In The Iowa Supreme Court
No. 22–1967
Submitted October 10, 2024—Filed November 15, 2024
Daniel Murillo,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Iowa,
Appellee.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Samantha
Gronewald, judge.
Required sex offender registrant seeks further review of a court of appeals
decision affirming the denial of his application for modification of his registry
requirements. Decision of Court of Appeals Vacated; District Court
Judgment Affirmed.
Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all
participating justices joined. May, J., took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
Jesse A. Macro, Jr. of Macro Law, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee. 2
Christensen, Chief Justice.
Under Iowa Code section 692A.128 (2022), applicants seeking
modification of their sex offender registration requirements must meet statutory
threshold criteria before a district court may exercise its discretion and approve
or reject their application. In this case, the registered sex offender’s application
to modify and remove his name from the registry was denied. The district court
determined the applicant had not “successfully completed” his required sex
offender treatment program, which is a threshold requirement of
section 692A.128(2). The district court, in its discretion, also concluded the
applicant posed an ongoing risk to the community and should not be removed
from the registry. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.
Upon review, we partially agree. For the reasons explained below, we hold
that the district court erred in determining the applicant had not “successfully
completed” his required sex offender treatment program in spite of a certificate
indicating he had. However, the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied the applicant’s petition to modify his sex offender requirements because
it applied only relevant factors when making its discretionary determination.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On August 19, 2005, Daniel Murillo pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the
third degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.4(1) (2005). The
district court sentenced Murillo to an indeterminate term of incarceration not to
exceed ten years and ordered Murillo to register as a sex offender on October 7.1
1When Murillo was sentenced, the law governing sex offender registration would have
required him to register as a sex offender for ten years. See Iowa Code § 692A.2(1) (2005). Chapter 692A was subsequently amended by the Iowa General Assembly and Murillo’s conviction is now classified as an aggravated offense, which requires him to be registered as a sex offender for life. See 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 119, §§ 1–30 (codified at Iowa Code §§ 692A.101–30 (Supp. 2009)); Iowa Code §§ 692A.101(1)(a)(3), .106(5) (2022). This court has concluded 3
While incarcerated, Murrillo was required to participate in a sex offender
treatment program (SOTP) facilitated by the Iowa Department of Corrections
(DOC). The SOTP required participants to fully admit to the specifics of their
criminal acts or the individual would not be allowed to continue in the program.
Murillo originally struggled to admit his guilt when he began treatment; however,
he decided to take responsibility for his actions after the SOTP counselor
explained that he would not be allowed to complete the program if he did not
make an admission. Murillo believed that failing to complete the SOTP would
result in his sentence being “doubled,”2 so he admitted to his crime and
participated in the SOTP. He received a certificate of completion for the program
in October 2009.
After completing the SOTP, Murillo remained eligible for a reduced
sentence and discharged his sentence in December 2009. Murillo has been
registered as a sex offender since his release from custody. At the time of
Murillo’s application to be removed from the registry, he had been a registered
sex offender for over twelve years.
On June 6, 2022, Murillo, a resident of Polk County, filed an application
to be removed from the sex offender registry in the Polk County District Court.
In response, the State filed a resistance to the application on September 27. The
State’s resistance focused on the sex offender registry modification evaluation
Murillo underwent in accordance with Iowa Code section 692A.128(2) (2022).
chapter 692A is not punitive and does not raise ex post facto constitutional concerns. State v. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Iowa 1997). 2If Murillo refused to admit his guilt, his sentence would not have been “doubled.” He
would have, however, been ineligible for a sentence reduction. See Iowa Code § 903A.2(1)(a) (flush language) (2009) (“However, an inmate required to participate in a sex offender treatment program shall not be eligible for a reduction of sentence unless the inmate participates in and completes a sex offender treatment program established by the director.”). 4
The evaluation was administered by Dr. Anthony Tatman, who was designated
by the Director of the Fifth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services
to assess Murillo’s risk level to reoffend.
Dr. Tatman interviewed Murillo on November 4, 2020, and created a report
of his evaluation that he reviewed with Murillo on December 4. The report
detailed the phone interview that Dr. Tatman conducted with Murillo and the
results of actuarial tests that Dr. Tatman completed. According to the actuarial
tests conducted, Murillo was in the “low risk” category for recidivism. The
interview, however, raised concerns for Dr. Tatman. In his report, Dr. Tatman
explained that Murillo denied having engaged in any illegal sexual conduct or
having tased the victim, maintained that the sexual incident in question was
consensual, and stated that he only admitted to committing the acts during his
SOTP so that his time would not be “doubled.”
