Daniel Cook v. Smg Construction Services, LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: June 24, 2026
• Docket: A24A0886
• Status: Published

Opinion

FIFTH DIVISION MCFADDEN, P. J., RICKMAN, P.J., and MERCIER, J.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

June 24, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A24A0886. COOK v. SMG CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, LLC.

MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.

In Cook v. SMG Constr. Servs., 373 Ga. App. 354 (908 SE2d 387) (2024), we

held that the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff Daniel

Cook’s knowledge of a hazard precluded summary judgment to defendant SMG

Construction Services, LLC in this premises liability case. The Supreme Court of

Georgia vacated our judgment, holding that as a matter of law Cook had actual

knowledge of the hazard, an unguarded balcony ledge in a house under construction,

and remanded for us to determine whether genuine issues of material facts existed as

to the other elements of SMG’s affirmative defenses: assumption of the risk and

voluntary negligence. SMG Constr. Servs. v. Cook, 322 Ga. 819 (922 SE2d 76) (2025). We therefore vacate our earlier opinion and in its place we adopt as our own the

Supreme Court’s opinion in SMG Constr. Servs., 322 Ga. 819, and address the other

elements of SMG’s affirmative defenses. Finding that genuine issues of material fact

do exist as to both of those defenses, we hold that SMG was not entitled to summary

judgment and we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to it.

1. Facts and procedural history

The facts of this case are set forth in detail in SMG Constr. Servs., 322 Ga. at

820-21, and Cook, 373 Ga. App. at 355-56(1). In summary, the evidence viewed in the

light most favorable to nonmovant Cook, see Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622,

624(1)(a) (697 SE2d 779) (2010), showed that Cook was badly injured in a fall from

an interior balcony overlooking the foyer of a house under construction on property

owned by SMG. Cook, an independent contractor, had been installing cabinetry in a

bathroom that was on the second floor but not in the immediate vicinity of the

balcony. The balcony did not have a guardrail, and environmental conditions at the

time of Cook’s fall, such as drywall dust, overspray, poor lighting, and lack of visual

contrast, affected his ability to perceive the exact location of the edge of the balcony

or its proximity to him. While straightening an air hose, Cook began to “shuffle”

2 backward across the floor outside the bathroom, stepped off of the edge of the

balcony, and fell to the first floor of the house.

The Supreme Court held that the “evidence is insufficient to create a question

of material fact as to [Cook’s] actual knowledge [of the exposed ledge], the primary

theory on which SMG’s motion for summary judgment is based.” SMG Constr.

Servs., 322 Ga. at 827. But the Court held that the

conclusion that no issue of material fact exists with respect to Cook’s actual knowledge of the specific hazard at issue is not the end of the inquiry because knowledge is only one element of the affirmative defenses raised in SMG’s motion for summary judgment and ruled on by the trial court. While expressing no opinion on the strength or resolution of such arguments, we are able to imagine that the conditions Cook suggests impaired his perception of the hazard might be relevant to the elements of SMG’s affirmative defenses. But we leave it to the Court of Appeals to determine on remand whether, in light of our conclusion that SMG has established Cook’s actual knowledge of the hazard at issue, SMG has also shown the absence of any question of material fact concerning the other elements of its affirmative defenses.

Id. at 827-28. As explained below, we determine that SMG has not shown the absence

of any question of material fact with regard to the other elements of its two affirmative

defenses, assumption of the risk and voluntary negligence.

3 2. Assumption of the risk

“The affirmative defense of assumption of the risk bars a plaintiff from

recovering on a negligence claim if it is established that he without coercion of

circumstances, chooses a course of action with full knowledge of its dangers and while

exercising free choice as to whether to engage in the act or not.” Kensington Place

Owners Ass’n v. Thomas, 318 Ga. App. 609, 611 (734 SE2d 445) (2012). “In its

simplest and primary sense, assumption of the risk means that the plaintiff, in

advance, has given his consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct

toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the

defendant is to do or leave undone.” Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 864(1) (471

SE2d 866) (1996) (emphasis omitted). See OCGA § 51-11-2 (“As a general rule no

tort can be committed against a person consenting thereto if that consent is free, is not

obtained by fraud, and is the action of a sound mind.”).

