Supreme Court of Florida
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Nos. SC2026-1234, SC2026-1236, & SC2026-1281
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DANIEL O. CONAHAN, JR.,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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No. SC2026-1282
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DANIEL O. CONAHAN, JR.,
Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
September 3, 2026
TANENBAUM, J.
Daniel Conahan received a death sentence for murdering Richard Montgomery. Governor DeSantis signed a warrant on August 11, 2026, and Conahan’s execution was set for September
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10, 2026. Conahan appeals from court orders summarily denying his third and fourth successive motions for post-conviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and from an order summarily denying his motion for post-conviction DNA testing filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853. He also requests a stay of execution and has petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.; see also State v. Fourth Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 697 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla. 1997) (holding “that in addition to our appellate jurisdiction over sentences of death, we have exclusive jurisdiction to review all types of collateral proceedings in death penalty cases”). For the reasons set out below, we affirm the summary denials of post-conviction relief, deny Conahan’s request for a stay of execution, and deny him any relief on his habeas petition.
I
The underlying facts of this case are as follows. Sometime in the evening of April 16, 1996, Montgomery informed some friends that he was going out to make a few hundred dollars but would return soon. He did not tell the friends, but he did tell his mother, that someone had offered him $200 to pose for nude pictures. He
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also mentioned, though without identifying Conahan as the offeror, that he had recently met a Daniel Conahan who lived in Punta Gorda Isles and was a nurse at a medical center, all of which accurately described Appellant/Petitioner, Conahan.
The next day, April 17, Montgomery was found dead in a remote, heavily wooded area. He was nude, his genitalia had been removed, and he had visible signs of trauma to the neck, waist, wrists, and back. His body was covered in carpet padding, and deputies found a rope on top of a nearby trash pile. They also found human remains from other, unidentified decedents around the scene. Of note, a K-9 showed unusual interest in a portion of a tree that looked somewhat flattened and worn down.
An autopsy showed that Montgomery had died from strangulation. The marks along his neck, chest, and wrists were of similar width and were consistent with marks that would be left on an individual who had been tied to a tree. Those marks did not extend to his back, but Dr. Imami, who prepared the autopsy report, agreed that the distinct marks on his back were also consistent with his having been tied to a tree.
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In 1994, Conahan carried out an eerily similar assault on another victim, Stanley Burden,1 who physically resembled Montgomery and, like Montgomery, was a high school drop-out who had difficulty maintaining steady income. Conahan approached Burden and offered to pay him between $100 and $150 to pose for nude photographs. After Burden agreed, Conahan drove him to the woods, where Conahan laid out a tarp and took multiple pictures on a Polaroid camera. Conahan then took out a package of clothesline so that he could take “bondage” pictures. Conahan asked Burden to get close to a nearby tree, draped the clothesline over Burden, then suddenly snapped the rope tightly around Burden and tied him to the tree, at which point Conahan proceeded to perform oral sex on Burden before attempting to sodomize him. After failing to sodomize Burden, Conahan hit him in the head and attempted to strangle him with the rope for thirty minutes. Frustrated, Conahan asked Burden why he would not die and eventually left the scene with Burden still tied to the tree.
1. The details of this assault were presented at trial under the Williams rule. See Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959); § 90.404(2), Fla. Evid. Code.
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Based on the similarities in Burden’s and Montgomery’s cases, law enforcement launched an undercover investigation of Conahan, during which Conahan twice offered money to an undercover officer in exchange for sexual favors. This included an offer of $150 if the undercover officer posed for nude pictures. Law enforcement also obtained paint samples from Conahan’s father’s car, which Conahan sometimes used. Analysts found that the paint samples from the car were indistinguishable from a paint chip that was found on Montgomery’s body. Law enforcement also found that, on the evening of April 16, 1996, Conahan’s credit card was used to purchase clothesline, Polaroid film, pliers, and a utility knife from a Punta Gorda Walmart. Security photos showed that just minutes later, Conahan withdrew cash from a nearby ATM. No items recovered from the crime scene contained Conahan’s DNA. All of this evidence was presented at Conahan’s bench trial. 2 The trial court found and adjudicated Conahan guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and kidnapping.
2. Conahan waived his right to a jury for the guilt phase of his trial.
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At the penalty phase of Conahan’s trial, Dr. Huser, a medical examiner, testified that killing a person by ligature strangulation would require one to apply pressure for an extended length of time. She also stated that to be killed by strangulation would be terrifying. She also opined that Montgomery’s ligature injuries had all been sustained before he died, which differed from Dr. Imami’s opinion that some of the injuries were post-mortem, noting that it defied common sense for Conahan to have restrained Montgomery after he died.