In Dr. Tatman’s conclusion, he expressed concerns over whether Murillo
“successfully completed all sex offender treatment programs,” as required by
section 692A.128(2)(b):
This criteria of [Murillo] needing to “successfully” complete all sex offender treatment that is required is difficult to answer. Based on information obtained in this evaluation [Murillo] admitted to his offense to the Court, then denied the allegations of sexual abuse made against him when he was incarcerated, then admitted to engaging in the behaviors outlined in the police report to keep his earned time, and now again has recanted this admission. He stated that he only took the plea (admitting guilt in court) in fear that he would go to prison for life, and then admitted again in prison in order to keep his earn[ed] time, essentially lying to the Court and his treatment facilitators.
I consulted with [the] Assistant Warden of Treatment for the Newton Correctional Facility’s Sex Offender Treatment Program about this situation on 12-3-2020. He reported that if a person does not take responsibility for their crime they are removed from treatment. He further stated that it is their practice that the program would not determine anyone “completed” who said they were 5
innocent. Therefore, the question about whether or not [Murillo] actually “completed” treatment remains for this evaluator. Although [Murillo] has a Certificate of Completion from [the Department of Corrections], this completion was done under false pretenses that [Murillo] was admitting his crime. If [Murillo] did not lie, and maintained his belief that he was innocent as he does now, he would not have completed treatment. Therefore, it is this evaluator’s opinion and recommendation that this issue requires a ruling by the Court to determined if he actually completed treatment or not.
Based on Dr. Tatman’s report, the State argued in its resistance that Murillo has
shown a willingness to only admit fault when it benefits him. Accordingly, he
failed the threshold test in section 692A.128(2) because he had not “successfully
completed” his required SOTP. Iowa Code § 692A.128(2)(b).
On September 30, 2022, the district court held a hearing on the
application. During the hearing, Murillo stated multiple times that he fully
admits to having committed illegal sexual conduct. He also stated that he was
still “struggling with admitting to . . . [his] crime at this point” and struggled to
accept the pain he caused the victim. Murillo argued that Dr. Tatman should
have included his struggles in the report but agreed that the report truthfully
portrayed the statements he made during the interview. Murillo claimed,
however, that he was untruthful at times to Dr. Tatman during the interview and
that was why the report contained statements where he refused to admit to his
actions. Yet, Murillo still agreed that his ability to accept responsibility has
shifted back and forth.
The district court requested briefing from the parties on the issue of
whether Murillo successfully completed treatment in compliance with
section 692A.128(2)(b). The State once again argued that Murillo did not
successfully complete treatment because he only accepted responsibility for his
crime to remain in the SOTP and be eligible for a sentence reduction. Murillo
argued he completed the training required by his sentence as evidenced by his 6
certificate of completion and noted that he was found to be a “low risk” to reoffend
in his evaluation.
The district court determined Murillo did not satisfy all the modification
eligibility requirements in section 692A.128(2) because he did not successfully
complete his required SOTP. The court held that although Murillo had evidence
that he completed his SOTP, his false pretenses to remain in the program and
his shifting stories did not indicate a successful completion of the program.
Although the district court concluded Murillo did not meet the threshold criteria
in section 692A.128(2), it made a discretionary determination that Murillo had a
need for further treatment and remained an ongoing risk to the community, thus
denying his application for modification.
Murillo filed a timely appeal, and we transferred the case to the court of
appeals, which affirmed the decision of the district court. Murillo sought further
review, which we granted.
II. Standard of Review.
Under Iowa Code section 692A.128, a district court may consider
modifying a sex offender’s registry obligation if mandatory threshold criteria are
met. This initial threshold determination, and any questions involving the
interpretation of Iowa Code chapter 692, are reviewed for correction of errors at
law. Fortune v. State, 957 N.W.2d 696, 702–03 (Iowa 2021) (citing State v. Iowa
Dist. Ct., 843 N.W.2d 76, 79–80 (Iowa 2014); Schaefer v. Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68,
74 (Iowa 2013)).
