Daniel Lee Lauer v. King County Jail Staff, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedJanuary 9, 2026
Docket2:25-cv-02416
StatusUnknown

This text of Daniel Lee Lauer v. King County Jail Staff, et al. (Daniel Lee Lauer v. King County Jail Staff, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Daniel Lee Lauer v. King County Jail Staff, et al., (W.D. Wash. 2026).

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 DANIEL LEE LAUER, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-02416-JHC-DWC 11 Plaintiff, v. ORDER DECLINING TO SERVE 12 KING COUNTY JAIL STAFF, et al., 13 Defendants. 14

15 The District Court referred this action to United States Magistrate Judge David W. 16 Christel. Plaintiff Daniel Lee Lauer, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a proposed 17 civil rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkts. 4, 4-1. Having reviewed and screened 18 Plaintiff’s proposed Complaint (Dkt. 4-1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court declines to serve 19 the proposed Complaint, but grants Plaintiff leave to amend it, if possible, to correct the 20 deficiencies identified herein. 21 I. Background 22 Plaintiff, who is detained at King County Jail (“KCJ”) initiated this lawsuit on November 23 21, 2025. Dkt. 1. After receiving an IFP Deficiency Letter, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Proceed 24 1 In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Motion”) and proposed Complaint. Dkts. 4, 4-1. The Complaint lists 2 the following as Defendants in this action: KCJ Staff, KCJ Medical Staff, and King County 3 Department of Adult and Juvenile Detention (“KCDAJD”). Dkt. 4-1 at 1. 4 In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges what while detained at KCJ, the jail staff, including the

5 medical team, subjected him to unsafe conditions and denied him medical care. Id. Several of the 6 individuals who allegedly mistreated Plaintiff no longer work at KCJ because their work visas 7 expired. Id. 8 II. Discussion 9 A. Screening Standard 10 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the Court is required to screen 11 complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or 12 employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the 13 complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 14 state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant

15 who is immune from such relief.” Id. at (b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Barren v. Harrington, 16 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998). Dismissal on these grounds constitutes a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. 17 § 1915(g). 18 The Court is required to liberally construe pro se documents. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 19 97, 106 (1976). However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint to contain “a 20 short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. 21 P. 8(a). “Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). 22 To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) he suffered a 23 violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute; and (2) the

24 1 violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v. 2 Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The first step in a § 1983 claim is therefore to 3 identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 4 (1994).

5 To satisfy the second prong, a plaintiff must allege facts showing how individually 6 named defendants caused, or personally participated in causing, the harm alleged in the 7 complaint. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988); Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 8 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). A person subjects another to a deprivation of a constitutional right 9 when committing an affirmative act, participating in another’s affirmative act, or omitting to 10 perform an act which is legally required. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 11 Sweeping conclusory allegations against an official are insufficient to state a claim for relief. 12 Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. Further, a § 1983 suit cannot be based on vicarious liability alone, but 13 must allege the defendant’s own conduct violated the plaintiff’s civil rights. City of Canton v. 14 Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385–90 (1989).

15 After informing a pro se litigant of any pleading deficiencies, a court must generally 16 grant leave to file an amended complaint if there is a possibility the pleading deficiencies may be 17 cured through amendment. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). However, if 18 the claims put forth in the complaint lack any arguable substance in law or fact, then the 19 complaint must be dismissed as frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 20 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave 21 to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured 22 by amendment.’”) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 1988)). 23

24 1 B. Failure to State a Claim 2 An initial screening of the Complaint shows that Plaintiff fails to state a claim. 3 Specifically, Plaintiff fails to allege that any specific Defendant violated his constitutional rights. 4 The Complaint lists the Defendants in the caption but does not allege how they violated

5 Plaintiff’s rights. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that a 6 defendant is liable under § 1983 “only upon a showing of personal participation by the 7 defendant.”). In addition, Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory. He merely states that he was 8 subject to unsafe housing and was denied medical care at KCJ. And he cannot sue KCDAJD 9 because it is an arm of the State. See Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 10 70 (1989) (holding that “[s]tates and governmental entities that are considered ‘arms of the State’ 11 for Eleventh Amendment purposes” are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983). 12 The Court, therefore, declines to serve the Complaint because Plaintiff fails to state any 13 colorable claims.

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Bluebook (online)
Daniel Lee Lauer v. King County Jail Staff, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/daniel-lee-lauer-v-king-county-jail-staff-et-al-wawd-2026.