Daniel Dumond v. State of Florida

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: July 23, 2025
• Docket: 3D2025-0163
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed July 23, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

No. 3D25-0163 Lower Tribunal No. F20-13035

Daniel Dumond, Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Ramiro C. Areces, Judge.

Daniel Dumond, in proper person.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SCALES, C.J., and LOGUE and LOBREE, JJ.

SCALES, C.J. Following this Court’s affirmance of Daniel Dumond’s conviction and

sentence, we treat Dumond’s pro se letter as a timely petition for writ of

habeas corpus asserting claims of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel. We deny the petition. Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643

(Fla. 2000); Phelps v. State, 317 So. 3d 1207, 1209–10 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021).

Dumond was convicted after a jury trial of felony battery, among other

offenses. He filed a timely notice of appeal of the final judgment of conviction

and sentence through appointed appellate counsel. Appellate counsel filed

an Anders1 brief in this Court, asserting that it was his considered opinion

that there was no basis for the appeal, that the appeal was without merit and

frivolous. Upon review of the record, this Court ultimately granted appellate

counsel’s motion to withdraw and issued a per curiam affirmance. The

Mandate issued on January 22, 2025. Dumond v. State, 404 So. 3d 359

(Fla. 3d DCA 2024). Dumond timely filed the instant pleading raising various

claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the

standards set forth in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). “Appellate counsel’s

ineffectiveness is limited to those situations where the petitioner establishes,

1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 2 first that appellate counsel’s performance was deficient because ‘the alleged

omissions are of such magnitude as to constitute a serious error or

substantial deficiency falling measurably outside the range of professionally

acceptable performance’ and second, that the petitioner was prejudiced

because appellate counsel's deficiency ‘compromised the appellate process

to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the

result.’” Wilson v. State, 305 So. 3d 341, 341 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (quoting

Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000)); see Davis v. State,

383 So. 3d 717, 733 (Fla. 2024).

On review of the limited record before us, we conclude Dumond’s

claims do not meet either of Strickland’s requirements of deficient

performance or resulting prejudice. Certainly, the claims Dumond raises here

would have been found to be without merit had appellate counsel raised the

issues on direct appeal. Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 643.

Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.