Daniel Dean v. Patrick Carby

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: May 9, 2024
• Docket: 2023 CA 000659
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

RENDERED: MAY 10, 2024; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2023-CA-0659-MR

DANIEL DEAN APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM GRAYSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE KENNETH H. GOFF, II, JUDGE ACTION NO. 21-CI-00216

PATRICK CARBY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: CALDWELL, A. JONES, AND KAREM, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Daniel Dean appeals the Grayson Circuit Court’s grant of

summary judgment in Patrick Carby’s favor in a premises liability action. Upon

review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 27, 2020, Dean fell over a skid steer attachment owned and

located on a farm belonging to Carby. Dean filed suit against Carby under a premises liability theory on July 26, 2021. Specifically, Dean alleged Carby was

negligent in breaching the common law duties owed by a landowner to invitees on

the property. After conducting discovery, Carby filed a motion for summary

judgment on August 16, 2022. The circuit court granted Carby’s motion in an

order dated May 2, 2023. This appeal followed.

We will set forth further facts as necessary below.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

This Court reviews a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment as

follows:

The proper standard of review on appeal when a trial judge has granted a motion for summary judgment is whether the record, when examined in its entirety, shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The trial judge must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, resolving all doubts in its favor. Because summary judgment does not require findings of fact but only an examination of the record to determine whether material issues of fact exist, we generally review the grant of summary judgment without deference to either the trial court’s assessment of the record or its legal conclusions.

Bruner v. Cooper, 677 S.W.3d 252, 269 (Ky. 2023) (quoting Hammons v.

Hammons, 327 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Ky. 2010)).

-2- II. Discussion

On appeal, Dean takes issue with the circuit court’s determination that

the skid steer attachment did not create an “unreasonably dangerous condition”

under the guidelines provided in City of Barbourville v. Hoskins, 655 S.W.3d 137,

141-42 (Ky. 2022). As previously discussed, Dean’s complaint is based on

premises liability, which falls under general negligence law. Lewis v. B & R

Corporation, 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App. 2001). To prevail on a negligence

theory, a plaintiff must prove “(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care,

(2) the defendant breached the standard by which his or her duty is measured, and

(3) consequent injury.” Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85, 88 (Ky.

2003) (citations omitted).

As the Kentucky Supreme Court discussed, “Kentucky law remains

steadfast in its adherence to the traditional notion that duty is associated with the

status of the injured party as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser.” Shelton v.

Kentucky Easter Seals Soc., Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901, 909 (Ky. 2013) (citations

omitted). Moreover, “[w]hen the facts of a case are undisputed, the determination

of the duty owed by a landowner to a guest is a question of law to be determined

by the court.” Hoskins, 655 S.W.3d at 141 (citation omitted).

In this case, neither party disputes the classification of Dean as an

invitee at Carby’s farm, as he was “an individual present on the premises at the

-3- explicit or implicit invitation of the property owner to do business or otherwise

benefit the property owner.” Bramlett v. Ryan, 635 S.W.3d 831, 837 (Ky. 2021).

Therefore, Carby owed Dean a duty “to discover unreasonably dangerous

conditions on the land and to either correct them or warn of them.” Kentucky River

Medical Center v. McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d 385, 388 (Ky. 2010).

While “[i]t is generally a question of fact . . . whether an unreasonably

dangerous condition existed on the land possessor’s premises sufficient to trigger

the duty to warn or ameliorate … summary judgment still remains a viable

concept[.]” Hoskins, 655 S.W.3d at 141 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). Indeed,

[i]f reasonable minds cannot differ or it would be unreasonable for a jury to find breach or causation, summary judgment is still available to a landowner. And when no questions of material fact exist or when only one reasonable conclusion can be reached, the litigation may still be terminated.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The Hoskins Court defined an “unreasonably dangerous condition” as

“one that is recognized by a reasonable person in similar circumstances as a risk

that should be avoided or minimized or one that is in fact recognized as such by the

particular defendant.” Id. at 141 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Further, “[o]ne indication that a risk is not unreasonable is that a reasonable person

in the defendant’s shoes would not take action to minimize or avoid the risk.” Id.

-4- (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Additionally, “at common law,

conditions on the land could not be deemed unreasonably dangerous if they were

known to the visitor or so obvious to him that he may be expected to discover

them.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Resultingly, “if the

conditions on the premises are not unreasonably dangerous, the land possessor’s

duty of care is not implicated, and thus injuries arising from such conditions cannot

give rise to the possessor’s liability.” Id. at 141-42 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

In this case, the circuit court correctly determined that no reasonable

jury could conclude that the presence and location of the skid steer attachment was

an unreasonably dangerous condition. The skid steer was farm equipment

understandably placed on the farm’s gravel lot. Based on his prior visits, Dean

testified at his deposition that he was aware of the condition of Carby’s property,

including the location of Carby’s farm equipment. The attachment was not

concealed in any way, and Dean testified that he had been cognizant of the

attachment’s location, having sat next to it fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes

before he fell.

Moreover, Dean testified that he was conscious of the mechanical,

electrical, and hydraulic issues the skid steer was experiencing before his fall,

based on Carby’s warnings. Dean further testified that, regardless of Carby’s

-5- instruction, Dean intended to step back from the skid steer once it started, given its

known issues. Moreover, Dean was not distracted when he fell. In short, Dean

failed to identify a single risk that Carby knew that was unknown to Dean. Thus,

the location of the skid steer attachment was either “known to [Dean] or so obvious

to him that he may be expected to discover [it].” Hoskins, 655 S.W.3d at 141

(citations omitted).

As such, the circuit court did not err in deciding that the presence and

location of the skid steer attachment at Carby’s farm was not an unreasonably

dangerous condition. Consequently, “if the conditions on the premises are not

unreasonably dangerous, the land possessor’s duty of care is not implicated[.]” Id.

at 141-42 (citations omitted)

CONCLUSION

For the preceding reasons, we affirm the Grayson Circuit Court’s

grant of summary judgment in favor of Carby.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Richard I. Williams, Jr. Andrew T. Garverich Hollyn Richardson Elizabethtown, Kentucky Louisville, Kentucky

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