The jury recommended a death sentence on the murder conviction by a twelve-to-zero vote. The trial court agreed and sentenced Conahan to death.
On direct appeal, we affirmed Conahan’s convictions and sentences, including the death sentence. Conahan v. State, 844 So. 2d 629, 643 (Fla. 2003). For post-conviction timeliness purposes under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, finality occurred when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review on October 6, 2003. See Conahan v. Florida, 540 U.S. 895 (2003).
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Since then, Conahan has asserted multiple unsuccessful collateral challenges to both the judgment and death sentence, in both state and federal courts. See Conahan v. State, 118 So. 3d 718 (Fla. 2013) (affirming denial of Conahan’s initial motion for post-conviction relief and denying habeas relief); Conahan v. State, 2017 WL 656306 (Fla. Feb. 17, 2017) (affirming denial of Conahan’s first successive motion for post-conviction relief); Conahan v. State, 258 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. 2018) (affirming summary denial of Conahan’s second successive motion for post-conviction relief); Conahan v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:13-cv-428-JES-KCD, 2023 WL 2648168 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2023) (denying habeas relief); Conahan v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 2024 WL 2950845 (11th Cir. May 31, 2024) (denying Conahan’s motion for a certificate of appealability); Conahan v. Dixon, 145 S. Ct. 1195 (2025) (denying Conahan’s petition for writ of certiorari); see also Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2007) (denying class petition, which Conahan had joined, challenging the constitutionality of Florida’s lethal injection procedures); Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So. 3d 529 (Fla. 2014) (denying class petition, which Conahan had joined, challenging the constitutionality of the Timely Justice Act of 2013).
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On February 3, 2023, Conahan filed a third successive rule 3.851 motion for post-conviction relief, which the trial court summarily denied on July 14, 2026. Meanwhile, on January 17, 2025, Conahan filed his rule 3.853 motion for post-conviction DNA testing, which remained pending until after the death warrant was signed on August 11, 2026. He appealed the summary denial of his third successive rule 3.851 motion on August 7, 2026. Governor DeSantis set Conahan’s execution for September 10, 2026, and the trial court denied Conahan’s rule 3.853 motion the day after the warrant was signed, on August 12, 2026. Conahan appealed that denial order on the same day.
Meanwhile, Conahan moved this court to extend the time set by our post-warrant schedule governing post-conviction proceedings, in the light of his two contemporaneous appeals. After we denied that motion, Conahan filed a fourth successive motion for post-conviction relief and a motion to stay execution in the trial court. Conahan then moved to amend his fourth successive motion, which request the trial court denied. The trial court then summarily denied the rule 3.851 motion and the motion to stay in a single order, and Conahan appealed that order and moved, now in
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this court, to stay his execution. Conahan also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court. His three appeals have been consolidated, and we now address those appeals, his motion to stay, and his writ petition.
II
Starting with the appeals from the denials of Conahan’s third and fourth successive rule 3.851 motions, the trial court has the authority to summarily deny a motion for post-conviction relief if either the motion fails to sufficiently “allege factual elements sufficient to constitute a basis for the collateral relief sought” or “the record conclusively shows no entitlement to relief.” State v. Weeks, 166 So. 2d 892, 897 (Fla. 1964) (internal quotations omitted); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B); see also State v. Reynolds, 238 So. 2d 598, 600 (Fla. 1970) (holding that the trial court “may make a summary disposition” when it determines that the motion either “is defective in form or substance and insufficient to state a prima facie case entitling the prisoner to relief” or “appears to be sufficient, but the files and records in the case conclusively refute the allegations or otherwise conclusively preclude relief”); Muhammad v. State, 426 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. 1982) (“If the motion
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and the record and files of the case conclusively show that the movant is not entitled to relief, the motion may be denied without an evidentiary hearing.”).
In reviewing the trial court’s summary denials, we must treat the defendant’s “allegations as true except to the extent that they are conclusively rebutted by the record.” Harich v. State, 484 So. 2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 1986); see also Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008). “The defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally valid claim. Mere conclusory allegations are not sufficient to meet this burden.” Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000). “We must examine each claim to determine if it is legally sufficient, and, if so, determine whether or not the claim is refuted by the record.” Id. Applying these principles here, we conclude that the trial court’s summary denials of Conahan’s successive rule 3.851 motions were not error meriting any appellate relief.
