D’Angelo v. NH Supreme Court, et al.

2012 DNH 204

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: December 20, 2012
• Docket: 12-CV-411-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

D’Angelo v . NH Supreme Court, et a l . 12-CV-411-SM 12/20/12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Stephen L . D’Angelo, Plaintiff

v. Case N o . 12-cv-411-SM Opinion N o . 2012 DNH 204 New Hampshire Supreme Court, and Brian Germain, Esq., Defendants

O R D E R

The plaintiff, Stephen D’Angelo, appears pro se (although he

is an attorney). He brings this action seeking compensatory,

declaratory, and injunctive relief, asserting that the state

courts violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during

the course of child support proceedings to which he was a party.

The Magistrate Judge has reviewed the complaint in due course and

has filed a formal Report and Recommendation, in which she

recommends dismissal of all D’Angelo’s claims for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, after applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Defendants also move to dismiss all of plaintiff’s claims.

Plaintiff objects.

The Report and Recommendation is adopted in part,

defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted, and all of

plaintiff’s claims are dismissed. Background

D’Angelo has been involved in an ongoing dispute over his

child support obligations since approximately 2006. The New

Hampshire Circuit Court, 10th Circuit, Family Division (the

“Derry Family Court”) conducted a number of hearings and issued

several orders in an effort to resolve D’Angelo’s financial

obligations to his son. In those various orders, the court

observed that, D’Angelo “has a well-documented history of

thwarting the discovery process and of selectively excluding

relevant financial information to the detriment of the

Petitioner,” Complaint, Exhibit H (document n o . 1 - 8 ) , Order dated

May 1 5 , 2012 (“DFC Order”) at 1 (quoting a prior order). It also

noted that it had “already found M r . D’Angelo in Contempt of

Court on multiple occasions.” Id. at 3 . The court went on to

observe that D’Angelo (a practicing attorney):

would represent that his gross income ranges from $29,500 to a high of $93,387.00 while being able to travel extensively, own two Porsche automobiles, purchase a 40ft yacht for $190,000.00, own several automobiles to include a Lexus, and maintain a lifestyle that would indicate by his travel, entertainment, and expenditures that he has disposable monies in excess of those stated on his Financial Affidavit.

Id. at 2 . Given those ongoing concerns, in September of 2011,

the court appointed Attorney Brian Germaine as a Commissioner, to

2 investigate and report to the court with regard to D’Angelo’s

gross income from 2006 forward.

In May of 2012, the court conducted yet another hearing, to

address several pending motions. At that hearing, Commissioner

Germaine presented his findings. The court determined them to be

well-supported and credible, and adopted them as to D’Angelo’s

gross income from 2006 forward. DFC Order at 1 0 . It also found,

“by clear and convincing evidence that [D’Angelo] had the ability

to make [past support payments] to the Petitioner and chose to

pay his own bills despite being cautioned by this Court.” DFC

Order at 4 . It then held D’Angelo in contempt for having failed

to pay past-due child support obligations, entered judgment in

favor of D’Angelo’s former wife in the amount of more than

$110,000.00, and modified D’Angelo’s monthly child support

obligations going forward. DFC Order at 10-12. D’Angelo filed a

Notice of Discretionary Appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme

Court, but the court declined to hear his appeal. This

litigation followed.

In his complaint, D’Angelo advances nine separate claims

against the New Hampshire Supreme Court (“NHSC”) and Attorney

Germaine. They can be summarized as follows:

3 1. The Derry Family Court (over which the NHSC has supervisory authority) violated plaintiff’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it refused to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to entering an order modifying his child support obligations;

2. The NHSC violated plaintiff’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it declined to grant his notice of appeal; and

3. The court-appointed commissioner, Brian Germaine, violated plaintiff’s federally protected constitutional rights, and committed a variety of state common law torts, when he made allegedly false statements about plaintiff to the family court.