The defense has three elements: (1) actual knowledge of the danger; (2)

understanding and appreciation of the risks associated with the danger; and (3)

voluntary exposure to those risks. Vaughn, 266 Ga. at 864(1); Schuessler v. Bennett, 287

4 Ga. App. 880, 887(3) (652 SE2d 884) (2007). SMG has established the first element

of this defense, actual knowledge of the danger, as a matter of law. SMG Constr.

Servs., 322 Ga. at 827. And we find no genuine issue of material fact with regard to the

second element, an understanding and appreciation of the risks associated with the

danger, because “[n]o danger is more commonly realized and risk appreciated ... than

that of falling[.]” Riley v. Brasunas, 210 Ga. App. 865, 867(1) (438 SE2d 113) (1993)

(quotation marks omitted).

But a jury question exists as to the third element of the defense, voluntary

exposure to the risk. “Exposure to the known risk must be voluntary, the result of a

deliberate choice.” Bass Custom Landscapes v. Cunard, 258 Ga. App. 617, 620(1) (575

SE2d 17) (2002) (quotation marks omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by

Pollard v. Great Dane, 371 Ga. App. 872, 875-76(2)(a) n.5 (903 SE2d 338) (2024). To

be barred from recovery as a matter of law under the defense of assumption of the risk,

Cook must have “voluntarily assume[d] a position of imminent danger[.]” Daves v.

Shepherd Spinal Ctr., 219 Ga. App. 835, 836(1) (466 SE2d 692) (1996) (quotation

marks omitted).1

1 The issue of whether a plaintiff voluntarily assumed a position of imminent danger also applies in the context of the so-called “hired worker exception,” an 5 The fact that, at the time of the fall, Cook was performing a job on the second

floor of the house does not mean that as a matter of law he voluntarily exposed himself

to the hazard. “An employee’s freedom of choice can be restricted by the

circumstances under which he works and the coercion of seeking to remain

employed.” York v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, 217 Ga. App. 839, 840 (459 SE2d 470) (1995)

(citation modified). Nevertheless, “we have found assumption of the risk as a matter

of law when an employee chooses a perilous course of conduct that he had been

empowered to refuse.” Smith v. LT Nails, 331 Ga. App. 98, 100 (770 SE2d 646)

(2015). “A person cannot undertake to do what obviously is a dangerous thing, even

if he is directed by another, without assuming the risks incident thereto[.]” Batts v.

exception to the duty of ordinary care that OCGA § 51-3-1 imposes upon owners and occupiers of land in some situations involving hired workers, who “recklessly test[] an observed and clearly obvious peril, or voluntarily assume[] a position of imminent danger.”Sinyard v. Ga. Power Co., 363 Ga. App. 195, 205, 208(2)(b) (871 SE2d 45) (2022) (quotation marks omitted). Indeed, we have described that exception to the statutory duty of care as “a narrow, specific expression of the doctrine of assumption of the risk.” Id. at 208 (2)(b) (citation modified). The issue of whether SMG owed Cook a duty of ordinary care under OCGA § 51-3-1 is no longer at issue in this case. We resolved that question in Cook’s favor in Cook, 373 Ga. App. at 360-61(2), and our Supreme Court neither addressed nor considered that portion of our opinion in SMG Constr. Servs., 322 Ga. 819. Because that portion of our opinion regarding the application of OCGA § 51-3-1 to this case is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling, it becomes binding upon the return of the remittitur. See Shadix v. Carroll County, 274 Ga. 560, 563(1) (554 SE2d 465) (2001). 6 Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, 219 Ga. App. 327, 328 (464 SE2d 829) (1995)

(citation modified).

