REGAN, District Judge.
Plaintiif brought this action to recover Federal income taxes claimed to be erroneously assessed and collected by the Commissioner for the years 1951 and 1952, with interest thereon and penalties.1 This Court has jurisdiction under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1346.
The pleadings in this case presented three issues: (1) Whether the Foundations tax-exempt status was properly denied for the taxable years 1951 and 1952 under the provisions of Section 3814(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939; (2) if so, is the Commissioner’s determination of deductible expenditures correct; and (3) if exempt status was properly denied, is plaintiif subject to a penalty for failure to timely file returns for the years 1951 and 1952; Issue number (2) has been conceded by plaintiff and trial of issue (3) was reserved to a later date by pre-trial order. Issue (1) is the sole question now presented to the Court. The matter was tried to the Court and submitted on a partial stipulation of facts, transcript, exhibits' and briefs.
The Danforth Foundation, hereinafter referred to as “the Foundation”, was incorporated in 1927 by a pro forma decree of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, under the provisions of the Missouri law for chartering charitable organizations, Article XI, Chapter 90, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1919. The purpose of the Foundation was originally set out as follows:
“This Foundation is formed solely and only for charitable and humanitarian purposes and to promote the well-being of mankind throughout the United States.”
In 1933, the article was amended to read as follows:
“This Foundation is formed solely and only for purely charitable, educational and religious purposes and to promote the well-being of mankind throughout the United States.”
The Articles of Agreement wei’e amended in 1945 to make the existence of the Foundation perpetual.
The founders of the Foundation were William Danforth, president of Ralston Purina Company until 1936 and thereafter chairman of the board, and his wife, Adda Danforth. Mr. and Mrs. Dan-forth were the principal contributors to the assets of the Foundation throughout the period from its origin through the years here involved, the total value of their gifts being $4,864,657.00. The greater part of the assets of the Foundation after 1936 was comprised of common stock of the Ralston Purina Company, which stock was voted by proxy held during 1951 and 1952 by Donald [763] Danforth who succeeded his father as president of the Company. Three family members, William and Donald Danforth and Dorothy Compton, daughter of the founders, were trustees of the Foundation during the taxable years involved in this case.
The Commissioner, by letter dated April 13,1939, determined that the Foundation was tax exempt under the provisions of Section 101(6), Chapter 1, of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, for the year 1939 and “subsequent years so long as there is no change in your organization, your purposes or your method of operation”.
Section 3814, enacted effective September 23, 1950, provided for the denial of exemption under Section 101(6) in event of unreasonable accumulations of income. The statute was applicable to years beginning after December 31, 1950.
The Foundation filed for taxable years 1951 and 1952, as in other years, returns entitled “Return of Organization Exempt under Section 101(6)”. By letter of July 21,1958, the Commissioner ruled denying the Foundation’s exemption for the years 1951 and 1952 because of accumulations of income held to be unreasonable within the meaning of Section 3814. Assessment pursuant to the proposed deficiencies in tax and penalties set out in a 30-day letter was consented to by the Foundation and the Foundation paid in full said assessment. The Foundation’s claims for refund of the full amount paid together with interest were disallowed by the Commissioner.
The pertinent part of Section 3814 reads as follows:
“In the case of any organization described in section 101(6) to which section 3813 is applicable, if the amounts accumulated out of income during the taxable year or any prior taxable year and not actually paid out by the end of the taxable year—
“(1) are unreasonable in amount or duration in order to carry out the charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for such organization’s exemption under section 101(6); * * * exemption under section 101(6) shall be denied for the taxable year. Sept. 1950 64 Stat. 957.”
The regulations merely rearrange the order of the words of the statute. Treasury Regulations 111, Sec. 29.3814-1 and 118 Sec. 39.3814-1. The legislative history of the Section is but a little more enlightening. The Revenue Act of 1950 was directed in part toward eliminating abuses of exempt status under section 101(6). There was, prior to the enactment of the 1950 Act, frequent misuse of trust funds for the purpose of financing business interests of the grantor.2 The House Bill provided not only against the application of funds to purposes other than the charitable purpose defined by the trust-forming instrument, but also provided for protection against potential abuse by requiring the expenditure of ail current income within a short period after the close of the year. That provision was rejected by the Senate Committee as being too inflexible, thus, defeating the proper purpose of many exempt funds. Senate Report No. 2375, Aug. 22, 1950, U.S.Code and Cong.Serv. p. 3087. It was the joint conference which formulated Section 3814 as it was enacted.
