Daniel C. Ramsey v. N. Thompson

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 Case No.: 23-cv-1920-JAH-DDL

12 Plaintiff, REPORT AND 13 v. RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER (1) DENYING 14 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 15 N. THOMPSON, SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND (2) GRANTING 16 Defendants. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

18 [Dkt. Nos. 67, 76] 19 20 Plaintiff Daniel C. Ramsey, proceeding pro se in this civil rights action, 21 alleges his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was transferred to 22 High Desert State Prison. Dkt. No. 47. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for 23 Summary Judgment [see Dkt. No. 67 (“P. MSJ”)] and Defendant’s Motion for 24 Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment 25 [see Dkt. No. 76-2 (“D. MSJ”)]. This Report and Recommendation is submitted to 26 United States District Judge John A. Houston pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and 27 Civil Local Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f) of the United States District Court for the 28 Southern District of California. For the following reasons, the Court 1 RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED and 2 that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement be GRANTED. 3 I. 5 On October 16, 2023, Plaintiff Daniel C. Ramsey, a state prisoner proceeding 6 pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 7 § 1983 against N. Thompson and H. Moseley.1 Dkt. No. 1. 8 On December 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. 9 Dkt. No. 18. 10 On December 27, 2024, N. Thompson answered the complaint. Dkt. No. 22. 11 On February 12, 2025, Judge Houston held a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion 12 for a preliminary injunction, denied the motion, and granted Plaintiff leave to amend 13 his complaint. Dkt. No. 33. 14 On February 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) 15 alleging that John Doe #1, Warden (RJD) 2 violated his right to Due Process and 16 failed to protect him, and that Defendant N. Thompson was deliberately indifferent 17 to his medical needs and failed to protect him from harm, in violation of his Eighth 18 Amendment rights. Dkt. No. 36 at 2-7. 19 On February 28, 2025, Defendant N. Thompson moved for partial dismissal 20 of the FAC. Dkt. No. 37. 21 22 23

24 25 1 Defendant H. Moseley was terminated from the case on January 22, 2024. See Docket; see also Dkt. No. 5. 26