Both successive rule 3.851 motions hinge on claims of newly discovered evidence. The “newly discovered evidence” supporting the third successive motion consists of reports prepared by would- be forensic experts who reviewed the autopsy report, the paint
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evidence, and the fiber evidence from trial on Conahan’s request. The “newly discovered evidence” supporting the fourth successive motion consists of a consensus study report documenting “concerns” with the “Medicolegal Death Investigation System,” though Conahan’s actual argument simply amounts to his belief that the State’s experts’ testimony contained “elements of bias.” The problem with both successive motions is thus clear: although the reports cited are new, the evidence is not.
To overcome the one-year time limit on rule 3.851 motions by reason of newly discovered evidence, the motion must allege that “the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown . . . and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A). Furthermore, any successive motion for post-conviction relief “must be dismissed” if “there was no good cause for failing to assert those grounds in a prior motion.” See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2). There is no reason why Conahan or counsel could not have, through the exercise of due diligence, dug into and challenged back in 2003 the autopsy report, the fiber evidence, or the paint evidence that they ultimately challenged in Conahan’s third successive rule 3.851 motion, almost twenty years
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after his death sentence became final.
Likewise, there is no reason why Conahan could not have argued in a timely post-conviction motion that the State’s experts’ testimony included “elements of bias.” Everything Conahan has cited to from the consensus study report to support his argument is a basic, commonsense principle that any lawyer exercising due diligence could have applied to an analysis of the State’s experts’ testimony, such as the principle that an expert’s testimony should not be “overly influenced by nonscientific information.” In sum, nothing in the report was necessary to the argument Conahan raised in his fourth successive rule 3.851 motion. See Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 318, 325 (Fla. 2007) (noting that this court “has not recognized [] ‘new research studies’ as newly discovered evidence”); Sliney v. State, 362 So. 3d 186, 189 (Fla. 2023) (finding that an updated scientific consensus did not constitute newly discovered evidence where the operative facts had “long been available”). Moreover, the report is from a study on deaths of individuals while incarcerated or in police custody—it is hardly related to the expert testimony in this case, which centered on the murder of a civilian that took place in the woods.
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That said, Conahan’s main argument on appeal, which he also raised in his fourth successive rule 3.851 motion, is that the thirty- day period between the signing of the death warrant and the execution date is not long enough for him to fully investigate and litigate both his pre-warrant and post-warrant claims, which, he asserts, is a violation of his due process rights. Beyond that, Conahan contends that the trial court unnecessarily shortened the time period for him to present his claims in that court, mostly by making his fourth successive rule 3.851 motion due three days earlier than it would have been due under the State’s proposed post-warrant schedule. To bolster that argument and as a separate basis for relief, Conahan also alleges that the trial court erred in denying his request to amend his fourth successive rule 3.851 motion as untimely.
Turning first to the amendment request, allowing Conahan to amend his motion would not have helped him because the argument he sought to add would have been procedurally barred for the same reason the arguments he actually made were barred: Conahan failed to establish that the “newly discovered evidence” underlying his amendment request could not have been found by
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the exercise of due diligence or that there was some other good cause for him not to have raised the argument sooner. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A), (e)(2). And he makes no attempt to do so on appeal. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to amend.
As for the due process argument itself, a “motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence,” which is what Conahan titled his fourth successive rule 3.851 motion, is not the proper vehicle for bringing such a claim. That is because procedural defects in carrying out a sentence give no reason to vacate the sentence (or the underlying judgment). At best, Conahan’s due process argument could be construed as further elaboration on his motion to stay. That said, the argument lacks merit. We have repeatedly stated that expedited warrant proceedings do not constitute a violation of due process. See, e.g., Jennings v. State, 422 So. 3d 107, 118–19 (Fla.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 402 (2025); Jones v. State, 419 So. 3d 619, 625 (Fla.) (citing multiple cases that concluded the same), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 79 (2025). And this is so even when claims were pending at the time the warrant was signed. See Hutchinson v. State, 416 So. 3d 273, 279–80 (Fla.), cert.
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denied, 145 S. Ct. 1980 (2025). All due process requires is notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 27 (Fla. 2016) (citing Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993)); Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Roberts, 2 Fla. 102 (1848). As we found decisive in Jones, Conahan “has not identified any matter on which he was denied notice and an opportunity to be heard.” 419 So. 3d at 625.
