Daniel A. Fernandez v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: April 17, 2024
• Docket: 2022-1872
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed April 17, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________

No. 3D22-1872 Lower Tribunal No. 14-31602 ________________

Daniel A. Fernandez, et al., Appellants,

vs.

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Appellee.

An appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Maria de Jesus Santovenia, Judge.

Neustein Law Group, P.A., and Nicole R. Moskowitz, for appellants.

Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, and James H. Wyman; Blank Rome LLP, and Michael R. Esposito and Nicole R. Topper (Tampa), for appellee.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and SCALES and MILLER, JJ.

LOGUE, C.J.

Appellants are owners of a residential property who signed a certain

2003 note and mortgage. They appeal the dismissal of their motion to

enforce a settlement agreement allegedly regarding that note and mortgage. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the dismissal and remand for

further proceedings.

Appellants brought the underlying action against Ocwen Loan

Servicing, LLC in 2014. Appellants sued Ocwen for alleged improper

attempts to collect and foreclose on the note and mortgage. The lawsuit was

ultimately resolved by a confidential settlement in 2016 (the “2016

Settlement”).

Pursuant to the 2016 Settlement, the parties filed a joint stipulation of

dismissal stating, “Plaintiffs and Defendant have settled the within cause

pursuant to a written settlement agreement,” and agreeing that the “[trial

c]ourt shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement

agreement and enter such further orders as are necessary to that end.”

The trial court entered an order approving the joint stipulation of

dismissal. In relevant part, the order dismissed the case with prejudice and

provided that the trial court would have jurisdiction to enforce the parties’

settlement. Specifically, the order stated that the “[trial c]ourt shall retain

jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and enter such further

orders as are necessary to that end.”

On March 6, 2019, Ditech Financial, LLC filed a mortgage foreclosure

action against Appellants concerning the same note and mortgage in a

2 different case styled, Ditech Financial LLC v. Daniel A. Fernandez, et al., No.

2019-07895-CA (01) (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct.).

Apparently in response to Ditech Financial’s foreclosure action, on May

27, 2022, Appellants filed a motion in the underlying action to enforce the

2016 Settlement. After a hearing on this motion, the trial court declined to

address the merits and dismissed the motion “without prejudice to the issues

raised in the Motion being addressed in Case No. 2019-07895-CA (01).”

Because the parties in 19-07895 and the parties in the underlying

action are not the same and the relationship of the parties has not been

established, it is far from clear that Appellants will have the same relief

available to them in 19-07895 as they are claiming in the underlying action.

On appeal, moreover, both parties briefed this matter as a question of

whether the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement

agreement. Given the language of the joint stipulation and the trial court’s

order, we hold that the trial court did retain such jurisdiction. Platinum Luxury

Auctions, LLC v. Concierge Auctions, LLC, 227 So. 3d 685, 688 (Fla. 3d DCA

2017) (“When a trial court approves a settlement agreement by order and

retains jurisdiction to enforce its terms, the trial court has the jurisdiction to

enforce the terms of the settlement agreement.”). In so holding, we are not

addressing the merits of Appellants’ motion to enforce the 2016 Settlement.

3 Ocwen argues that the trial court, although specifically reserving

jurisdiction to enforce “the settlement agreement,” never expressly approved

the 2016 Settlement but only the joint stipulation which was based on the

“written settlement agreement.” We do not read the law as supporting this

distinction in these circumstances.

Reversed.