27 2 Warden Doe has not been identified and thus has never been served nor 28 appeared in the action. 1 On March 25, 2025, the Court issued an Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for 2 Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint and Report and Recommendation for 3 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as Moot. Dkt. No. 41. 4 On April 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) under 5 § 1983, against Defendant N. Thompson. Dkt. No. 47 at 1. Plaintiff alleges claims 6 under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for deliberate indifference, failure 7 to protect, and procedural due process violations. Id. at 2. 8 On May 5, 2025, Defendant N. Thompson filed a Motion for Partial Dismissal 9 of Plaintiff’s SAC for failure to state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due 10 process claim. Dkt. No. 48-1. On May 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the 11 motion and Defendant replied on June 19, 2025. Dkt. Nos. 50-1, 56. 12 On July 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. No. 13 67. 14 On October 24, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and 15 Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. No. 76. 16 On October 30, 2025, the Court issued a Report and Recommendation for 17 order (1) Granting Defendant's Motion for Partial Dismissal and (2) Order Denying 18 in Part and Granting in Part Plaintiff's Motion for the Court to Take Judicial Notice 19 of Adjudicative Facts. Dkt. No. 80. 20 On November 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a declaration in support of his MSJ and 21 an opposition to Defendant’s MSJ. Dkt. No. 87. That same day, Plaintiff filed 22 another opposition to Defendant’s MSJ. Dkt. No. 88. 23 On December 15, 2025, Defendant filed a reply in support of her MSJ. Dkt. 24 No. 89. 25 On December 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply in support of his MSJ. Dkt. No. 26 93. 27 28 1 On March 27, 2026, Judge Houston adopted the Report and 2 Recommendation and dismissed Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim without 3 leave to amend. Dkt. No. 94. 4 II. 5 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS3 6 This action arises out of Plaintiff’s transfer to High Desert State Prison 7 (“HDSP”). SAC at 4. Plaintiff alleges he is a wheelchair-bound, disabled inmate 8 who suffers from paraplegia and other unspecified medical conditions, and as a 9 result has a “high risk” medical designation. Id. at 5, 8-9. In early 2023, Plaintiff, 10 who was housed at Richard J. Donovan (“RJD”), was informed by his counselor 11 that he was up for an annual review for good behavior and that, due to his medical 12 status, the options for housing were the California Health Care Facility and the 13 California Medical Facility. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff preferred the California Health Care 14 Facility, and that information was forwarded to the Inmate Classification Committee 15 (“ICC”). Id. at 5. 16 On March 3, 2023, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant filed an Auditor Action 17 removing Plaintiff‘s medical conditions, overriding Plaintiff’s high risk medical 18 designation without any stated reason, and recommending Plaintiff’s transfer to 19 HDSP, a non-high risk medical facility. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff alleges this was done 20 without approval by the California Correctional Health Care Service (“CCHCS”) or 21 his primary care provider. Id. at 6. After learning of the proposed transfer to HDSP, 22 Plaintiff filed a 602 grievance requesting the transfer be placed on hold as he did 23 not belong in a facility unable to house individuals with high-risk medical needs 24 and an inability to defend themselves. Id. at 7-8. In his grievance, Plaintiff also 25 noted that he was scheduled for another surgery and a follow-up appointment with 26 27 3 This section is taken from the Court’s October 30, 2025 Report and 28 1 his neurosurgeon. Id. at 8. Plaintiff’s grievance was denied and he was 2 transferred to HDSP in March 2023. Id. at 7-8. 3 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s decision to override his high risk 4 designation and authorize the transfer to HDSP violated his Eighth Amendment 5 rights as it was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, failed to protect him, 6 and recklessly ignored the excessive risk the transfer posed to Plaintiff’s health. 7 Id. at 13. Plaintiff further alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment due process 8 rights were violated because he was not asked about the decision to remove his 9 high-risk medical designation and Defendant failed to receive approval from 10 CCHCS, ICC, or Plaintiff before making her decisions related to the Audit. Id. at 11 14. In addition, Plaintiff was not informed of his transfer until the day it took place 12 and had no opportunity to research, investigate, or be heard on the issue. Id. 15 A. Plaintiff’s Motion 16 Plaintiff argues that summary judgment should be entered in his favor 17 because Defendant violated his constitutional rights by endorsing his transfer to a 18 non-high risk medical facility. P. MSJ at 3-4. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that his 19 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated and that Defendant was 20 deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, interfered with his medical diagnosis, 21 and failed to protect him. Id. 22 Defendant contends that Plaintiff did not suffer an Article III injury and that 23 the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant his request for injunctive relief. D. MSJ at 20- 24 23. Defendant further contends that she did not violate Plaintiff’s rights because 25 she followed policy and information from others and was not deliberately 26 indifferent. D. MSJ at 23-29. Finally, Plaintiff does not have a protected liberty 27 interest and Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 29-33. 28 1 Plaintiff replies that summary judgment should be entered in his favor as 2 Defendant “failed to generate a genuine dispute of material fact.” Dkt. No. 93 at 2. 3 B. Defendant’s Motion 4 Defendant argues that summary judgment should be entered in her favor 5 because she did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Plaintiff’s claims fail as 6 a matter of law, and she is entitled to qualified immunity from suit. Dkt. No. 76 at 7 1. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the objective and 8 subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment claim and that Plaintiff does not have 9 a protected interest under the Constitution or state law.4 D. MSJ at 10. 10 Plaintiff contends that he established that his Eighth and Fourteenth 11 Amendment rights were violated. Dkt. No. 88. Plaintiff states that Defendant had 12 access to all of his records, reviewed them, disregarded them and recommended 13 him for transfer to a non-high risk facility in violation of his rights. Id. at 2. Plaintiff 14 was not given the opportunity to present his position prior to transfer. Id. at 6-7. 15 Defendant replies that Plaintiff’s attempts to overcome the genuine and 16 undisputed material facts are based on “speculation and unsupported, irrelevant 17 theories.” Dkt. No. 89 at 1. Defendant further replies that Plaintiff failed to satisfy 18 his burden to point to specific evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact. 19 Id. at 2. Defendant notes that Plaintiff’s objections to her statement of undisputed 20 material facts should be overruled and that Plaintiff’s opposition evidence should 21 not be considered because it is “unsworn and not authenticated.” Id. at 4. 