Conahan contends that having more time post-warrant would have enabled him to raise additional claims, noting that he had only six hours to file public records requests under section 27.7081, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852. Conahan does not identify what those additional claims might have been, and, more crucially, ignores the fact that he had almost twenty-three years before the warrant was signed to file any rule 3.852 requests and raise any claims. See Glock v. Moore, 776 So. 2d 243, 254 (Fla. 2001) (recognizing that defendants ought to show good cause for waiting until after the death warrant is signed to make public records requests); Sims v. State, 753 So. 2d 66, 70 (Fla. 2000) (explaining that rule 3.852 is “not intended to be a procedure authorizing a fishing expedition for records”). Conahan
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cannot wait over two decades and then complain that he has not had enough time to investigate possible additional bases to challenge his conviction and sentence. Indeed, he has challenged them multiple times. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in denying him relief on his due process claim.
III
Apart from the due process challenge to the denials of the successive rule 3.851 motions, Conahan focuses his appeal on the trial court’s denial of his rule 3.853 motion. In that motion, Conahan asked to test five different items for DNA. The items were all tested before trial, none were found to contain Conahan’s DNA, some were found to contain DNA from a contributor other than Conahan or Montgomery, and these facts were presented at trial. Now, Conahan argues that advances in DNA science would enable the third-party contributor to be identified. For purposes of a rule 3.853 motion, the difference between “someone other than Conahan” and “a specific named individual other than Conahan” is narrow, to put it mildly.
To grant a rule 3.853 motion, the trial court must find “a reasonable probability that the movant would have been acquitted
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or would have received a lesser sentence if the DNA evidence had been admitted at trial.” See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(c)(5)(C); § 925.11(2)(f)3., Fla. Stat. There is no reasonable probability that knowing the identity of the third-party contributor would have changed any aspect of the outcome. And as the trial court noted in its order denying the rule 3.853 motion, Montgomery’s body was found in an open area commonly used as a trash dump, so it “should not, therefore, be surprising that the victim’s hair might carry random DNA.” The same goes for the two cigarette butts found at the scene, which contained neither Conahan’s nor Montgomery’s DNA but did contain a third party’s DNA.
That leaves the two sets of Montgomery’s fingernail clippings, which contained only Montgomery’s DNA. Conahan argues that advances in DNA testing may show traces of another contributor’s DNA. As the trial court pointed out, this argument rests entirely on the purely speculative notion that Montgomery clawed at his attacker during the murder. The burden was on Conahan to show a reasonable probability that his requested DNA testing would exonerate him or lessen his sentence. See Scott v. State, 46 So. 3d 529, 533 (Fla. 2009). Conahan offered nothing except that maybe
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someone else’s DNA would be found on Montgomery’s fingernails. This was not enough to carry his burden. We thus find that Conahan’s rule 3.853 motion was properly denied.
IV
Lastly, we turn to Conahan’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition is essentially an attempt by Conahan to relitigate the entire case, repeating factual claims from his previously denied rule 3.851 motions and insisting that this court must ignore procedural barriers and its own prior decisions because failing to ignore them would result in a “manifest injustice.” Conahan asserts that he has been denied meaningful appellate review, which the procedural history of this case flatly refutes. See Conahan, 844 So. 2d 629; Conahan, 540 U.S. 895; Conahan, 118 So. 3d 718; Conahan, 2017 WL 656306; Conahan, 258 So. 3d 1237; Conahan, 2023 WL 2648168; Conahan, 2024 WL 2950845; Conahan, 145 S. Ct. 1195. Conahan insists that he is nevertheless entitled to what would essentially be another direct appeal so that his various post-conviction claims can be considered in the aggregate, ignoring the axiomatic fact that a litigant “is not
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entitled to two appeals.” See Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1958).
We have been clear: “[h]abeas corpus is not a second appeal and cannot be used to litigate or relitigate issues which could have been, should have been, or were raised on direct appeal.” Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1992) (citing Porter v. Dugger, 559 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1990); Clark v. Dugger, 559 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1990)). Conahan asserts that there is a “manifest injustice” exception to this principle. He cites cases where we recognized such an exception to res judicata, collateral estoppel, and “law of the case” doctrines, but they are distinguishable as arising in non- habeas contexts.
Still, it is true we have acknowledged a “manifest injustice”
exception to a habeas petition’s being otherwise procedurally barred. Cf. Walls v. State, 423 So. 3d 865, 876 (Fla.) (considering and rejecting argument that enforcing procedural bar to habeas petition would result in “manifest injustice” (citing prior decisions)), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1436 (2025). Conahan claims the “manifest injustice” that would result from our not lifting the procedural bar here is the execution of a defendant professing his innocence. But
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he fails to recognize that such an exception could justify ignoring all procedural bars and allowing never-ending litigation in virtually every capital case. Rather than point to some recent, exceptional development that might excuse the procedural bar, Conahan simply disagrees with the trial court’s and this court’s decisions on his various post-conviction motions and appeals. This cannot be the sort of “manifest injustice” over which we will consider a habeas petition as a second appeal, lest the exception swallow the rule.
