Daniel Garces v. City of Redondo Beach

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedApril 9, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-00414
StatusUnknown

This text of Daniel Garces v. City of Redondo Beach (Daniel Garces v. City of Redondo Beach) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Daniel Garces v. City of Redondo Beach, (C.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 || Mildred K. O’Linn (State Bar No. 159055) missy.olinn@manningass. com 2 || David Fleck ( tate Bar No. 192912) David.Fleck@manningkass.com || MANNING & KASS ELLROD, RAMIREZ, TRESTER LLP 4/801 S. Figueroa St, 15" Floor Los Angeles, California 90017-3012 5 || Telephone: ge) 624-6900 Facsimile: (213) 624-6999 6 Attorneys for Defendants, City of 7 || Redondo Beach and Officer Patel 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA x 11 1 oO DANIEL GARCES, Case No. 2:25-cv-414-MWC-MAA 13 District Judge, Michelle Williams Court > Plaintiff, Magistrate Judge Maria A. Audero = 14 < Vv. = '° CITY OF REDONDO BEACH > TIPULATED PROTECTIVE 16 |} OFFICER PATTEL, and DOE ORDER OTECTIV OFFICERS 1-10, 17 Defendants. 18 Action Filed: 01/16/2025 19 Trial Date: N/A 20 |} 1. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 21 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, 22 || proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public 23 || disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may 24 || be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to 25 || enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. 26 The parties acknowledge that this Stipulated Protective Order does not confer 27 || blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the 28 || protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited

1 || information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable 2 || legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 13.3 below, 3 || that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential 4 || information under seal; Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be 5 || followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from 6 || the Court to file material under seal. 7\|2. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 8 1.1. Defendants’ Contentions. 9 Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for a 10 || protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace 2 11 || officer personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records for 12 || the following reasons. 2 13 First, defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of 14 || privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein 15 || that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective 16 || procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 17 || 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18 || 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies 19 || to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege 20 || law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying 21 || [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 22 || 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based 23 || “privacy rights [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); □□□ 24 || Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Defendants further 25 || contend that uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten 26 || the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. 27 Second, defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement agencies 28 || have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official information

1 || privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client privilege 2 || and/or attorney work product protection interests in the personnel files of their peace 3 || officers — particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files that 4 || contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or 5 || evaluation/analysis, or communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering 6 || legal advice or analysis — potentially including but not limited to evaluative/ 7 || analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or reports, evaluative/analytical 8 || portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or reports prepared at the direction of 9 || counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 10 || F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 2 11 |) 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 n. 4 12 ||(1995); Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tuite 2 13 ||v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. S$ 14 || Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 = 15 || F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further contend that such 16 || personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public entity’s custodian 17 || of records pursuant to applicable California law and that uncontrolled release is 18 || likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; impairment in the collection 19 || of third-party witness information and statements and related legitimate law 20 || enforcement investigations/ interests; and a chilling of open and honest discussion 21 || regarding and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that can erode a public 22 || entity’s ability to identify and/or implement any remedial measures that may be 23 || required. 24 Third, defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same 25 || rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it 1s contrary to 26 || the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ 27 || compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 28 || 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., Amend V.

1 Accordingly, defendants contend that, without a protective order preventing 2 || such, production of confidential records in the case can and will likely substantially 3 || impair defendant public entity’s interests in candid self-critical analysis, frank 4 || internal deliberations, obtaining candid information from witnesses, preserving the 5 || safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and peace officers’ 6 || families and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace officers, and 7 || preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally undermined by 8 || publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information — as can and often does 9 || result in litigation. 10 1.2. Plaintiff agrees that there is Good Cause for a Protective Order 2 11 || consistent with the terms and provisions of this Stipulation so as to preserve the 12 || respective interests of the parties. 2 13 1.3. The parties jointly contend that there is typically a particularized need S$ for protection as to any medical or psychotherapeutic records and autopsy = 15 || photographs, because of the privacy interests at stake therein. Because of these 16 || sensitive interests, a court order should address these documents rather than a 17 || private agreement between the parties. 18 1.4. The parties therefore stipulate that there is Good Cause for, and hereby 19 || jointly request that the Honorable Court issue/enter, a Protective Order regarding 20 || confidential documents consistent with the terms and provisions of this Stipulation.

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Related

Providence School Department v. Ana C., a Minor
108 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 1997)
Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles
710 P.2d 329 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Soto v. City of Concord
162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)
Tuite v. Henry
181 F.R.D. 175 (District of Columbia, 1998)

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Bluebook (online)
Daniel Garces v. City of Redondo Beach, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/daniel-garces-v-city-of-redondo-beach-cacd-2025.