22 Defendant also contends that Plaintiff failed to (1) address her arguments 23 regarding Plaintiff’s lack of Article III injury and the Court’s lack of personal 24 25 4 Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim was 26 pending when Defendant moved for summary judgment, and Defendant included 27 that claim in the summary judgment motion “[i]n an abundance of caution.” D. MSJ at 10 n. 2. As noted above, Judge Houston subsequently dismissed the 28 1 jurisdiction to award injunctive relief, (2) create a genuine issue of material fact as 2 to his deliberate indifference claim, and (3) demonstrate an underlying protected 3 liberty interest. Id. at 5-8. Finally, Defendant contends that she is entitled to 4 qualified immunity. Id. at 8-9. 5 IV. 7 A. Pro Se Litigants 8 When a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must be careful to construe the 9 pleadings liberally and to afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Erickson 10 v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 11 2002). This rule of liberal construction is “particularly important” in civil rights cases. 12 Hendon v. Ramsey, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 (S.D. Cal. 2007); see also Hebbe 13 v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (“our obligation remains, where the 14 petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings 15 liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt”). 16 B. Summary Judgment 17 A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 18 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 19 a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The “moving party initially bears the burden 20 of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. 21 Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010).5 “Where the moving party meets that 22 burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate specific facts 23 demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” Id. This task “is not a light 24 one.” Id. The non-moving party cannot rely on his pleadings, but “must come forth 25 with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict [for] [him], 26 27 5 All citations, internal quotation marks, and subsequent history are omitted 28 unless otherwise noted. 1 assuming that all justifiable inferences are drawn in [his] favor.” Pac. Gulf Shipping 2 Co. v. Vigorous Shipping & Trading S.A., 992 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2021). 3 C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 4 Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) 5 that a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and 6 (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity 7 protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 8 Marsh v. Cty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2012). A person acting 9 under the color of law deprives another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning 10 of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or 11 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 12 deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].” Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. 13 Bd. of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007)). “The inquiry into causation 14 must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each 15 individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a 16 constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). 17 V. 19 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his Eighth Amendment rights when 20 she filed an Auditor Action overriding Plaintiff’s high risk medical designation which 21 resulted in his transfer to HDSP, a non-high risk medical facility. SAC at 6-7. 22 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief preventing him from being housed in a non-high Risk 23 facility, $880,00 in damages, $2,000,000 in punitive damages, and fees. Id. at 17. 24 A. Evidence the Court May Consider on Summary Judgment 25 In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court may only consider 26 admissible evidence. See Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 27 2002). A party may not create a triable issue of fact merely by presenting argument 28 in its legal memoranda. See S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig 1 Airlines) v. Walter Kidde & Co., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1982). Defendant 2 contends the Court should not consider Plaintiff’s unsworn statements in 3 determining whether a triable issue of fact exists. Dkt. No. 89 at n4. See Estrella 4 v. Brandt, 682 F.2d 814, 819–20 (9th Cir. 1982) (on summary judgment, 5 statements in legal memoranda are not evidence and “do not create issues of fact 6 capable of defeating an otherwise valid summary judgment motion”). 7 In ruling on the parties’ motions, the Court will consider facts contained in 8 Plaintiff’s motions and pleadings that are attested under penalty of perjury. See 9 Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004) (“because Jones is pro se, we 10 must consider as evidence in his opposition to summary judgment all of Jones's 11 contentions offered in motions and pleadings, where such contentions are based 12 on personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, 13 and where Jones attested under penalty of perjury that the contents of the motions 14 or pleadings are true and correct”). Moreover, the Court will consider Plaintiff’s 15 unsworn statements to the extent Plaintiff could testify under oath at trial regarding 16 his personal knowledge of those statements. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d at 17 1036-1037 (9th Cir. 2003) (At the summary judgment stage, we do not focus on 18 the admissibility of the evidence's form. We instead focus on the admissibility of its 19 contents.”); see also Rosenfeld v. Mastin, No. CV 11-7002-DOC(E), 2013 WL 20 5705638, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 11, 2013) (considering plaintiff’s unsworn 21 statements made in the third amended complaint and in the summary judgment 22 opposition because plaintiff “plainly has personal knowledge of the content of these 23 statements and could present the statements in admissible form through his own 24 testimony at trial,” but not considering plaintiff’s speculative statements regarding 25 a particular claim where there was no indication plaintiff had personal knowledge 26 of the claim); Boyd v. McDowell, No. CV 21-5616-JAK(E), 2024 WL 4719709, at 27 *4 (“the Court should consider the unsworn factual statements made by Plaintiff in 28 the Fourth Amended Complaint, to the extent that document shows Plaintiff has 1 personal knowledge of the content of the statements and could present the 2 statements in admissible form through his own testimony at trial”). 6 3 B. Defendant’s Evidence 4 In support of her MSJ and opposition to Plaintiff’s MSJ, Defendant submits 5 (1) a memorandum of points and authorities [Dkt. No. 76-2]; (2) a statement of 6 undisputed material facts [Doc No. 76-3]; (3) her own sworn declaration [Dkt. No. 7 76-4 (“Thompson Decl.”)]; (4) the sworn declaration of C. Hees, Correctional 8 Captain in the Classification Services Unit (“CSU”) of the Division of Adult 9 Institutions [Dkt. No. 76-5 (“Hees Decl.”)], (5) the sworn declaration of B. Baldoni, 10 Correctional Counselor II in the CSU Health Care Headquarters [Dkt. No. 76-6 11 (“Baldoni Decl.”)], (6) the sworn declaration of T. Murray, Health Care Chief 12 Executive Officer at HDSP [Dkt. No. 76-7 (“Murry Decl.”)], (7) the sworn declaration 13 of defense counsel, Anne M. Kammer [Dkt. No. 76-8 (“Kammer Decl.”)], and (8) 14 excerpts from Plaintiff’s deposition transcript [76-8 at 4-21]. 15 C. Plaintiff’s Evidence 16 In support of his MSJ, Plaintiff submits (1) a Medical Classification Chrono 17 from September 21, 2021 [Dkt. No. 67-1 at 2], (2) an order for a low air mattress 18 [Dkt. No. 67-1 at 4], (3) a Health Care Transfer Information Form CDCR 7371 [Dkt. 19 No. 67-1 at 6-7], (4) a Health Care Services Request Form CDCR 7362 [Dkt. No. 20 67-1 at 9-10], (5) a July 4, 2023 Office of Appeals Decision [Dkt. No. 67-1 at 11], 21 (6) his own declaration signed under penalty of perjury [P. Decl.], (7) a statement 22