D’Angelo seeks the following relief: (a) an injunction to prevent

“the Derry District Court from implementing, enforcing or

otherwise taking any action” on its order of May 1 5 , 2012,

Complaint at para. 112; (b) monetary damages against the NHSC to

“fairly and adequately compensate Plaintiff” for the court’s

“reckless and wanton” refusal to review the decisions of its

family courts, Complaint at paras. 119 and 122; and (c) monetary

damages against Attorney Germaine for having violated plaintiff’s

federally protected constitutional rights and for having

committed numerous common law torts.

4 Discussion

I. The Report and Recommendation.

The Magistrate Judge concluded that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine deprives this court of subject matter over each of

D’Angelo’s claims and, therefore, recommended that they be

dismissed. In reaching that conclusion, she observed:

D’Angelo’s claims are, at their core, the claims of a disgruntled litigant, seeking federal district court review of state court judgments, filed after the state proceedings have ended, and rooted in the belief that the judgments are wrong and injurious to him. To adjudicate D’Angelo’s claims, this court would necessarily be called upon to review the validity of the DFC’s order and the NHSC’s decision to decline D’Angelo’s appeal. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes such review by this court, insofar as D’Angelo’s federal claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court decisions at issue.

Report and Recommendation, at 5-6. With respect to D’Angelo’s

requests for injunctive relief, as well as his efforts to

collaterally attack various decisions of the state courts as

“unlawful” or “unconstitutional,” this court plainly lacks

subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

See also The Anti Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

Given his dissatisfaction with the Family Court’s order and

the NHSC’s decision not to entertain his appeal, D’Angelo should

have appealed to the United States Supreme Court. His remedy was

not to file an action in federal court seeking to collaterally

5 challenge those final state court decisions. Count one of his

complaint i s , therefore, dismissed.

But, as to D’Angelo’s remaining claims, whether the court

has subject matter jurisdiction is open to some debate. It is

certainly arguable that the court has jurisdiction over his

constitutional challenge to New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 3 ,

as well as his state and federal claims against Attorney

Germaine, since resolving those claims would not seem to require

the court to review the validity of the state court decisions

referenced in D’Angelo’s complaint. Accordingly, the court turns

to defendants’ motions to dismiss.

II. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.

Defendants also claim that many of D’Angelo’s claims must be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. And, defendants assert that D’Angelo’s

remaining claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

A. Count Two - Supreme Court Rule 3 .

In count two of his complaint, D’Angelo challenges the

constitutionality of NHSC Rule 3 , which provides, in relevant

part, that the following types of appeals are not “mandatory

6 appeals” (meaning that the court may, in its discretion, decline

to hear any such appeal from a lower court order):

(9) an appeal from a final decision on the merits issued i n , or arising out o f , a domestic relations matter filed under RSA Title XLIII (RSA chapters 457 to 461-A); provided, however, that an appeal from a final divorce decree or decree of legal separation shall be a mandatory appeal.

Rule 3 , Rules of The Supreme Court of the State of New Hampshire

(West 2012). D’Angelo filed such a discretionary appeal to the

NHSC, challenging the May 1 5 , 2012, order of the Derry Family

Court. The NHSC declined to hear his appeal and, in so doing,

let the order of the Derry Family Court stand.

D’Angelo asserts that “Rule 3 promulgated by the New

Hampshire Supreme Court violate[s] the Fourteenth (14th) and

Fifth (5th) Amendments Due Process Rights of the United States

Constitution.” Complaint at para. 114. Although his complaint

and subsequent filings are unclear, it seems D’Angelo believes he

has a constitutionally protected procedural due process right to

an appeal of the Derry Family Court’s order. He is incorrect.

See, e.g., United States v . MacCollom, 426 U.S. 3 1 7 , 323 (1976)

(“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not

establish any right to an appeal.”); Griffin v . Illinois, 351

U.S. 1 2 , 18 (1956) (“[A] State is not required by the Federal

7 Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate

review at all.”).

Of course, “[w]hen an appeal is afforded, . . . it cannot be

granted to some litigants and capriciously or arbitrarily denied

to others without violating the Equal Protection Clause.”