Here, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Cook chose a perilous

course of conduct and voluntarily assumed a position of imminent danger, such that

the defense of assumption of the risk would bar his claim. As detailed above, there is

evidence that the second-floor bathroom in which he was installing cabinetry was not

near the unprotected balcony and that Cook did not realize his proximity to the

balcony edge when he began to straighten the air hose, due to the environmental

conditions that impaired his perception of the location of the edge.

The dissent discounts that evidence, instead concluding that, as a matter of law,

Cook “could not have been misguided by the existence of an optical illusion in the

opposite direction of his line of sight.” In doing so, the dissent focuses on Cook’s

perception at the moment he began to walk backwards, when he was not looking

toward the balcony edge. Such focus is too narrow. Cook’s perception of the location

of that edge before he turned away from it and began to walk backwards, and the

existence of conditions that impaired that perception, are also material to the issue of

whether Cook voluntarily assumed a position of imminent danger.

7 “[T]he standard to be applied in assessing an assumption of the risk defense is

a subjective one, geared to the particular plaintiff and his situation, rather than that of

a reasonable person of ordinary prudence[.]” Muldovan v. McEachern, 271 Ga. 805,

808(2) (523 SE2d 566) (1999) (quotation marks omitted). “Except in plain, palpable

and undisputed cases where reasonable minds cannot differ as to the conclusions to

be reached, the jury must determine whether a claimant exercised ordinary care for

his safety or assumed the risk of injury.” King v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 347 Ga. App. 606,

608(2) (820 SE2d 445) (2018) (quotation marks omitted). Given the evidence that

Cook was working in an area of the second floor at a distance from the unguarded

balcony ledge under conditions that impaired his perception of its exact location, a

jury question exists as to whether Cook deliberately chose to expose himself to the

known risk of falling from the balcony. So SMG is not entitled to summary judgment

on its defense of assumption of the risk.

3. Voluntary negligence

Voluntary negligence is “a type of contributory negligence[.]” Robinson v.

Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 737-38 (493 SE2d 403) (1997) (punctuation omitted). Our

Supreme Court has adopted the description of this type of negligence set forth in the

8 Second Restatement of Torts: “‘an intentional and unreasonable exposure of the

plaintiff to danger created by the defendant’s negligence, of which danger the plaintiff

knows or has reason to know.’” Id. at 738 (quoting Restatement of Law 2d, Torts, §

466(a) (punctuation omitted)). See also Am. Multi-Cinema v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442,

445(2) (679 SE2d 25) (2009) (holding that voluntary negligence is a plaintiff’s

“intentional disregard of a known risk”); W. Lumber Co. v. Beck, 231 Ga. App. 46, 47

(497 SE2d 647) (1998) (holding that voluntary negligence is a “plaintiff’s intentional

and unreasonable exposure of self to a hazard of which plaintiff has knowledge”). A

comment to that clause of the Restatement notes that intentional exposure to the

danger requires that the plaintiff “have the purpose to place himself within reach of

it. It is not enough that his failure to exercise reasonable attention to his surroundings

prevents him from observing the danger, or that lack of reasonable preparation or

competence prevents him from avoiding it when the condition created by the

defendant is known to him.” Restatement of Law 2d, Torts, § 466(a), comment c.

A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Cook purposefully put

himself within reach of the unguarded balcony ledge. As discussed above, there is

evidence that the bathroom in which he was working was not near the ledge, and that

9 he could not accurately perceive its proximity when he began to straighten the air

hose. For these reasons, SMG also was not entitled to summary judgment on its

defense of voluntary negligence.

Judgment reversed. Rickman, P.J. concurs in judgment only, and Mercier, J.,

dissents.

10 A24A0886. COOK v. SMG CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, LLC.

MERCIER, Judge, dissenting.