23 24 6 Plaintiff argues that all statements contained in his SAC must be accepted as 25 true because Defendant failed to respond to the SAC as ordered by the Court and required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 8(b)(6). P. MSJ 26 at 12-13, ¶ 23. That is incorrect. Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s complaint by 27 filing a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 48; see also Dkt. No. 64 (“Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment Against 28 1 of undisputed material facts [Dkt. No. 87-1], (8) a Classification Chrono CDCR 2 128G [Dkt. No. 87-2], (9) an October 24, 2023 Office of Appeals Decision [Dkt. 3 No. 87-3], (10) his objections to Defendant’s statement of undisputed material 4 facts, (11) a second declaration signed under penalty of perjury [Dkt. No. 87 5 (“Ramsey Decl.”)] and (12) an opposition to Defendant’s MSJ [Dkt. No. 88]. 6 D. Undisputed Facts 7 Both Plaintiff and Defendant agree that it is undisputed that (1) Plaintiff is 8 housed in HDSP, which is not a high-risk facility, (2) Plaintiff has a high risk medical 9 clinical status and requires a high-risk medical designation, (3) Defendant 10 endorsed Plaintiff’s transfer to HDSP, (4) as a Classification Staff Representative 11 (“CSR”), Defendant was not authorized to transfer Plaintiff to an institution that 12 could not provide Plaintiff with the appropriate level of medical care, (5) Plaintiff 13 was housed at RJD from 2014 to March 2023, (6) Counselor J. Fontaine evaluated 14 the locations that were in compliance with policy and Plaintiff’s medical clinical 15 status and located two prisons that were available medical facilities, California 16 Health Care facility (“CHCF”) and California Medical Facility (“CMF”), Plaintiff 17 chose CHCF as first choice and CMF as second, and the counselor agreed and 18 forwarded the findings to the Unit Classification Committee (“UCC”), (7) Plaintiff 19 signed documents for CHCF and CMF because he did not protest the findings or 20 having the Counselor to represent him before the UCC and the Institution 21 Classification Committee (“ICC”) and the ICC and UCC both agreed with the 22 selected medical facility institutions and approved transfer by recommendation, (8) 23 on March 2, 2023, Defendant audited the RJD UCC’s recommendation regarding 24 Plaintiff’s housing transfer and endorsed Plaintiff for transfer to HDSP, (9) 25 Defendant typed “A.) Medical Conditions- Removed/Disapproved, B.) HR (High 26 Risk) w/ override, and C.) Reason’s None” on the Auditor Action document, (10) 27 Defendant overrode Plaintiff’s high-risk medical designation and endorsed 28 Plaintiff’s transfer to HDSP, (11) the UCC and ICC document filed and given to the 1 Defendant showed Plaintiff’s housing score, needs, by the abbreviation “MED,” 2 (12) CCHCS has a medical classification system for the incarcerated population in 3 CDCR’s custody, (13) Plaintiff is endorsed for housing at HDSP, (14) Plaintiff has 4 been labelled by medical custody staff as a Fall Risk, (15) Plaintiff needs 5 assistance to use the bathroom and relied on inmates to help whom he paid with 6 food from the kitchen or package canteen when he went to store, (16) Plaintiff 7 submitted an administrative grievance regarding his transfer to HDSP which was 8 denied without Plaintiff being interviewed, and (17) Plaintiff did not have a hearing, 9 interview, or notice that he was being transferred, or that his medical conditions 10 would be overridden and removed before Defendant’s actions on March 3, 2023. 11 See P. MSJ at 5-9; Dkt. No. 76-3 at 18-22 (Defendant’s Responses to Plaintiff’s 12 Facts in Support of Plaintiff’s Moton for Summary Judgment). 13 E. Plaintiff’s Objections 14 Plaintiff “objects to all undisputed facts pages 2-17 numbers 1-18 and objects 15 to Plaintiff summary judgment statements page 18-22 numbers 3-22” as being 16 inconsistent with the facts as stated in his SAC.7 Dkt. No. 88 at 9-10. 17 Plaintiff’s objections to “all undisputed facts pages 2-17 numbers 1-18” are 18 OVERRULED. Facts 1-2 are undisputed and in accordance with Plaintiff’s own 19 undisputed facts. See Dkt. No. 76-3 at 2 (Fact No. 1 “Plaintiff Ramsey is an 20 incarcerated person in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 21 Rehabilitation (CDCR)” and Fact No. 2 “During his entire period of incarceration, 22 Ramsey has relied on a wheelchair.”) and compare to Ramsey Decl. at ¶ 2 (“I’ve 23 been incarcerated since 2006 as a disable[d] person in a wheelchair (DPW) do 24 25 7 Plaintiff is referring to Defendant’s Undisputed Material Facts in Support of 26 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and In Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion 27 for Summary Judgment [see Dkt. No. 76-3 at 2-17] and Defendant’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Facts in Support of Plaintiff’s Moton for Summary Judgment [see Id. at 28 1 [sic] to paraplegic.”) and SAC at 1, 4-5 (stating that Plaintiff resides at the address 2 for HDSP and previously resided in RJ Donovan Correctional Facility and that his 3 custody level includes “disable[d] person in wheelchair (DPW)”). The remaining 4 facts (Nos. 3-18) discuss Defendant’s years of service, job titles, duties, and 5 responsibilities, and the policies and procedures for determining the placement of 6 incarcerated individuals in various facilities. Dkt. No. 76-3 at 2-17. The facts come 7 from the sworn declarations of Defendant Thompson, C. Hees, and B. Baldoni who 8 have first-hand knowledge of the facts based on their work experience. Plaintiff 9 does not have personal knowledge of Defendant’s years of service, job titles, 10 duties, and responsibilities, and the policies and procedures for determining the 11 placement of incarcerated individuals in various facilities. 12 Plaintiff’s objections to all “summary judgment statements page 18-22 13 numbers 3-22” are OVERRULED. Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, his own 14 declaration and recitation of the facts in his SAC support the facts identified by 15 Defendant as undisputed from Plaintiff’s facts in support of his Motion for Summary 16 Judgment. Dkt. No. 76-3 at 18-22; see also Attachment A to this Report & 17 Recommendation. 18 Plaintiff also objects to Defendant’s undisputed facts regarding Policies and 19 Procedures for Prison Transfers [see Dkt No. 76-3 at 3-7], Plaintiff’s Initial Eligibility 20 for a Transfer by RJD’s UCC [see id. at 8-10], and Plaintiff’s Transfer Review by 21 the CSU and Thompson [see id. at 10-17]. Dkt. No. 88 at 11-40. Plaintiff objects 22 for various reasons including (1) opinion, (2) hearsay of statement of policies and 23 procedures or with no expert opinion, (3) argumentative, inconsistent with the 24 facts, (4) false documents and/or lack of authentication of document, and (5) lack 25 of foundation of opinion. “While objections based on relevance, lack of foundation, 26 and lack of personal knowledge may be cognizable at trial, on a motion for 27 summary judgment, the Court is concerned only with the admissibility of relevant 28 facts at trial, and not the form of these facts as presented in the [m]otion.” Perrotte 1 v. Boulton, No. 5:22-CV-01593-SSS-SPX, 2025 WL 2371824, at *3 (C.D. Cal., July 2 21, 2025) (emphasis in original) (overruling “Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections based 3 on relevance, self-serving nature, lack of foundation, and lack of personal 4 knowledge”); see also Ramirez v. Victoria's Secret Stores, LLC, 2019 WL 5 6998784, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2019) (overruling defendant's evidentiary 6 objections based on relevance, lack of foundation, lack of personal knowledge, 7 and speculation). In addition, Plaintiff’s objections are generally stated without any 8 explanation as to how the evidentiary rules are violated. See Blue Novis, Inc. v. 9 U.S. Alliance Group, Inc., No. 820CV01280JVSDFMX, 2021 WL 3163613, at *1 10 (C.D. Cal., May 25, 2021) (“[t]he Court does not give merit to Alliance's boilerplate 11 objections that are devoid of relevant analysis or do not adequately dispute the 12 facts in the [statement of undisputed facts].”). 