The cases are more helpful in defining “unreasonable accumulations” in that they provide some standard by way of fact comparisons.. The only case directly concerned with the construction of the wording of Section 3814(1) which has been reviewed by an appellate court is Erie Endowment v. United States (W.D. Pa.1961), 202 F.Supp. 580, affirmed March 28, 1963, (C.C.A.3) 316 F.2d 151, where the corresponding section of the 1954 Code was involved. In the Erie Endowment case, the clearly defined use for the major part of the current income was to accumulate $10,000,000.00, after which some worthwhile endeavor would be sup[764] ported. The appellate court stated, 316 F.2d page 155:
“ * * * The standard to be applied is whether the taxpayer can justify the total accumulation of income at the end of the taxable year, in terms of both time and amount, on the basis of a rational total program of charitable intent. * * *
“Absent a justifiable total program of accumulation, however, tax exemption must be denied. The program must be prospective and not occur to the organization only after the Commissioner’s shadow becomes visible. ‘Afterthoughts will not suffice.’ ”
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REGAN, District Judge.
Plaintiif brought this action to recover Federal income taxes claimed to be erroneously assessed and collected by the Commissioner for the years 1951 and 1952, with interest thereon and penalties.1 This Court has jurisdiction under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1346.
The pleadings in this case presented three issues: (1) Whether the Foundations tax-exempt status was properly denied for the taxable years 1951 and 1952 under the provisions of Section 3814(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939; (2) if so, is the Commissioner’s determination of deductible expenditures correct; and (3) if exempt status was properly denied, is plaintiif subject to a penalty for failure to timely file returns for the years 1951 and 1952; Issue number (2) has been conceded by plaintiff and trial of issue (3) was reserved to a later date by pre-trial order. Issue (1) is the sole question now presented to the Court. The matter was tried to the Court and submitted on a partial stipulation of facts, transcript, exhibits' and briefs.
The Danforth Foundation, hereinafter referred to as “the Foundation”, was incorporated in 1927 by a pro forma decree of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, under the provisions of the Missouri law for chartering charitable organizations, Article XI, Chapter 90, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1919. The purpose of the Foundation was originally set out as follows:
“This Foundation is formed solely and only for charitable and humanitarian purposes and to promote the well-being of mankind throughout the United States.”
In 1933, the article was amended to read as follows:
“This Foundation is formed solely and only for purely charitable, educational and religious purposes and to promote the well-being of mankind throughout the United States.”
The Articles of Agreement wei’e amended in 1945 to make the existence of the Foundation perpetual.
The founders of the Foundation were William Danforth, president of Ralston Purina Company until 1936 and thereafter chairman of the board, and his wife, Adda Danforth. Mr. and Mrs. Dan-forth were the principal contributors to the assets of the Foundation throughout the period from its origin through the years here involved, the total value of their gifts being $4,864,657.00. The greater part of the assets of the Foundation after 1936 was comprised of common stock of the Ralston Purina Company, which stock was voted by proxy held during 1951 and 1952 by Donald [763] Danforth who succeeded his father as president of the Company. Three family members, William and Donald Danforth and Dorothy Compton, daughter of the founders, were trustees of the Foundation during the taxable years involved in this case.
The Commissioner, by letter dated April 13,1939, determined that the Foundation was tax exempt under the provisions of Section 101(6), Chapter 1, of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, for the year 1939 and “subsequent years so long as there is no change in your organization, your purposes or your method of operation”.
Section 3814, enacted effective September 23, 1950, provided for the denial of exemption under Section 101(6) in event of unreasonable accumulations of income. The statute was applicable to years beginning after December 31, 1950.
The Foundation filed for taxable years 1951 and 1952, as in other years, returns entitled “Return of Organization Exempt under Section 101(6)”. By letter of July 21,1958, the Commissioner ruled denying the Foundation’s exemption for the years 1951 and 1952 because of accumulations of income held to be unreasonable within the meaning of Section 3814. Assessment pursuant to the proposed deficiencies in tax and penalties set out in a 30-day letter was consented to by the Foundation and the Foundation paid in full said assessment. The Foundation’s claims for refund of the full amount paid together with interest were disallowed by the Commissioner.
The pertinent part of Section 3814 reads as follows:
“In the case of any organization described in section 101(6) to which section 3813 is applicable, if the amounts accumulated out of income during the taxable year or any prior taxable year and not actually paid out by the end of the taxable year—
“(1) are unreasonable in amount or duration in order to carry out the charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for such organization’s exemption under section 101(6); * * * exemption under section 101(6) shall be denied for the taxable year. Sept. 1950 64 Stat. 957.”
The regulations merely rearrange the order of the words of the statute. Treasury Regulations 111, Sec. 29.3814-1 and 118 Sec. 39.3814-1. The legislative history of the Section is but a little more enlightening. The Revenue Act of 1950 was directed in part toward eliminating abuses of exempt status under section 101(6). There was, prior to the enactment of the 1950 Act, frequent misuse of trust funds for the purpose of financing business interests of the grantor.2 The House Bill provided not only against the application of funds to purposes other than the charitable purpose defined by the trust-forming instrument, but also provided for protection against potential abuse by requiring the expenditure of ail current income within a short period after the close of the year. That provision was rejected by the Senate Committee as being too inflexible, thus, defeating the proper purpose of many exempt funds. Senate Report No. 2375, Aug. 22, 1950, U.S.Code and Cong.Serv. p. 3087. It was the joint conference which formulated Section 3814 as it was enacted.