The fact is that Conahan has filed five rule 3.851 motions, one rule 3.853 motion, seven appeals in this court (including the three that have been consolidated here), a habeas petition, and four filings in federal court in the over twenty-six years since he was sentenced. We cannot conclude that it is a manifest injustice to deny him another chance to rehash everything he has already litigated in the past two and a half decades. Conahan’s habeas petition is thus procedurally barred. See id. at 876–77 (rejecting “manifest injustice” claim because a review of the record and precedent left the court “confident in the propriety of the sentence imposed”).
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Moreover, even if the petition were not procedurally barred, it lacks merit. In addition to the various issues we already found meritless in Conahan’s earlier appeals, Conahan focuses heavily on the evidence referenced in his third successive rule 3.851 motion: the fiber evidence, the paint evidence, and Dr. Huser’s testimony. As to the fiber evidence, the State argued at trial that hundreds of fibers found at the murder scene linked Conahan to the crime, while Conahan argues that only five fibers could have linked him to the crime. To the extent that we grant Conahan’s assertion that the State greatly exaggerated the weight of the fiber evidence, the relative absence of fibers linking Conahan to the crime would not establish his innocence. It also would not undermine the case for his guilt so as to create a reasonable possibility of a different outcome. The paint evidence is even less availing, with Conahan acknowledging that the paint chip found at the scene matched all four layers of paint on his father’s car but emphasizing that the chip could have matched any car that happened to have the same four layers of paint. Lastly, Conahan dwells on the fact that Dr. Huser stated that her testimony was partly based on “common sense,” ignoring the fact that the jury heard this very admission and
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still unanimously recommended the sentence of death. Conahan may feel that the jury gave too much weight to Dr. Huser’s testimony, but it is not as if the jury did not do so with eyes open; it is not this court’s role to substitute its judgment on the weight of the evidence for that of the factfinder. See Holstun v. Embry, 169 So. 400, 405–06 (Fla. 1936).
Montgomery was bound and strangled to death in the woods shortly after telling his friends that he was going out to make a few hundred dollars. Burden’s testimony, which the factfinder found to be credible despite knowing about the challenges posed by Conahan, established that Conahan had offered him a little over a hundred dollars in exchange for nude photographs, taken him to the woods, bound him, and attempted to strangle him. Burden’s testimony was corroborated by the testimony of an undercover officer whom Conahan had approached in the same manner. It was corroborated by Burden’s open court presentation of his scars from the assault. And it was corroborated by visible marks on a tree that corresponded with Burden’s injuries.
Other evidence, which Conahan does not attack, established that he purchased clothesline and Polaroid film—the same
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materials he used during the attack on Burden—and withdrew cash from an ATM mere hours before Montgomery’s murder. Finally, Dr. Huser concluded, based on Dr. Imami’s autopsy report, that Montgomery died by strangulation. She opined, based on her medical expertise, that a person would have to strangle another for a significant length of time to kill him. Moreover, the conclusion that Montgomery struggled was based not only on Dr. Huser’s testimony but Dr. Imami’s, as he agreed with the State that the markings on Montgomery’s back were consistent with his having struggled against a tree. Conahan has offered no alternative explanation for how those markings got there, and a K-9’s unusual interest in a worn-down portion of a nearby tree further supported the State’s theory of what occurred. Moreover, in the light of all of that, the paint chip exactly matching all four layers of paint on Conahan’s father’s car, which Conahan used, is noteworthy. In sum, even when accounting for Conahan’s arguments, there is no reasonable possibility that he could have been found innocent or that the aggravators would not have applied. But this is beside the point, as Conahan’s repetitious and untimely claims are procedurally barred. He has shown no entitlement to habeas relief.
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V
On all the reasoning just set out, we affirm the trial court’s summary denials of Conahan’s third and fourth successive motions for post-conviction relief and of his motion for post-conviction DNA testing, deny him a stay of his execution, and deny him any relief under habeas.
No oral argument is necessary, and no motion for rehearing will be considered. The mandate shall issue immediately.
It is so ordered.
COURIEL, C.J., and MUÑIZ, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and BARRIOS, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., concurs in result.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Charlotte County, Lisa S. Porter, Judge Case No. 081997CF0001660001XX And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus
Suzanne Keffer, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Brittney Lacy, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Yiitsodirah Final, Staff Attorney, Office of Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Timothy A. Freeland, Special Counsel, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, and Suzanne Glickman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
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for Appellee/Respondent