After traversing a second-floor landing in a home under construction more than

a dozen times, Daniel Cook, with actual knowledge that the ledge of that landing had

no guardrails and an exposed dropoff, voluntarily chose to walk backwards towards the

ledge without looking behind him. As a result, Cook stepped off the ledge, fell, and

suffered injuries. Under these circumstances, Cook assumed the risk of his fall and

acted with voluntary negligence. As such, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment against him and in favor of the homeowner, SMG Construction Services,

LLC (“SMG”), in this premises liability action. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.

Here, a careful review of the entire record is paramount, and we must consider

all of Cook’s testimony regarding his unfortunate fall. Given that the grant of a motion

for summary judgment is being analyzed, we must “view the evidence, and all

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to [Cook].” Cowart

v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 624 (1) (a) (697 SE2d 779) (2010) (citation and punctuation

omitted). See also OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

With these guiding principles in mind, Cook deposed that, on the day of his fall,

he was acting as a subcontractor and installing bathroom cabinets in the home owned

by SMG. This job required him to work on three bathrooms located on the second

floor of the home. To reach these bathrooms, Cook deposed that he had to walk up a

set of “straight” stairs with fifteen to sixteen steps to an “open space” or “foyer” at

the top. This open space at the upper landing of the stairs was designed to look out

and into the home’s two-story entry foyer just inside the front door.V6. At the time

that Cook was working on the home, it is undisputed that there was no guardrail

installed at the edge of this open area. So, for orientation purposes, the unprotected

ledge was directly in front of anyone who was standing on the top stair, and the 2 second-floor bathrooms in which Cook was installing cabinets were just to the left and

right of the central open space.

According to Cook, he walked up and down the stairs to the various upper-level

bathrooms at least eight times, meaning he traversed through the open space at the top

of the stairs approximately fifteen times before his accident. As he walked up and

down the stairs and left and right through the open space, Cook “knew [the ledge] was

open[.]” Cook deposed, however, that he “didn’t give the [open ledge] a second

thought” because “it wasn’t in [his] immediate workspace area.” Cook further

admitted that, before his fall, he “had gone up the stairs [and] seen a ledge that’s not

protected, but it wasn’t a concern to him at the time[.]” Also, when asked to define

his “immediate work area,” Cook indicated that it was “[w]here I’m doing the work”

which included “the area where [he was] coming up and down and walking and

traversing and carrying cabinets and carrying tools[.]” And, Cook had to walk through

at least part of the open area with the unguarded ledge to access the second-floor

bathrooms located on each side of the open space.

With regard to the fall, itself, Cook deposed that, after he had begun installing

cabinets in the Jack-and-Jill bathrooms just to the right of the landing or open space

at the top of the stairs, he realized that an air hose that he needed to use had a kink in 3 it. (Cook had carried the hose up the stairs with him, and it was connected to an air

compressor on the first floor.) To unkink the hose, Cook stepped out of the bathroom

into “that common area,” which was only one or two steps from the bathroom he was

in at the time. He then began twisting the hose while walking backwards towards the open

ledge. Cook admitted that, “[p]rior to taking [his] first step backwards, [h]e did not

look behind [him].” In fact, he admitted that he did not look behind him “[a]t any

point in time while [he] was pulling and tugging on this air hose[.]” Cook also

admitted that he only took “two or three” steps backwards before he fell off the ledge.

And, he agreed that he was, in fact, “[s]huffling backwards” in an open area where he

had seen that there was no guardrail.

Nonetheless, Cook opined that the fall was one-hundred percent the fault of

SMG. To explain the reason for his fall, Cook stated: “On a cloudy day in Georgia in

December, and there’s overspray on the floor along with drywall dust that kind of

blends that edge in. So, I thought it was further away from where it was.” He

continued: “I could see where it dropped off, but as I explained already, the drywall dust,

the overspray and the cloudy day all kind of blended it together. So, I thought it was

further back than where it was.”(Emphasis supplied.) But, as pointed out above,

Cook unequivocally deposed that he was walking backwards and not looking behind 4 him when he fell, so, in his backward shuffle to the ledge, he could not have been

misguided by the existence of an optical illusion in the opposite direction of his line

of sight.

