Daniel Lee Paschal v. Edward Mitchell Dodson

District Court, E.D. California·Decided September 23, 2025·No. 2:25-cv-02438·Unknown

Opinion

DANIEL LEE PASCHAL, No. 2:25-cv-2438 DAD AC PS Plaintiff, v. ORDER Defendant. Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was accordingly referred to the undersigned by E.D. Cal. 302(c)(21). Plaintiff filed a request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and submitted the affidavit required by that statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The motion to proceed IFP will therefore be granted. A. Legal Standard The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff must assist the court in determining whether the complaint is frivolous, by drafting the complaint so that it complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are available online at www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/current- rules-practice-procedure/federal-rules-civil-procedure. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain (1) a “short and plain statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the reason the case is filed in this court, rather than in a state court), (2) a short and plain statement showing that plaintiff is entitled to relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiff, and in what way), and (3) a demand for the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff’s claims must be set forth simply, concisely and directly. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Forms are available to help pro se plaintiffs organize their complaint in the proper way. They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200), Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court will (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.2000)) (en banc). B. The Complaint Plaintiff’s is a California resident suing another California resident for Copyright Infringement and asserting four state law causes of action: misappropriation of likeness, unfair competition, defamation per se, and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. ECF No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff is the “creator and owner of original TikTok video and photo content through his business account.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that defendant, without authorization, downloaded, copied, reposted, and distributed plaintiff’s TikTok videos and photos, including works that were critical of defendant. Id. Defendant “falsely represented or implied that such works were his own or used them to harass and damage Plaintiff’s reputation and business.” Id. Defendant posted a TikTok video falsely stating that plaintiff “started his nonprofit to get close to children.” Id. As a result, plaintiff lost goodwill, followers, and business opportunities, as well as suffered emotional distress and reputational harm. Id. C. Discussion Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be served at this time because the sole basis for federal jurisdiction is the Copyright Infringement claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 133, and the complaint as drafted does not state a cause of action for Copyright Infringement. Copyright law protects all “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). “This protection has never accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his work. Rather, the Copyright Act grants the copyright holder ‘exclusive’ rights to use and to authorize the use of his work in five qualified ways, including reproduction of the copyrighted work in copies.” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432–33 (1984) (footnote omitted). Importantly, even some direct copies of a copyrighted work “are not within the exclusive domain of the copyright owner; some are in the public domain. Any individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a ‘fair use;’ the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to such a use.” Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 433. Copying of a copyrighted work “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. §

Daniel Lee Paschal v. Edward Mitchell Dodson, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Scheuer v. Rhodes
416 U.S. 232 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena
592 F.3d 954 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. Am. Asphalt S., Inc.
388 P.3d 800 (California Supreme Court, 2017)