Elizabeth Main Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES:
Alan N. Linker Seiller Waterman LLC
David B. Tachau Tachau Meek PLC
Paul Joseph Hershberg Paul Hershberg Law, PLLC