Danette M. Roland v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 17, 2016
• Docket: 29A04-1508-MF-1241
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Feb 17 2016, 8:22 am this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE John Thrasher Neal Bailen Indianapolis, Indiana Stites & Harbison PLLC Jeffersonville, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Danette M. Roland, February 17, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 29A04-1508-MF-1241 v. Appeal from the Hamilton County Superior Court Nationstar Mortgage LLC, The Honorable William J. Hughes, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge The Honorable William P. Greenaway, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 29D03-1404-MF-3480

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1508-MF-1241 | February 17, 2016 Page 1 of 5 [1] Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (Nationstar) filed a mortgage foreclosure action

against Danette Roland, and Roland filed counterclaims against Nationstar for

criminal conversion and alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices

Act. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Roland’s

counterclaims, and Roland appeals from the trial court’s order denying her

motion and granting Nationstar’s.

[2] Concluding sua sponte that the order from which Roland appeals is not an

appealable final judgment, we dismiss.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] In 1999, Wayne Roland (Wayne) executed a promissory note payable to

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. in the principal amount of $225,000. As

security for the note, Wayne and Roland, who were at that time married,

granted Countrywide a mortgage on their Carmel residence. Nationstar is the

current holder of the note and the assignee of the mortgage.

[4] In 2014, Nationstar filed an action to foreclose on the mortgage. Roland

asserted counterclaims for criminal conversion and alleged violations of the

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Nationstar and Roland filed cross-motions

for summary judgment on her counterclaims. After briefing and a hearing, the

trial court denied Roland’s motion and granted summary judgment for

Nationstar on the counterclaims, and the foreclosure claim remained pending.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1508-MF-1241 | February 17, 2016 Page 2 of 5 Roland filed a motion to reconsider,1 which the trial court denied. This appeal

ensued.

Discussion & Decision

[5] Except as provided in Ind. Appellate Rule 4,2 this court has jurisdiction in all

appeals from final judgments. Ind. Appellate Rule 5(A); Whittington v.

Magnante, 30 N.E.3d 767, 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). “Whether an order is a

final judgment governs the appellate courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.” Front

Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 757 (Ind. 2014) (citing Georgos v.

Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind. 2003)). “The lack of appellate subject matter

jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and where the parties do not raise the

issue, this court may consider it sua sponte.” In re Estate of Botkins, 970 N.E.2d

164, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[6] A final judgment is one that “disposes of all claims as to all parties[.]” Ind.

Appellate Rule 2(H); see also Bueter v. Brinkman, 776 N.E.2d 910, 912-13 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that a final judgment “disposes of all issues as to all

parties, to the full extent of the court to dispose of the same, and puts an end to

1 We note that this motion was styled a “Motion for Correction of Errors.” Appellant’s Appendix at 595. However, because the trial court’s summary judgment order was not a final judgment (as we explain further below), a motion to correct error was improper. See Ind. Trial Rule 59(C) (providing that a motion to correct error must be filed within thirty days “after the entry of a final judgment”); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 690 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (a motion to reconsider may be made prior to entry of final judgment; after final judgment, a party may file a motion to correct error). Accordingly, Roland’s motion should be viewed as a motion to reconsider. 2 App. R. 4 provides for appeal directly to our Supreme Court for a narrow class of cases, none of which are relevant here.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1508-MF-1241 | February 17, 2016 Page 3 of 5 the particular case as to all of such parties and all of such issues” (quoting

Hudson v. Tyson, 383 N.E.2d 66, 69 (Ind. 1978)). Because Nationstar’s

foreclosure claim remained pending after the trial court granted Nationstar’s

motion for summary judgment on Roland’s counterclaims, that order is not an

appealable final judgment pursuant to App. R. 2(H)(1). Nor did the trial court’s

summary judgment order or its order on Roland’s motion to reconsider contain

the “magic language” set forth in App. R. 2(H)(2) (providing that a judgment as

to fewer than all claims or parties is nevertheless final if the trial court

determines, expressly and in writing, “that there is no just reason for delay and

in writing expressly directs the entry of judgment”). See also Botkins, 970 N.E.2d

at 167.

[7] Because the trial court’s summary judgment order was not a final judgment,

Roland cannot appeal unless the order is an appealable interlocutory order

pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 14. See id. at 168. App. R. 14(A) provides that

certain interlocutory orders may be appealed as a matter of right. “Such

appeals must be expressly authorized, and that authorization is to be strictly

construed.” Id. Because none of the grounds for interlocutory appeals set forth

in App. R. 14(A) are applicable to the case before us, Roland is not entitled to

an interlocutory appeal as a matter of right. Nor has Roland satisfied the

certification and acceptance requirements of App. R. 14(B) (providing that

“[a]n appeal may be taken from other interlocutory orders if the trial court

certifies its order and the Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction over the

appeal”).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1508-MF-1241 | February 17, 2016 Page 4 of 5 [8] For all of these reasons, we conclude that the order from which Roland appeals

is neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order. This court

therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Roland’s appeal.

[9] Appeal dismissed.

[10] Robb, J., and Barnes, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1508-MF-1241 | February 17, 2016 Page 5 of 5