13 Because the evidence Plaintiff objects to “could be presented in an 14 admissible form at trial (i.e., through testimony from a witness laying the foundation 15 for an exception or because the Court finds the evidence to be non-hearsay”)” and 16 because Plaintiff provides boilerplate general objections, Plaintiff’s objections 17 based on opinion statement, hearsay, argumentative statements, inconsistency 18 with the facts, false documents and/or lack of authentication of document, and lack 19 of foundation of opinion are OVERRULED. Cherewick v. State Farm Fire and 20 Casualty, 578 F.Supp.3d 1136, 1157 (S.D. Cal. 2022) (While hearsay evidence is 21 not typically admissible at trial, if hearsay evidence “could be presented in an 22 admissible form at trial (i.e., through testimony from a witness laying the foundation 23 for an exception or because the Court finds the evidence to be non-hearsay),” that 24 evidence can be considered when evaluating a motion for summary judgment). 25 F. Eighth Amendment Claim 26 Plaintiff asserts multiple Eighth Amendment theories of liability, and the 27 Court addresses each in turn. 28 /// 1 1. Conditions of Confinement 2 “The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it 3 permit inhumane ones,” and “the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the 4 conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth 5 Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citations omitted). “To 6 prove an Eighth Amendment violation based on prison conditions, a prisoner must 7 satisfy a two-part test.” Grenning v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 8 2014). “The objective part of the test requires a showing that the defendants 9 deprived the plaintiff of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Id. 10 (citation omitted). “The subjective part requires a showing that the defendants 11 acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.” Id. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“a 12 prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an 13 inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and 14 disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be 15 aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 16 serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference”). 17 Plaintiff’s allegations that he was in a “flooded cell for months,” that the prison 18 had an “incomplete roof” from March 2023 until November 2023 and that the prison 19 grounds were covered in snow and had uneven terrain do not raise a triable issue 20 of fact as to his Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant based on conditions 21 of confinement. Even assuming any of these alleged conditions could be 22 construed as depriving Plaintiff “of the minimal civilized measure of life's 23 necessities,” Grenning, 739 F.3d at 1238, his claim fails on the subjective part 24 because there is no evidence Defendant was aware of the conditions and 25 disregarded an excessive risk of harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff presents no evidence 26 supporting a finding that Defendant was aware of any prison condition presenting 27 a risk of harm to Plaintiff and disregarded that risk of harm by authorizing Plaintiff’s 28 transfer to HDSP. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“the official must both be aware 1 of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 2 harm exists, and he must also draw the inference”). 3 Plaintiff’s allegation that the prison environment at HDSP is more dangerous 4 than what would typically be acceptable because of his inability to defend himself 5 with one arm is too speculative to establish deliberate indifference. Dilbert v. 6 Fisher, 2023 WL 4848515, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 28, 2023) (“To the extent that 7 Plaintiff claims an Eighth Amendment violation due to the fact that his 8 ‘high risk medical’ status may result in his potential transfer to another prison with 9 younger and more dangerous inmates, such a risk of serious harm to Plaintiff is 10 speculative and too attenuated to meet the deliberate indifference standard to 11 sustain an Eighth Amendment violation.”). Plaintiff does not provide or identify 12 evidence of a specific harm, nor does he allege he suffered actual harm. Plaintiff 13 also alleges that HDSP was dangerous because if he fell and injured his neck, it 14 would take 1.5 – 2 hours to get him to a proper hospital. P. Decl. at 18. On this 15 record, Plaintiff’s perceived threat of future harm is purely speculative. 16 Plaintiff’s speculative contentions regarding a risk of harm from other HDSP 17 inmates and an inability timely transport him to a hospital if medical treatment were 18 necessary fail to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant deprived him 19 “of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Grenning, 739 F.3d at 1238. 20 Moreover, there is no evidence that Defendant was aware of any such conditions 21 and acted with deliberate indifference in transferring Plaintiff to HDSP. Id. 22 For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court 23 GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and enter judgment in 24 Defendant’s favor and DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgement as to 25 Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim. 26 2. Failure to Protect 27 Under the Eighth Amendment, “prison officials have a duty to protect 28 prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. 1 To prevail on a failure to protect claim, Plaintiff must show prison officials were 2 “deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to his safety. Id. at 834. “Deliberate 3 indifference has both subjective and objective components.” Labatad v. Corr. 4 Corp. of Am., 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013). To establish the objective 5 component, “the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing 6 a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To establish the 7 subjective component, the inmate must show that a prison official “kn[ew] that 8 inmates face[d] a substantial risk of serious harm and disregard[ed] that risk by 9 failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Labatad, 714 F.3d at 1160. 10 Plaintiff alleges there was more violence at HDSP because general 11 population inmates were intermixed with sensitive needs yard inmates and that he 12 had to pay other inmates for protection. P. Decl. at ¶ 18, 22; SAC at 7-8, 11; P. 13 MSJ at 8. However, Plaintiff does not allege that he was threatened or injured by 14 any general population inmates and does not otherwise identify a particularized 15 risk of harm. See Brown v. Department of Corrections, No. 16 317CV05524BHSDWC, 2018 WL 3371545, at *4 (W.D. Wash., June 8, 2018) 17 (noting that “speculative concerns of being assaulted do not rise to the level of 18 substantial risk required by the Eighth Amendment” and finding no genuine issue 19 of material fact where generalized statement that Plaintiff faced a risk of harm was 20 insufficient to show substantial risk of serious harm); see also Williams v. Wood, 21 223 F. App'x 670, 671 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of failure to protect claim 22 where prisoner “did not allege that he ha[d] been assaulted or threatened with an 23 assault[,]” and because “speculative and generalized fears of harm at the hands 24 of other prisoners do not rise to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious harm to his 25 future health” under Farmer). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to satisfy the objective 26 requirement of an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim. And even if Plaintiff 27 had proffered facts sufficient to create a triable issue of fact on this claim, he has 28 not proffered any facts demonstrating that Defendant was aware of such risks and 1 disregarded them by authorizing Plaintiff’s transfer to HDSP. Accordingly, the 2 Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT Defendant’s Motion for 3 Summary Judgment and enter judgment in Defendant’s favor and DENY Plaintiff’s 4 Motion for Summary Judgement as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to 5 protect claim. 6 3. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need 7 A prison official’s “deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious illness or 8 injury” violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual 9 punishment. Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). A prisoner 10 must satisfy an objective and subjective requirement to assert an Eighth 11 Amendment violation. Id. The objective requirement is satisfied where the inmate 12 demonstrates that his medical need is sufficiently “serious” such that the “failure to 13 treat [the] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 14 wanton infliction of pain.” Id. “Examples of conditions that are serious in nature 15 include an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and 16 worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that 17 significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and 18 substantial pain.” Santos v. Annikos, No. 3:23-CV-00281-MMD-CSD, 2025 WL 19 2654834, at *3 (D. Nev., June 9, 2025). 