Dana Corp. v. Wentz

505 A.2d 639, 95 Pa. Commw. 269, 1986 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1943
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 25, 1986
DocketAppeals, 100 Misc. Docket 4, 101 Misc. Docket 4, 102 Misc. Docket 4, 103 Misc. Docket 4, and 104 Misc. Docket 4
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 505 A.2d 639 (Dana Corp. v. Wentz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dana Corp. v. Wentz, 505 A.2d 639, 95 Pa. Commw. 269, 1986 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1943 (Pa. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinion

Opinion by

Judge MacPhail,

Dana Corporation, Plymouth Meeting Mall, Inc., Rouse-Plymouth, Inc., SPS Technologies, Inc., and The Estate of A. H. Weiss (collectively referred to as “Taxpayers”) appeal here an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County which approved the common level ratio and the assessment methodology used by the Board of Assessment Appeals (Board) in Montgomery County in assessing Taxpayers’ real estate for the years 1977-1983.

This case began when the Marriott Corporation filed a timely appeal challenging its assessment by the Board for the 1977 tax year. Separate tax appeals were subsequently filed by Taxpayers herein. By orders dated December 2, 1981 and February 9, 1983, all pending tax appeals challenging the common level ratio were consolidated. The proceedings were then bifurcated by the trial court into separate hearings on the common level ratio issue and the fair market *272 value and assessment of the Marriott. Only the issue of the common level ratio is bef ore us on appeal. 1

In its opinion in support of its order, the trial court noted that the issue in the appeals was whether the Taxpayers ’ properties were properly .and uniformly assessed for taxation purposes. Taxpayers contended before the trial court and argue here that their assessments were excessive, contrary to law and .that the Board’s common level ratio of 17% was unjust, improper and lacked uniformity. The trial court phrased the issue before it in these terms:

The common question presented here is whether the method for determining assessed values based on the application of the uniform assessment ratio (17%) to adjusted market values is lawful where the adjusted market value is determined by applying a uniform adjustment factor to market values established for the base year 1976?

Slip op. at 3. The trial court decided that the Board’s methodology complied with statutory requirements.

In their appeals, Taxpayers challenge that methodology contending that it is not in accord with traditional methodology for ascertaining the common level ratio. They argue that the court erred in ruling that the Board had used the correct market data in arriving at the property assessments and in ruling that it was not the Board’s burden .to show that all properties appreciate in value at a uniform rate over a given period of time.

Our scope of review in a tax assessment appeal is restricted to a determination of whether the trial *273 court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. In the Matter of Harrisburg Apartments, Inc., 88 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 410, 489 A.2d 996 (1985). The trial court’s findings must be given great force and will not be disturbed unless clear error appears. Id.

In this case, the determination of whether the Board’s uniform assessment ratio of 17% is valid depends upon whether the Board’s use of a so-called “backtrending” of arriving at assessed values is in accord with the duty imposed upon the Board by the assessment law. We agree with 'the trial court that this is a purely legal question.

Section 3 of the Act of June 26, 1931, P.L. 1379 (Act), 72 P.S. §5344 provides in pertinent part:

It shall he the duty of said board, in each county to which this act applies, to make and have supervision of the maldng of annual assessments of persons, property and occupations now or hereafter made subject to assessment for taxation for county, borough, town, township, school, poor and institution district purposes, and to make and have supervision of listing and valuation of property excluded or exempted from taxation. In making assessments of property at less than actual value, it shall accomplish equalization with other properties within the taxing district.

In Deitch Co. v. Allegheny Board of Property Assessment, 417 Pa. 213, 209 A.2d 397 (1965) our Supreme Court outlined the process to be used where property tax assessments were based on something less than 100% of actual value. The Court said:

[R] eal estate ... is to be assessed at its actual value. The term actual value means the market value and market value has been defined as a price which a purchaser, willing but not *274 obliged to buy, would pay au owner, willing but not obliged to sell, taking into consideration all uses to which the property iis adapted and might in reason be applied. . . . [A] s a practical matter, . . . real estate is frequently assessed at a percentage which is less than market value. . . . [T]he assessors should accomplish equalization of the subject property in accordance with other assessments in the taxing district. And more importantly, Article IX, §1, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania provides that all taxes must be unif orm on the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.
[A] taxpayer should pay no more or no less than his proportionate .share of the cost of government. Implementation of this principle would require that an owner’s assessment be reduced so as to conform with the common level assessment in the taxing district. ...
Of course, the question arises as to the definition of the term ‘common level’. Where the evidence shows that the assessors have applied a fixed ratio of assessed to market value throughout the taxing district, then that ratio would constitute the common level. However, where the evidence indicates that no such fixed ratio has been applied, and that ratios vary widely in the district, the average of such ratios relay be considered the ‘common level’. . . . [I]t may be that the evidence will show some percentage of assessed to market value about which the bulk of individual assessments tend to cluster, in which event such percentage might be acceptable as the common level.

*275 417 Pa. at 217-21, 209 A.2d at 400-01 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).

In the case sub judice, as is usual in most property tax assessment appeals, the evidence upon which the trial court based its findings and conclusions came largely from the testimony of two expert witnesses, Dr. Edelstein for the Taxpayers and Mr. Gustafson for the taxing authorities. In analyzing this conflicting testimony, the trial court found both witnesses to be credible but gave more weight to Mr. Gustafson’s •testimony. 2

Both experts used the so called “stratification” method of obtaining sales data to determine the common level ratio in the instant case. This methodology was approved in Keebler Co. v. The Board of Revision of Taxes of Philadelphia, 496 Pa. 140, 436 A.2d 583 (1981).

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Related

Bolus v. County of Monroe
650 A.2d 1188 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1994)
In re Real Estate Tax Exemption Appeal of Cornwall Manor
561 A.2d 73 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1989)
In re Appeal of the City of Pittsburgh
541 A.2d 40 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
505 A.2d 639, 95 Pa. Commw. 269, 1986 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1943, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dana-corp-v-wentz-pacommwct-1986.