Daniel Banken v. Daniel P. Driscoll

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: October 30, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-06071
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 DANIEL BANKEN, CASE NO. C24-06071-KKE 8

Plaintiff(s), ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 9 v. MOTION TO AMEND

10 DANIEL P. DRISCOLL,

11 Defendant(s).

12 Now before the Court is Plaintiff Daniel Banken’s “Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend 13 judgment,” which he files “pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 14 7(h)(1).” Dkt. No. 99 at 1. Plaintiff cites multiple conclusions from the Court’s prior order (Dkt. 15 No. 98), asserting each statement amounts to a “manifest error.” Dkt. No. 99 at 4, Dkt. No. 100. 16 Reconsideration is “an ‘extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 17 finality and conservation of judicial resources.’” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 18 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 19 59.30[4] (3D ED. 2000)). The Local Rules of this district indicate that motions for reconsideration 20 are, in general, “disfavored.” Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(h)(1). Such motions will ordinarily 21 be denied without “a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing of new facts or 22 legal authority which could not have been brought to [the court’s] attention earlier with reasonable 23 diligence.” LCR 7(h)(1)–(2). Though the Court has discretion to reconsider a prior order for 24 1 manifest error, a motion for reconsideration does not “provide litigants with a second bite at the 2 apple. A motion for reconsideration should not be used to ask a court to rethink what the court 3 had already thought through—rightly or wrongly.” Gaskill v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. C11-5847,

4 2012 WL 13026638, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 28, 2012). “Mere disagreement with a previous 5 order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration[.]” Id. 6 Upon review of Plaintiff’s motion, the Court finds no manifest error. See Gaskill, 2012 7 WL 13026648, at *1 (a manifest error is “an error that is plain and indisputable”). As explained 8 previously, the record shows that the Army served Plaintiff with its initial disclosures via a link 9 and a disc sent by certified mail. Dkt. No. 98. at 1–2. Plaintiff apparently elected not to open the 10 link when it was served, and thus, it expired, requiring Defendant to send a new link, which it did. 11 Dkt. No. 94-3. Plaintiff’s delay does not render Defendant’s initial service untimely. Exclusion 12 of evidence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c) therefore does not apply and there was

13 no manifest error in the Court’s prior order. Moreover, as the Court noted in the prior order, even 14 if the Army had failed to timely serve its initial disclosures, which the record does not reflect, 15 Plaintiff articulated no legal or factual basis on which any alleged service delay would support 16 entering summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. Dkt. No. 98 at 2. 17 Plaintiff also argues that the Court “applied the wrong legal standard” by observing that 18 Plaintiff failed to meet and confer regarding this discovery dispute. Dkt. No. 99 at 6. This district’s 19 local rules require parties to meet and confer on discovery disputes in advance of raising them with 20 the Court. See LCR 37 (a)(1). The Court did not err in requiring Plaintiff to follow the local rules. 21 Finally, Plaintiff does not provide any new evidence or legal arguments that could not have 22 been presented in his prior motion. See generally Dkt. No. 99. Instead, Plaintiff’s motion

23 generally repeats facts and arguments that this Court already considered and rejected. See Dkt. 24 1 Nos. 91, 98, 99. Because Plaintiff’s motion does not meet the high standard necessary to warrant 2 reconsideration, the motion is DENIED (Dkt. No. 99). 3 Dated this 30th day of October, 2025.

4 A 5 Kymberly K. Evanson 6 United States District Judge

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