Daniel Everett v. Paul Boschetti

Ninth Circuit

Daniel Everett v. Paul Boschetti

689 F. App'x 564

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedApril 24, 2017

Docket15-17203

StatusUnpublished

This text of 689 F. App'x 564 (Daniel Everett v. Paul Boschetti) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Daniel Everett v. Paul Boschetti, 689 F. App'x 564 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Daniel Everett appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s order denying Everett’s “motion for damages and voiding of judgments for violation of automatic stay.” We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo a district court’s decision on appeal from a bankruptcy court, and apply the same standard of review the district court applied to the bankruptcy court’s decision. Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates, Inc.), 912 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1990). We affirm.

The bankruptcy court properly denied Everett’s motion because Everett failed to show that the entry of stipulated judgment in accordance with the parties’ settlement agreement or payment of his state court initial appearance fee was outside the scope of the order granting relief from the automatic stay. See Griffin v. Wardrobe (In re Wardrobe), 559 F.3d 932, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2009) (order granting relief from the automatic stay is effective as to claims pending in the state court at the time).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Mano-Y & M, Ltd. v. Field (In re Mortg. Store, Inc.), 773 F.3d 990, 998 (9th *565 Cir. 2014); Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Daniel Everett appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s order denying Everett’s “motion for damages and voiding of judgments for violation of automatic stay.” We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo a district court’s decision on appeal from a bankruptcy court, and apply the same standard of review the district court applied to the bankruptcy court’s decision. Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates, Inc.), 912 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1990). We affirm.

The bankruptcy court properly denied Everett’s motion because Everett failed to show that the entry of stipulated judgment in accordance with the parties’ settlement agreement or payment of his state court initial appearance fee was outside the scope of the order granting relief from the automatic stay. See Griffin v. Wardrobe (In re Wardrobe), 559 F.3d 932, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2009) (order granting relief from the automatic stay is effective as to claims pending in the state court at the time).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Mano-Y & M, Ltd. v. Field (In re Mortg. Store, Inc.), 773 F.3d 990, 998 (9th *565 Cir. 2014); Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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689 F. App'x 564, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/daniel-everett-v-paul-boschetti-ca9-2017.

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