Once the threshold criteria are met, the district court “may modify” the
applicant’s registration requirements. Iowa Code § 692A.128(5). This language
vests the district court with discretion, and we review the district court’s decision
for abuse of discretion. Fortune, 957 N.W.2d at 703 (citing State v. Adams, 554 7
N.W.2d 686, 690 (Iowa 1996)). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a district
court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to
an extent clearly unreasonable.” Id. (quoting State v. Wilson, 878 N.W.2d 203,
210–11 (Iowa 2016)). “A ground or reason is untenable when it is not supported
by substantial evidence or when it is based on an erroneous application of the
law.” Id. (quoting State v. Gomez Garcia, 904 N.W.2d 172, 177 (Iowa 2017)).
III. Analysis.
A. Statutory Framework. Registered sex offenders may file an application
in district court to have their sex offender registry requirements modified. Iowa
Code § 692A.128(1). Iowa Code section 692A.128 lays out the criteria that must
be met:
2. An application shall not be granted unless all of the following apply:
a. The date of the commencement of the requirement to register occurred at least two years prior to the filing of the application for a tier I offender and five years prior to the filing of the application for a tier II or III offender.
b. The sex offender has successfully completed all sex offender treatment programs that have been required.
c. A risk assessment has been completed and the sex offender was classified as a low risk to reoffend. The risk assessment used to assess an offender as a low risk to reoffend shall be a validated risk assessment approved by the department of corrections.
d. The sex offender is not incarcerated when the application is filed.
e. The director of the judicial district department of correctional services supervising the sex offender, or the director’s designee, stipulates to the modification, and a certified copy of the stipulation is attached to the application.
....
5. The court may, but is not required to, conduct a hearing on the application to hear any evidence deemed appropriate by the 8
court. The court may modify the registration requirements under this chapter.
Id. § 692A.128(2), (5). This court recently articulated the analysis district courts
should utilize when considering an application for modification in Fortune v.
State, which involves a two-step process for district courts to follow. 957 N.W.2d
at 705.
First, a district court must determine that the threshold statutory
requirements found in subsection (2) of section 692A.128 are met. Id. If these
five requirements are not met, the application must be denied. Id. If the
requirements are met, the district court moves to the second step in its analysis,
which includes “determining, in its discretion, whether the registration
requirements should be modified.” Id. The district court, when exercising its
discretion, should consider any “additional factors that are relevant to the
question of whether the offender poses a sufficient risk of reoffense or that public
safety would require the registration regime be continued to provide a degree of
control on the offender and provide information to the public.” Id. at 707.
B. “Successfully Completed.” The district court in this case determined
that Murillo met all the threshold statutory requirements except one: the
successful completion of all required sex offender treatment programs. See Iowa
Code § 692A.128(2)(b). The parties disagree as to what “successfully completed”
means within the statute. Id. Murillo argues that he met the statutory
requirement because he finished the SOTP while he was incarcerated and has a
certificate to prove he completed it. The State argues, and the district court
agreed, that Murillo may have completed the program, but that does not mean
that he successfully completed the program. According to the State, Murillo did
not successfully complete the SOTP because he only admitted to his crime to
stay in the program and receive a chance at a reduced sentence. 9
1. Statutory interpretation principles. On further review, Murillo challenges
this interpretation of the statute. He argues that both courts were wrong to
consider anything outside of his certified completion of the program, which is
not in dispute. Therefore, this case raises a question of statutory interpretation.
“The first step in our statutory interpretation analysis is to determine
whether the statute is ambiguous.” Carreras v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 977
N.W.2d 438, 446 (Iowa 2022) (quoting State v. Zacarias, 958 N.W.2d 573, 581
(Iowa 2021)). If a statute is unambiguous, we will only consider its plain
language. Id. “However, ‘if reasonable minds could differ or be uncertain as to
the meaning of the statute’ based on the context of the statute, the statute is
ambiguous and requires us to rely on principles of statutory construction to
resolve the ambiguity.” Est. of Butterfield v. Chautauqua Guest Home, Inc., 987
N.W.2d 834, 838 (Iowa 2023) (quoting State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 135
(Iowa 2018)).
2. Section 692A.128(2)(b) is ambiguous. The parties disagree as to the
meaning of the section, but that is not enough to declare a statute ambiguous.
See id. “Ambiguity may arise from specific language used in a statute or when
the provision at issue is considered in the context of the entire statute or related
statutes.” Id. (quoting Sherwin–Williams Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 789
N.W.2d 417, 425 (Iowa 2010)). The ambiguity in section 692A.128(2)(b) exists
because of the context of the statute. Id. at 839 (“In many cases, we have
identified statutory text that, although clear in isolation, becomes ambiguous in
a statute’s broader context.”).
