Daniel L. Sanders v. State

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
• Decided: October 12, 1999
• Docket: 01C01-9712-CC-00586
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE FILED SEPTEMBER 1999 SESSION October 12, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk DANIEL LeMAY SANDERS, ) ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9712-CC-00586 Appellant, ) ) ROBERTSON COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE ) Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

GREGORY D. SMITH PAUL G. SUMMERS One Public Square, Suite 121 Attorney General & Reporter Clarksville, TN 37040 GEORGIA BLYTHE FELNER Asst. Attorney General John Sevier Bldg. 425 Fifth Ave., North Nashville, TN 37243-0493

JOHN W. CARNEY District Attorney General

DENT MORRISS Asst. District Attorney General 500 South Main St. Springfield, TN 37172

OPINION FILED:____________________

AFFIRMED

JOHN H. PEAY, Judge OPINION

Pursuant to plea negotiations, the petitioner pled guilty to first-degree

murder and received an agreed sentence of life without parole. He timely filed a petition

for post-conviction relief, arguing that his plea was unknowing and involuntary due to the

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court found

that the petitioner received effective assistance of counsel and that his plea was

knowingly and voluntarily entered. The petitioner now appeals. Finding no merit to his

argument, we affirm the post-conviction court’s order.

The petitioner maintains that his trial attorneys gave him incorrect

information and “bad advice” about his case. At the post-conviction hearing, the

petitioner, who potentially faced the death penalty if convicted at trial, testified that his

attorneys advised him that the punishment of life without parole, the sentence to which

he agreed, might still allow him the opportunity for parole in ten or fifteen years because

the laws were always changing and prisons were overcrowded. He also testified that he

believed he would be executed immediately following trial, even though (as he later

discovered) the electric chair had not been used for decades. According to the petitioner,

he felt pressured by circumstance and by his attorneys into accepting the plea offer.

On nearly every point, the testimony of the petitioner’s trial attorneys

contradicted the petitioner’s testimony. Both attorneys denied advising the petitioner that

there was any real possibility he could eventually receive parole with a life-without-parole

sentence. Both attorneys also denied advising the petitioner that he would be executed

immediately upon a jury’s finding of guilt. According to them, they advised the petitioner

about the appellate process, and they tended to agree with the petitioner’s view that even

if he received the death penalty he would likely never be executed, but they also warned

him that there was a tremendous difference in the nature of incarceration for death row

2 inmates and for the general prison population. The post-conviction court specifically

discredited the petitioner’s testimony and found he was given “the best representation he

could get.” Because the evidence does not preponderate against these findings, the

court’s findings preclude the relief petitioner seeks. See State v. Tate, 615 S.W.2d 161,

162 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981)(factual findings of trial court have the weight of a jury verdict

and will not be set aside unless the evidence preponderates against them).

The evidence shows that the petitioner placed significance on family

visitation in prison and that visitation while on death row was much more limited than

general incarceration. The petitioner expressed that accepting the plea agreement was

his “only way out” to avoid the electric chair because his grandmother was on her death

bed at the time he was considering the plea offer. He also stated that his attorneys

pressured him into accepting the plea by telling him he “didn’t stand a chance” at trial

because his codefendant would be testifying against him. The attorneys testified that the

case against the defendant was very strong and that it was in the petitioner’s best interest

to enter a plea agreement. Despite this, they indicated that if the petitioner chose to

proceed to trial, they were ready. After considering the evidence, the post-conviction

court determined that there was “not one speck of evidence” to support allowing the

petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea.1 We agree. See Tate, 615 S.W.2d at 162. The

post-conviction court’s order is affirmed.

_______________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, Judge

1 At the conclusion of his findings, the post-conviction court judge also stated, “I apologize to the Appeals Court for rambling on and on . . . .” Apology accepted.

3 CONCUR:

______________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, Judge

______________________________ JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, Judge