Based on Cook’s own version of events, the trial court properly granted

summary judgment to SMG, as Cook assumed the risk of his fall. To support a ruling

that Cook assumed the risk of falling, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to Cook, must show that he “(1) had actual knowledge of the danger; (2) understood

and appreciated the risks associated with such danger; and (3) voluntarily exposed

himself to those risks.” Liles v. Innerwork, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 352, 354(2) (631 SE2d

408) (2006). Our Supreme Court has confirmed that Cook had actual knowledge of

the open ledge (the first factor),1 and, based on the plain record before us, Cook fully

appreciated the danger the open ledge posed (the second factor). See O’Neal v. Sikes,

271 Ga. App. 391, 392 (609 SE2d 734) (2005) (“[N]o danger is more commonly

realized or risk appreciated ... than that of falling.”). And, despite actual knowledge

of the ledge and appreciation of the danger it posed, Cook voluntarily chose to walk

1 In SMG Constr. Servs. v. Cook, 322 Ga. 819 (922 SE2d 76) (2025), our Supreme Court determined that, under these circumstances, Cook had actual knowledge of the hazard that precipitated his injuries. 5 backwards in the common area next to the open ledge without looking back, knowingly

exposing himself to the risk of falling (the third factor). In doing so, he assumed the

risk of injury. See Sones v. Real Estate Dev. Group, 270 Ga. App. 507, 508-509(1) (606

SE2d 687) (2004) (holding that assumption of the risk barred employee’s claims after

he was injured when he was knocked off of platform being lifted by a forklift because

after “two prior nights’ use of the forklift and work platform with no guard rails or

tie-offs and operating the forklift in darkness, [the employee] was aware of and

appreciated both actually and subjectively the risk of injury by falling off the forklift”).

Although, in most cases, the issue of assumption of the risk presents a question

most suitable for a jury,

where, as here, the issue is plain, palpable, and indisputable, summary judgment is appropriate. [SMG] met [its] burden to show that [Cook] knowingly and voluntarily assumed the risk of injury, and [Cook] has failed to meet [his] burden to defeat the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk. Accordingly, [SMG is] entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Fuller v. McCormick, 340 Ga. App. 636, 641(1)(b) (798 SE2d 280) (2017) (citation and

quotation marks omitted).

In the alternative, the facts of this case also support a grant of summary

judgment in favor of SMG based on the affirmative defense of voluntary negligence.

6 Voluntary negligence generally refers to an “intentional disregard to a known risk[.]”

Henderson v. St. Paul Baptist Church, 328 Ga. App. 123, 125 (761 SE2d 533) (2014).

See also Am. Multi-Cinema v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442, 445(2) (679 SE2d 25) (2009)

(same). Here, again, Cook knew about the open ledge, appreciated its danger, but

intentionally and unreasonably disregarded that danger by blindly walking backwards

towards it. As such, his own voluntary negligence resulted in his fall, and, as a result.

the trial court properly granted SMG’s motion for summary judgment. See Landings

Assn. v. Williams, 291 Ga. 397, 400 (728 SE2d 577) (2012) (plaintiff “knowingly

assumed the risks of walking in areas inhabited by wild alligators or failed to exercise

ordinary care by doing so”).

In closing, it is true and important that we must remain mindful “that the

‘routine’ issues of premises liability, i.e., the negligence of the defendant and the

plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s lack of ordinary care for personal safety are generally not

susceptible of summary adjudication[.]” Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 748(2)

(493 SE2d 403) (1997). However, though tragic in result, voluntarily walking

backwards over the edge of a cliff – or, in this case, the edge of a second-story landing

– without looking is exactly the sort of act that is susceptible to summary judgment.

Accordingly, I must dissent. 7