Reasonable minds can differ as to what the successful completion of a
SOTP constitutes. See State v. Ross, 941 N.W.2d 341, 346 (Iowa 2020). Like the
other threshold requirements, which are binary decisions, the successful 10
completion of a SOTP could simply require the DOC’s acknowledgment that the
applicant has completed the SOTP. Alternatively, the use of the word
“successfully” before the word “completed” could imply the applicant must have
accomplished a goal or desired outcome during the applicant’s time in the
program, which is more than just participating.
3. Resolving the ambiguity. Thus, we must utilize our tools of statutory
construction to help determine the meaning of “successfully completed” in Iowa
Code section 692A.128(2)(b). “If a statute is ambiguous, the court . . . may
consider among other matters: . . . The consequences of a particular
construction.” Id. § 4.6(5). “When choosing among various ways to construe an
ambiguous statute, courts should choose a construction that is sensical and
reasonable.” Est. of Butterfield, 987 N.W.2d at 840 (citing Naumann v. Iowa Prop.
Assessment Appeal Bd., 791 N.W.2d 258, 262 (Iowa 2010)).
In this case, the threshold criteria of section 692A.128(2) should be treated
similarly. It would be an unreasonable construction of the statute to allow a
district court to exercise discretion for only one factor when the other five factors
are binary decisions for the court. Additionally, as this case demonstrates, if the
district court has discretion to determine whether an applicant has successfully
completed the SOTP, the DOC’s determination that an applicant has completed
the program could be considered irrelevant. We are not in a position to
second-guess the DOC’s determination that an applicant has completed the
required SOTP. Murillo has a certificate of completion from the DOC, but it has
been disregarded in favor of the district court’s decision that he has not
successfully completed his SOTP. This is also an unreasonable construction of
the statute, as the DOC facilitates the programs and should be able to make a
determination as to whether an applicant successfully completed its program. 11
See, e.g., Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 5th District, Client Treatment Programs, Sex
Offender Treatment Program, https://doc.iowa.gov/districts-prisons/5th-
district (last visited November 12, 2024).
When interpreting statutory language, we will also consider the purpose of
the statute. See Iowa Code § 4.6(1). “[W]e examine ‘the language used, the
purpose of the statute, the policies and remedies implicated, and the
consequences resulting from different interpretations.’ ” Carreras, 977 N.W.2d
at 446 (quoting Albaugh v. Reserve, 930 N.W.2d 676, 683 (Iowa 2019)). We must
construe statutes “reasonably and in such a way as to not defeat their plain
purpose.” Ross, 941 N.W.2d at 346 (quoting Coleman, 907 N.W.2d at 136).
Therefore, we must consider the purpose of section 692A.128. See In re
A.J.M., 847 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa 2014) (“Our goal is to construe the statute
under consideration ‘in light of the legislative purpose.’ ” (quoting State v. Erbe,
519 N.W.2d 812, 815 (Iowa 1994))). In general, the sex offender registry was
created to protect the public. See Fortune, 957 N.W.2d at 704–05 (citing Iowa
Dist. Ct., 843 N.W.2d at 81; In re A.J.M., 847 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Iowa 2014)). More
specifically, the modification provision of chapter 692A “balances the registry’s
protective purpose with our legislature’s related recognition—in enacting the
modification provision—of an individual’s interest in removal from the registry
when appropriate.” Id. at 705 (quoting Iowa Dist. Ct., 843 N.W.2d at 84).
The legislature created this balance by fashioning threshold criteria that
must be met before the district court may decide whether an applicant should
be removed from the registry. The binary threshold criteria help the applicant
meet set goals and facilitate removal from the registry. At the same time, allowing
the district court to exercise its discretion before an applicant can be removed
from the registry ensures the protection of the public. Therefore, in accordance 12
with the purpose of the statute, an applicant successfully completes the SOTP
when the DOC indicates that the applicant has, and the district court may
exercise its discretion after an applicant has met the binary criteria. This
approach remains focused on public safety and acknowledges that when
applicants do the required work, and meet the statutory requirements, they
should be considered for modification or removal from the registry.
