D'Angelo v. Schlem

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

D'Angelo v. Schlem

267 A.D.2d 418, 701 N.Y.S.2d 110, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13316

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 27, 1999

StatusPublished

This text of 267 A.D.2d 418 (D'Angelo v. Schlem) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

D'Angelo v. Schlem, 267 A.D.2d 418, 701 N.Y.S.2d 110, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13316 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

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Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCaffrey, J.), dated February 1, 1999, which, upon an order dated January 11, 1999, granting the defendants’ separate motions pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint, dismissed the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the order dated January 11, 1999, is vacated, the motions are denied, and the complaint is reinstated.

On a motion to dismiss a pleading for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be liberally construed. All of the facts alleged therein are to be accepted as true and accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference to determine whether they fit within any cognizable legal theory (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83; EECP [419]*419Ctrs. v Vasomedical, Inc., 265 AD2d 372). We find that the complaint states a cause of action for legal malpractice. Mangano, P. J., Ritter, Joy, McGinity and Smith, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCaffrey, J.), dated February 1, 1999, which, upon an order dated January 11, 1999, granting the defendants’ separate motions pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint, dismissed the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the order dated January 11, 1999, is vacated, the motions are denied, and the complaint is reinstated.

On a motion to dismiss a pleading for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be liberally construed. All of the facts alleged therein are to be accepted as true and accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference to determine whether they fit within any cognizable legal theory (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83; EECP [419]*419Ctrs. v Vasomedical, Inc., 265 AD2d 372). We find that the complaint states a cause of action for legal malpractice. Mangano, P. J., Ritter, Joy, McGinity and Smith, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

267 A.D.2d 418, 701 N.Y.S.2d 110, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13316, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dangelo-v-schlem-nyappdiv-1999.

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