20 The subjective component requires a culpable mental state, specifically, 21 “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 22 836. “Deliberate indifference exists when a prison official denies, delays or 23 intentionally interferes with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in 24 which prison officials provide medical care.” Id. at *4. The indifference must be 25 substantial, and inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross 26 negligence does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Estelle v. Gamble, 27 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 28 1 “Mere delay of medical treatment, without more, is insufficient to state a claim 2 of deliberate medical indifference.” Robinson v. Catlett, 725 F. Supp.2d 1203, 3 1208 (S.D. Cal. July 19, 2012). Deliberate indifference requires “a purposeful act 4 or failure to act on the part of the defendant.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 5 1060 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 6 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997). “A defendant must purposefully ignore or fail to 7 respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need in order for deliberate 8 indifference to be established.” Id. 9 Plaintiff alleges that he needed neurosurgery that involved his neck and 10 spine and that would allow for greater mobility in his arms without pain. SAC at 11 11, Exh. D. In support, Plaintiff provides Health Care Services Request Forms 12 dated August 29, 2023 and October 8, 2023 that include his request for neck and 13 spine surgery to help with the numbness in his right hand and his pain which he 14 describes as a ten out of ten. P. MSJ at Exh. 3. The form also includes requests 15 for assistance with showering and toileting. Id. Plaintiff also submits a declaration 16 under penalty of perjury declaring that his surgery was delayed because of his 17 transfer. P. Decl. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff does not provide any expert reports or medical 18 records opining on his need for surgery or the consequences, if any, of delayed 19 surgery. 20 a. Objective Prong 21 Plaintiff provides sufficient evidence to demonstrate a triable issue of fact as 22 to whether he had a serious medical condition. There is no dispute that the surgery 23 was ordered and performed. Given that back and spine surgery is something “that 24 a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or 25 treatment” and Plaintiff declared that the condition “significantly affect[ed] [his] daily 26 activities [and resulted in] the existence of chronic and substantial pain[,]” Plaintiff 27 presents evidence that the surgery was sufficiently serious such that the “failure to 28 treat [the] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 1 wanton infliction of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); see 2 also Santos, 2025 WL 2654834, at *3. 3 b. Subjective Prong 4 Plaintiff fails to establish a triable issue of fact to satisfy the subjective 5 requirement of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The evidence 6 does not show that Defendant interfered with Plaintiff’s medical diagnosis and 7 treatment or that the interference caused him harm. Indeed, the evidence does 8 not support a finding that Defendant had any knowledge of Plaintiff’s surgery let 9 alone any control over the scheduling of said surgery or potential delay due to 10 transfer. Plaintiff does not connect Defendant’s act of overriding Plaintiff’s medical 11 designation and facilitating Plaintiff’s transfer to a new facility, to a specific harm. 12 Instead, Plaintiff generally alleges that he was transferred to HDSP because of 13 Defendant’s actions and that had he not been transferred, his surgery would have 14 taken place as scheduled in March 2023. P. MSJ. Defendant’s audit of Plaintiff 15 and decision to remove his High Risk designation is not evidence that Defendant 16 had the required culpable mental state and intentionally interfered with Plaintiff’s 17 treatment. 18 Additionally, the evidence does not show that Plaintiff suffered additional 19 harm or injury from the eight-month delay in surgery. Plaintiff alleges that prior to 20 his transfer, he was scheduled to have surgery and a follow-up appointment with 21 his neurosurgeon. See SAC at 8, Exh. D. Plaintiff later states that while his March 22 2023 surgery was “delayed[,]” it still took place in November 2023. Id. at 11. He 23 also generally alleged that he was “deprived of medical treatment and care” and 24 that there was “interference of a medical diagnosis and treatment.” Id. at 11, 13. 25 Plaintiff does not allege or identify any specific harm that he suffered because of 26 the delay in getting surgery, nor does he identify the medical care and treatment 27 that he was allegedly denied or how it caused him harm. See P. MSJ; Dkt. Nos. 28 87-88; and SAC. Plaintiff does not provide any evidence, other than his own 1 conjecture, that he needed surgery before November 2023 or that he suffered 2 harm because of the delayed surgery. Id. Plaintiff’s opinion regarding the timing 3 of his surgery, without more, is insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact 4 or to show that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm. 5 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to satisfy the subjective requirement of an Eighth 6 Amendment deliberate indifference claim and the Court RECOMMENDS that the 7 District Court GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and enter 8 judgment in Defendant’s favor and DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 9 Judgement as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to 10 serious medical need. 11 G. Qualified Immunity 12 “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability 13 for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 14 statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” 15 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “A clearly established right is one 16 that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that 17 what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015). “Put 18 simply, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who 19 knowingly violate the law.” Id. 20 The Court employs a two-step analysis to determine whether a government 21 official is entitled to qualified immunity. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655 (2014). 22 First, the Court must determine whether the facts, “taken in the light most favorable 23 to the party asserting the injury, show the officer’s conduct violated a federal right.” 24 Id. at 655-56. Second, the Court must determine “whether the right in question 25 was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation.” Id. at 656. “Courts have 26 discretion to decide the order in which to engage these two prongs.” Id. 27 As set forth above, Plaintiff has not established a triable issue of fact 28 regarding his Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant. Accordingly, the Court 1 ||need not further analyze whether Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. See 2 || Rivas v. Koenig, No. 24-CV-00007-JST, 2026 WL 658410, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 3 ||2026) (“Because there was no violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, as 4 ||explained above, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified 5 immunity.”). 6 Vi. 8 For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the 9 District Judge issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and 10 || Recommendation, (2) denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and 11 || (3) granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 12 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report must be 13 with the Court and served on all parties no later than May 27, 2026. The 14 ||document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed 16 || with the Court and served on all parties no later than June 10, 2026. The parties 17 ||are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 18 |/right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. 19 || Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 20 || IT IS SO ORDERED.