Lindsey v . Normet, 405 U.S. 5 6 , 77 (1972). Here, however,

nothing in D’Angelo’s complaint suggests that Rule 3 operates to

“arbitrarily” or “capriciously” deny some state court litigants

an opportunity to appeal to the NHSC, while allowing others to do

so. Rule 3 does not unconstitutionally distinguish between

different classes or categories of litigants. Rather, it

permissibly distinguishes between different types of family court

orders - some of which the NHSC has determined it will always

entertain on appeal, while others are subject to the court’s

exercise of discretionary appellate authority.

In other words, all similarly situated litigants in the

State’s family courts are treated equally and the Equal

Protection Clause of the Constitution is not offended by Rule 3 .

Count two of D’Angelo’s complaint i s , therefore, dismissed for

failure to state a claim.

8 B. Count Three - Failure to Supervise.

In count three of his complaint, D’Angelo alleges that the

NHSC “recklessly and wantonly allowed its family courts to make

decisions without hearing, following law, and decide matters

without review or the right of appeal.” Complaint at para. 120.

He seeks a monetary award from the NHSC “in an amount that will

fairly and adequately compensate [him] for damages.” Id. at

para. 122. Plainly, however, the Justices of the NHSC are

entitled to judicial immunity from any such claim. See, e.g.,

Pierson v . Ray, 386 U.S. 5 4 7 , 553-54 (1967) (“Few doctrines were

more solidly established at common law than the immunity of

judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their

judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted

the doctrine, in [1872]. This immunity applies even when the

judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it is

not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt

judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is

that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions

with independence and without fear of consequences.”) (citations

and internal punctuation omitted); Mireles v . Waco, 502 U.S. 9,

11 (1991) (“Like other forms of official immunity, judicial

immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate

assessment of damages.”). Moreover, D’Angelo’s claim for

monetary damages against the New Hampshire Supreme Court is

9 barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See generally Pennhurst S t .

Sch. & Hosp. v . Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Arizonans for

Official English v . Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997).

Count three of D’Angelo’s complaint is dismissed for failure

to state a claim.

C. Claims Against Commissioner Brian Germaine.

In counts four through nine of his complaint, D’Angelo

advances various federal constitutional and state common law

claims against the commissioner appointed by the Derry Family

Court, Attorney Brian Germaine. Among other things, D’Angelo

says Germaine “failed to perform a reasonable investigation,”

Complaint at para. 125, “misrepresented material facts to the

court,” id. at 1 2 8 , and “under color of state law” violated

“plaintiff’s due process rights,” id. at 133.

It is beyond dispute that New Hampshire’s family court’s

have the authority to appoint commissioners in divorce

proceedings. See In re O’Neil, 159 N.H. 615, 624 (2010); Walker

v . Walker, 119 N.H. 5 5 1 , 553-54 (1979). And, as a court-

appointed commissioner, Germaine was cloaked with absolute quasi-

judicial immunity - immunity that shields him from precisely the

type of claims advanced by D’Angelo. See, e.g., Nystedt v .

10 Nigro, 700 F.3d 2 5 , 30 (1st Cir. 2012) (“The doctrine of quasi-

judicial immunity provides absolute immunity for those who

perform tasks that are inextricably intertwined with the judicial

function. This doctrine is rooted in the wise idea that those

who perform adjudicative functions require a full exemption from

liability.”) (citations and internal punctuation omitted). See

generally Cleavinger v . Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1985); Cok

v . Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1 , 2-3 (1st Cir. 1989).

Accordingly, counts four through nine of D’Angelo’s

complaint are dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in

defendants’ memoranda, the court:

1. adopts the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (document n o . 8 ) to the extent it recommends dismissal of D’Angelo’s efforts to collaterally challenge orders issued by the state courts, as well as his requests for injunctive relief, as set forth in counts one and two of his complaint; and

2. grants defendants’ motions to dismiss (documents n o . 9 and 1 1 ) . D’Angelo’s claims for compensatory and declaratory relief, as set forth in counts two through nine, are dismissed for failure to state a claim.

11 The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with

this order and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

t^"-^^^*^^^-^

Steven J./McAuliffe Jnited States District Judge

December 2 0 , 2012

cc: Stephen L . D’Angelo, pro se Nancy J. Smith, Esq. William C . Saturley, Esq. William H . Whitney, Esq.