Daniel Peristere v. Wms Properties, LLC.

Massachusetts Appeals Court

Daniel Peristere v. Wms Properties, LLC.

Massachusetts Appeals Court·Decided April 17, 2026·No. 25-P-0053·Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-53

DANIEL PERISTERE

vs.

WMS PROPERTIES, LLC.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, WMS Properties, LLC, brought a summary

process action against the plaintiff, Daniel Peristere, in the

Housing Court for possession of a residential property (the

property). After a trial, a jury granted possession of the

property to the defendant in February 2019. Although the

plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, which this court docketed,

it was dismissed. On October 15, 2024, the plaintiff filed a

complaint in the Superior Court seeking to remove the underlying

Housing Court summary process matter to the Superior Court. A

judge of the Superior Court dismissed that complaint on the

grounds that there was no authority to remove a Housing Court

summary process action to the Superior Court. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

The parties are familiar with the facts and extensive procedural history in this case. Accordingly, we do not repeat that information here.

Discussion. "[A] court's sua sponte motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is analogous to a party's motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (1) or (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974)." Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 460 Mass. 762, 764 (2011). "We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, and determining whether allegations plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief." Lanier v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 490 Mass. 37, 43 (2022). The plaintiff argues that the case must be removed to the Superior Court as a matter of right because the Housing Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree.

The Housing Court has "jurisdiction to hear summary process complaints, in which the owner of a housing unit seeks to evict the occupant of that unit and recover possession." Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Rego, 474 Mass. 329, 338 (2016). See G. L.

c. 185C, § 3.¹ In his filings in the original summary process action, the plaintiff acknowledged that this is a summary process proceeding. Hence, the Housing Court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case. See Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, supra.

The judge dismissed the complaint because "there is no statute or rule that allows the plaintiff to unilaterally and without authorization 'remove' a Housing Court eviction case to the Superior Court." We agree. "[H]earing eviction actions is an express and essential Housing Court function," and the judge properly dismissed the complaint on these grounds. Cambridge St. Realty, LLC v. Stewart, 481 Mass. 121, 127 (2018).²

The defendant's request for fees is denied.

Judgment of dismissal

affirmed. By the Court (Desmond, Tan & Wood, JJ.³),

Clerk

Entered: April 17, 2026.

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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-53

DANIEL PERISTERE

vs.

WMS PROPERTIES, LLC.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, WMS Properties, LLC, brought a summary

process action against the plaintiff, Daniel Peristere, in the

Housing Court for possession of a residential property (the

property). After a trial, a jury granted possession of the

property to the defendant in February 2019. Although the

plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, which this court docketed,

it was dismissed. On October 15, 2024, the plaintiff filed a

complaint in the Superior Court seeking to remove the underlying

Housing Court summary process matter to the Superior Court. A

judge of the Superior Court dismissed that complaint on the

grounds that there was no authority to remove a Housing Court

summary process action to the Superior Court. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

The parties are familiar with the facts and extensive procedural history in this case. Accordingly, we do not repeat that information here.

Discussion. "[A] court's sua sponte motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is analogous to a party's motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (1) or (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974)." Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 460 Mass. 762, 764 (2011). "We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, and determining whether allegations plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief." Lanier v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 490 Mass. 37, 43 (2022). The plaintiff argues that the case must be removed to the Superior Court as a matter of right because the Housing Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree.

The Housing Court has "jurisdiction to hear summary process complaints, in which the owner of a housing unit seeks to evict the occupant of that unit and recover possession." Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Rego, 474 Mass. 329, 338 (2016). See G. L.

c. 185C, § 3.¹ In his filings in the original summary process action, the plaintiff acknowledged that this is a summary process proceeding. Hence, the Housing Court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case. See Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, supra.

The judge dismissed the complaint because "there is no statute or rule that allows the plaintiff to unilaterally and without authorization 'remove' a Housing Court eviction case to the Superior Court." We agree. "[H]earing eviction actions is an express and essential Housing Court function," and the judge properly dismissed the complaint on these grounds. Cambridge St. Realty, LLC v. Stewart, 481 Mass. 121, 127 (2018).²

The defendant's request for fees is denied.

Judgment of dismissal

affirmed. By the Court (Desmond, Tan & Wood, JJ.³),

Clerk

Entered: April 17, 2026.

Daniel Peristere v. Wms Properties, LLC., (Mass. Ct. App. 2026).

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