99 ||Dated: May 6, 2026 Tb Loe 23 Hon.DavidD.Leshner sits 4 United States Magistrate Judge 25 26 27 28

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

19 ATTACHMENT A 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 No. Plaintiff’s Supporting Facts – See P. SAC, Dkt. No. 87 (“Ramsey 9 MSJ at 5-9 Decl.”), and/or Dkt. No. 67-1 at 10 15-21 (“P. Decl.”) 11 38 The plaintiff is house[d] at High Desert I’ve been incarcerated since State Prison (HDSP), in which is not a 2006 as a disabled[d] person in a 12 High Risk (HR) institution facility. wheelchair (DPW) do [sic] to 13 paraplegic. Ramsey Decl. at ¶ 2.

14 This complaint alleges that the 15 civil rights of Plaintiff, Daniel C. Ramsey, who presently resides 16 at P.O. Box 3030 Inf29, 17 Susanville, CA 96127, were violated. SAC at 1. 18 19 I was transferred to an institution that was not a medical facility – 20 High Desert State Prison 21 (HDSP). P. Decl. at ¶ 2. 4 The plaintiff is (HR) medical clinical I was classified by medical 22 status and requires a (HR) medical classification committee (MCC) 23 designation. AS A (DPW) with Chronic Pain Management, Fall Risk – High 24 Risk Medical with need of High 25 Risk Medical Treatment Facility. Ramsey Decl. at ¶ 7. 26

27 28 1 Plaintiff was (HR), Chronic Care, 2 (DPW) during the relevant time. 3 SAC at 7-9, 13.

4 I’ve been permanently High Risk 5 (HR) Chronic Care Clinical Status and Disabled Person in a 6 Wheelchair at all times. (DPW). 7 P. Decl. at ¶ 4. 5 The plaintiff was transferred to (HDSP) Because of the Defendant’s 8 because of the defendant (N. action and none [sic] actions. I 9 Thompson) endorsement. was transferer [sic] to a facility (HDSP) that’s not only not High 10 Risk Facility but also wouldn’t 11 provided [sic] for my medical needs. Ramsey Decl. at ¶ 21. 12

13 On March 21, 2023, the plaintiff was transferred to (HDSP) 14 because of the Defendant’s 15 approval, action and nonaction to prevent plaintiff’s transfer. SAC 16 at 8. 17 6 The defendant is not authorized to transfer plaintiff to a facility that’s not 18 meeting the level of care that’s been 19 clinically approved. 7 The plaintiff was housed at Richard J. During the relevant time in 20 Donovan Medical facility and was there question, Plaintiff was housed at 21 before his transfer from 2014 to March Richard J. Donovan Medical of 2023 because, of his previous prison Facility Institution. SAC at 4. 22 could not provide for His care and need- 23 (HDSP) an addition to the prison not I was at a medical facility before I being (HR) Facility. was transferred called Richard J. 24 Donovan – Medical Facility 25 (RJD). P. Decl. at ¶ 1. 8 The counselor (J. Fontaine) evaluated Plaintiff was called by his 26 the Locations that were in compliance counselor [J. Fontaine] at (RJD) 27 with policy and plaintiff’s medical clinical for a Pre-Evaluation Unit Classification Review . . . . 28 1 status. And located two prison’s that Plaintiff could be housed at two was medical Facilities available. The facilities – [] CHCF level 2 or [] 2 two institutional medical Facilities were CMF. Plaintiff picked (CHCF) as 3 California Health Care facility (CHCF) first choice and (CMF) as second and California Medical Facility (CMF). choice. The counselor agreed to 4 The plaintiff chosed the (CHCF) as first the selections and forwarded it to 5 choice and (CMF) as second. The the Classification Committee counselor agreed and forward the team (ICC) & (UCC). SAC at 4-5. 6 findings to Unit Classification 7 Committee (UCC). My counselor J. Fountaine verified that both (CMF) & 8 (CHCF) both had a bedspace 9 opening for me. Ramsey Decl. at ¶ 30. 10 11 I was given a option by my counselor J. Fountaine (CCI) 12 during a interview (1-12-2023) 13 prior to the classification committee to be transferred to 14 (CHCF) OR (CMF) institutions 15 medical facility. I chosed (CMF) first choice and (CMF) as second 16 choice because (CHCF) was 17 better then (CMF) and (CHCF) was close to someone I know. P. 18 Decl. at ¶ 6. 19 9 With the agreement between plaintiff And the counselor, the plaintiff signed 20 Documents of the facilities (CHCF) and 21 (CMF) he was to be transferred to. The plaintiff signed the Document because 22 he did not protest the Findings or for 23 The Counselor to Represent Him At (UCC) and Institution Classification 24 Committee (ICC). The (ICC) and (UCC) 25 both agree with the finding of selected institution medical Facilities and 26 Approved Transfer by 27 Recommendation. 28 1 10 On March 3, 2023, The Defendant Audit On 3-3-2023, The Defendant N. And Endorsed the plaintiff to (HDSP) Thompson. A Classification Staff 2 over-riding [override] the Representative (CSR), Audit, 3 Recommendation And the Reason’s To endorsed Plaintiff to be Transfer plaintiff to a Medical Facility. transferred to (HDSP). SAC at 7, 4 Exh. C. 5 11 The Defendant place on Her “Auditor On 3-3-2023, The Defendant N. Action” Document with Statement Thompson filed a “Auditor action” 6 Typed: A.) Medical Conditions- Document with the statement 7 Removed/Disapproved B.) HR (High typed: 1) Medical Conditions – Risk) w/ override. C.) Reason’s None removed/disapproved 2) HR 8 (High Risks) w/ override. 3) 9 Reason None. SAC at 6, Exh. C. 12 The Defendant “override,” Removed 10 And “Disapproved” plaintiff medical 11 condition’s. Also Clinical Status in Documents to Justify the placement of 12 a Facility Placement thats not High Risk 13 Medical. The Administrative determinant is used to indicate 14 placement conditions. It’s Also Used to 15 As A placement score. 13 The (UCC) and (ICC) Document filed 16 and given to the defendant, showed 17 plaintiff’s housing score, needs, by the Abbreviation “MED.” 18 14 Moreso, The Defendant Even placed on She also put “clinical category 19 Her Audit or Endorsement Form – issues N/A” SAC at 6, Exh. B. Clinical Category Issues – N/A. Even 20 so, the plaintiff Had Clinical Issues. 21 15 In Order For plaintiff or Any inmate prisoner to become (HR) And be 22 placed in A medical Facility, His 23 Attributes must match His need or clinical status. There is A “Medical 24 Classification System” That provides 25 Matching And Answering question where A inmate can go to be House. 26 16 The Defendant is Apart of Custody 27 Staff and Shall not make any medical changes to documents or decision 28 1 without Medically Authorized Approval from Medical physicians. 2 17 Since plaintiff’s Arrival At (HDSP) He Classification Committee and 3 Has been Denied Transfer out of the ADA employees at (HDSP) prison because of (CSR) Defendant refused to do any transfer 4 Transfer Approval to be At the prison. because of the defendant 5 endorsement (As in approval) that I was at the right institution. 6 P. Decl. at ¶ 20. 7 18 Being The plaintiff could not transfer Plaintiff [has] been subjected to because of the Defendant Altering And A.) Being in a dangerous 8 Falsifying Document on Her Auditor environment then the normal 9 Action Form. The plaintiff was aspect of prison. Not being able subjected to Harsh Weather (snow) in to defend for himself with the use 10 the Winter, paying inmates for of one arm in a hostile 11 protection, Delayed Surgeries for environment. B.) Flooded cell for months, not the correct medical months since his transfer (March 12 assistance needed with Daily Activities 21, 2023) Till Nov of 2023 13 (ADLS), unleveled Terrain because (incomplete roof). C.) Delayed (HDSP) Has Hill’s thats Hard for surgery which the plaintiff would 14 Wheelchair Inmates. The Plaintiff not have received a lot earlier than to 15 only feared for His Life but Also His wait from March 3, 2023 till Nov Safety with his Health. Any other fall on of 2023. (HDSP) did not have 16 His neck out His Wheelchair could available surgeons during the 17 Result in total Disability. All These relevant time. D.) Mental and issues was a Result of the Defendants emotional duress, sleepless 18 Actions. nights, stress. E.) Deprived of 19 medical treatment and care. F.) Interference of a medical 20 diagnosis and treatment. SAC at 21 11.