4. The district court erred. Based on our statutory interpretation of
“successfully completed,” the district court was incorrect to consider whether
Murillo deceived his SOTP counselor when he accepted responsibility for his
actions. Murillo has a certificate of completion for his SOTP from the DOC, which
signifies the DOC determined he successfully completed the program. The State
did not offer evidence to contradict his certification of completion nor did
Dr. Tatman’s testimony contradict Murillo’s completion of the program—only his
sincerity while completing it. We generally give a “wide berth” to the treatment
determinations of DOC correctional staff, and the DOC’s certificate of completion
enjoys a presumption of regularity that should not be second-guessed by the
district court absent evidence of its bad faith. See In re Det. of Schuman, 2 N.W.3d
33, 37, 49 (Iowa 2024) (quoting Off. of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman v. Edwards,
825 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Iowa 2012)) (holding the district court erred by substituting
its judgment for that of DOC staff). We conclude that the district court erred in
reaching its conclusion that Murillo did not meet the mandatory threshold
criteria for modification.
C. Discretionary Relevant Factors. Although the district court
determined Murillo did not meet the statutory threshold criteria under
section 692A.128(2), it nonetheless moved on to the next step and concluded
that Murillo should not be removed from the registry. Because we are holding 13
Murillo did indeed meet the statutory threshold criteria, we will address whether
the district court abused its discretion when it determined that Murillo’s
changing stories and dishonest reporting during his evaluation suggested an
ongoing need for treatment and, subsequently, denied his application.3
The district court’s discretion to deny or grant an application after the
threshold statutory criteria are met arises from the discretionary language of
section 692A.128(5). Iowa Code § 692A.128(5) (“The court may modify the
registration requirements under this chapter.”). When exercising its discretion,
“the district court, in addition to compliance with the statutory requirements,
may consider additional factors that are relevant to the question of whether the
offender poses a sufficient risk of reoffense or that public safety would require
the registration regime be continued.” Fortune, 957 N.W.2d at 707. A district
court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider a relevant factor or considers
an irrelevant factor. Id. If a district court considers only proper factors, the court
must have made a clear error in judgment to have abused its discretion. Id.
The district court did not consider an irrelevant factor in this case.
Murillo’s inability to consistently accept fault for his actions, and his lingering
issues associated with acknowledging the crime he committed, are relevant to
his likelihood to reoffend and, subsequently, public safety. See State v. Iowa Dist.
Ct., 801 N.W.2d 513, 519 (Iowa 2011) (citing McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33
(2002) (plurality opinion) (“Research indicates that offenders who deny all
allegations of sexual abuse are three times more likely to fail in treatment than
those who admit even partial complicity.”)). This court has acknowledged that
when admissions of guilt are required for a SOTP it serves the broader goals of
3We appreciate the district court completing the second step in its modification analysis,
despite having determined Murillo did not meet the threshold criteria. Otherwise, it would have been necessary for us to remand the case for further proceedings to address the second step. 14
protecting the public and helping registered sex offenders not reoffend. See id. at
527.
The district court may consider Murillo’s retraction of his prior SOTP
admission of responsibility and his “lingering issues” with accepting
responsibility. Even after treatment, Murillo, as shown by his 2020 interview and
his 2022 testimony during the district court hearing, continued to deny
committing the serious sexual offense that he pleaded guilty to. An applicant’s
tendency to lie about the crime is a relevant factor for the court to consider when
making a determination for public safety. As with other cases that come before
it, a district court must be allowed to consider whether it has the full truth, and
whether an applicant is willing to provide the full truth, when weighing evidence.
See, e.g., In re D.D., 955 N.W.2d 186, 197 (Iowa 2021) (Christensen, C.J.,
concurring specially) (“Frankly, ensuring the safety of the child when Mom
refuses to acknowledge the child’s sexual abuse . . . is not simply passing moral
judgment or acting out of a desire that the child has different parents. . . . [T]he
record (or lack thereof concerning Mom’s acknowledgment of the abuse) does not
support the recommendations for reunification.”); State v. Ruiz, No. 22–0241,
2023 WL 3088342, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2023) (holding that the district
court appropriately considered the defendant refusing to provide the truth and
not accepting appropriate accountability for his crime as aggravating factors for
sentencing).
Lastly, Murillo argues that the district court still abused its discretion
because it failed to appropriately weigh all the positive factors in favor of
removing him from the registry. The district court, however, did not commit clear
error in judgment when it determined that the positive factors, such as Murillo
being classified as “low risk” and his time in the community without reoffending, 15
were outweighed by his refusal to accept responsibility for his actions unless he
had something to gain. In the district court’s opinion, Murillo’s issues suggested
he was an “ongoing risk to the community” and presented “a need for further
treatment.” We cannot say the district court committed clear error in that
determination.
IV. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals
and affirm the judgment of the district court.
Decision of Court of Appeals Vacated; District Court Judgment
Affirmed.
All justices concur except May, J., who takes no part.