The cases are more helpful in defining “unreasonable accumulations” in that they provide some standard by way of fact comparisons.. The only case directly concerned with the construction of the wording of Section 3814(1) which has been reviewed by an appellate court is Erie Endowment v. United States (W.D. Pa.1961), 202 F.Supp. 580, affirmed March 28, 1963, (C.C.A.3) 316 F.2d 151, where the corresponding section of the 1954 Code was involved. In the Erie Endowment case, the clearly defined use for the major part of the current income was to accumulate $10,000,000.00, after which some worthwhile endeavor would be sup[764] ported. The appellate court stated, 316 F.2d page 155:
“ * * * The standard to be applied is whether the taxpayer can justify the total accumulation of income at the end of the taxable year, in terms of both time and amount, on the basis of a rational total program of charitable intent. * * *
“Absent a justifiable total program of accumulation, however, tax exemption must be denied. The program must be prospective and not occur to the organization only after the Commissioner’s shadow becomes visible. ‘Afterthoughts will not suffice.’ ”
The Court quoted Stevens Bros. Foundation, Inc. v. C. I. R. (1962) 39 T.C. No. 11, where the tax court found that accumulations of income were unreasonable as to time and amount. In the Stevens case, as in Erie Endowment, the record was barren of any particular use to which either the current income or the accumulated income would be put. The petitioner in the Stevens case had embarked on a student loan program but no attempt was made to relate needs to the money goal.
Both of the above cited cases distinguish the facts involved from the facts of Samuel Friedland Foundation v. United States, (1956 N.J.) 144 F.Supp. 74, page 92, while quoting with approval the test suggested therein:
“Does the charitable organization have a concrete program for the accumulation of income which will be devoted to a charitable purpose and in the light of existing circumstances is the program a reasonable one?”
The Friedland Foundation’s principle objective was charitable support for medical work and research and its particular primary objective during the years questioned was to provide for the construction of a medical research building at Brandéis University. The Court considered four broad factors: (1) the purpose of the accumulation and the dollar goal, (2) the funds available at the beginning of the period, (3) the likelihood of funds becoming available from contributions, and (4) the extent of time required to reach the goal. The Court concluded that the accumulation over the years of the $500,000.00 committed to the construction of the building, which could, under existing circumstances, reasonably be accomplished in six to eight years was npt unreasonable.
In three of the other cases turning upon a comparison of the facts with the statute, the yard stick of the income accumulations was the cost of or indebtedness on property. In A. Shiffman v. C. I. R., 32 T.C. 1073, and in Tell Foundation v. Wood, 52 A.F.T.R. 1801, the income was used to pay off indebtedness on property which comprised assets of the foundations. In Hulman Foundation, Inc. v. United States, D.C., 217 F.Supp. 423, the primary objective was to construct and maintain a civic building. The foundation had explored costs and sites, and before the end of the questioned period had determined that more money was needed than was available. In each case the Court found in favor of the foundation.
In Truscott v. United States, 1 A.F.T.R.2d 1743, the Holloway Foundation sought to create a fund for retirement benefits of employees of an unrelated private company. Benefits payable at the time of the accumulation would amount to approximately $15.00 per employee per month and growth could not be anticipated to provide a substantial benefit for some years to come.
The distinctions between the facts of the instant case and the cited cases are more numerous than the similarities. In the two cases decided in favor of the Government, virtually no current program or purpose existed but to accumulate income for the sake of accumulation. On the other hand, the cases determined in favor of the foundations involved situations where the charitable program was specific and concrete. By the very nature of the programs, the money goal could be figured in rather specific dollar [765] amounts and the time to achieve the goal, barring wide fluctuations from existing circumstances, could be narrowly calculated. The facts presented here are not easily aligned with either.
The Danforth Foundation showed, from the beginning, constant but uneven growth. The annual income spurted from $5,391.78 for 1928 to $43,952.62 for 1936, and to $197,638.75 for 1939. By the end of 1939 the Foundation had assets valued at $2,457,268.74. From 1944 through 1952, the assets, income and expenditures were as follows:
Year
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
Fair Market Value of Assets at Year’s End
$ 4,425,190.90
$ 7,444,197.79
$ 7,279,645.72
$ 8,963,954.23
$ 8,719,409.71
$15,779,885.62
$24,138,717.81
$34,503,807.33
$33,510,053.76
Gross Income less Capital Gain
$ 313,378.85
$ 307,574.19
$ 357,043.13
$ 531,135.91
$ 592,579.18
$ 819,321.95
$ 955,719.44
$1,290,241.45
$1,221,295.12
Charitable Gifts, Grants and Expenses
$ 73,984.49
$ 94,152.98
$164,244.96