22 I’ve been subjected to a flooding 23 cell for months, snow covered grounds, uneven terrain (Hills), 24 no support with (ADL’s) activity of 25 daily living, shower assistance I need as a person with one good 26 arm and because general 27 populated inmates was mix with SNY – Sensitive Needs Yard 28 1 inmate’s there was a lot of violences then normal. P. Decl. 2 at ¶ 22. 3 19 Because of Plaintiff fall in 2012 The I was classified by Medical plaintiff Has been label by medical Classification Committee (MCC) 4 custody staff as a Fall Risk. as a (DPW) with Chronic Pain 5 Management, Fall Risk. Ramsey Decl. at ¶ 7. 6 7 I’ve been a high fall risk since 2012 because I fell on my neck 8 and injured my spine. P. Decl. at 9 ¶ 23. 20 The plaintiff even need assistance to I needed more than an inmate to 10 use the Bathroom. He Relied on assist to push me in a wheelchair. 11 inmates to Help He paid with Food I need assistance with shower, from the Kitchen or package, canteen bathing, and placing on clothes. 12 when He went to store. (ADL) Assistance which only 13 medical facilities or CTC provides. Ramsey Decl. at ¶ 32. 14

15 I need help to use the bathroom and did not receive it from 16 custody nurse’s/ I was told by 17 Doctor Lee on 10/30/23 that I should be able to transfer after 18 surgery because the prison 19 infirmary (CTC) was close for repair. I had help from inmates I 20 padi with packages, food from 21 state (HDSP) or canteen (store) for my whole stay till surgery. P. 22 Decl. at ¶ 24. 23 21 The plaintiff wrote a Grievance (602) to Plaintiff found out he was going Stop His transfer In March of 2023. the same day and wrote a 24 About Thompson illegal Activities but grievance[] (602). Plaintiff was 25 was Denied And Not Interview to denied. SAC at 7, Exh. D (Appeal present his evidence of proof. of Grievance, Office of Appeal 26 Decision). 27 28 1 I wrote a grievance and was not given the opportunity to present 2 facts in defense or a hearing. P. 3 Del. at ¶ 25. 22 The Plaintiff Also Did not Have a Plaintiff was not notified he was 4 Hearing, interview, or any kind of being transfer[red] to (HDSP) til 5 notice that He was being Transfered, the day of (3-3-23). On his own. or that His medical condition’s would He also did not know that the 6 be overridden and Remove before the Defendant alter[ed] the medical 7 Defendant Actions on 3-3-2023. condition and (HR) clinical status of plaintiff[‘s] records. SAC at 14. 8 9 Before Defendant changed my medical conditions to 10 disapproved and removed I never 11 received any notice. As well as any notice my clinical status was 12 changed. Ramsey Decl. at ¶ 36. 13 I was never notified by the 14 Defendant I was being 15 transferred to (HDSP) or that my medical conditions would be 16 removed and disapproved during 17 or before her endorsement. P. Decl. at ¶ 26. 18 19

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28