Dan Thomas v. Linda Bilby-Knight and Mettie Faye Degetaire
This text of Dan Thomas v. Linda Bilby-Knight and Mettie Faye Degetaire (Dan Thomas v. Linda Bilby-Knight and Mettie Faye Degetaire) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NUMBER 13-01-034-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI
____________________________________________________________________
DAN THOMAS, Appellant,
v.
LINDA BILBY KNIGHT AND METTIE FAYE DEGETAIRE, Appellees.
____________________________________________________________________
On appeal from the 411th District Court of Polk County, Texas.
____________________________________________________________________
O P I N I O N
Before Justices Dorsey, Hinojosa, and Rodriguez
Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
Appellant, Dan Thomas, appeals from an order dismissing with prejudice his pro se, in forma pauperis suit under Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Appellant is an inmate at the Terrell Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice--Institutional Division. Appellant filed a lawsuit against appellees, Linda Bilby Knight and Mettie Faye Degetaire, Terrell Unit Mailroom Supervisors, alleging they had violated his rights under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and various provisions of Texas law by interfering with his mail. Appellant filed an unsworn declaration of his inability to pay costs. (1) Without a hearing, (2) the trial court dismissed appellant's lawsuit "with prejudice" because he failed to file a proper and complete affidavit concerning previous filings, in violation of section 14.004 of the civil practice and remedies code. (3) In a separate order, the court assessed all costs against appellant. This appeal ensued.
In two issues, appellant contends the trial court erred in dismissing his claims "with prejudice" and in assessing all costs against him. We modify the trial court's dismissal order and affirm it, as modified. We affirm the trial court's costs order.
Inmate litigation (except suits brought under the family code) in which the inmate files an affidavit or unsworn declaration
of inability to pay costs is governed by special procedural rules set out in chapter fourteen of the civil practice and remedies
code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.001 (Vernon Supp. 2001). The legislature enacted this statute to control
the flood of frivolous lawsuits being filed in Texas courts by prison inmates; these suits consume many valuable judicial
resources with little offsetting benefits. Thomas v. Bilby, 40 S.W.3d 166, 169 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no
pet.);Hickson v. Moya, 926 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, no writ). The rules set out in chapter 14 may not be
modified or repealed by the regular rules of civil procedure. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.014 (Vernon Supp.
2001).
The trial court has broad discretion to dismiss a lawsuit brought under chapter 14 as frivolous or malicious. Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2001); Jackson v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice - Institutional Div., 28
S.W.3d 811, 813 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied); Lentworth v. Trahan, 981 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.). In determining whether a claim is frivolous or malicious, the trial court may
consider whether: (1) the claim's realistic chance of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or
fact; (3) it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim; or (4) the claim is substantially similar to a
previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. § 14.003 (b) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
The proper standard of review of the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by an inmate who has filed an affidavit or declaration of inability to pay costs is whether the court abused its discretion. Jackson, 28 S.W.3d at 813; Barnum v. Munson, 998 S.W.2d 284, 286 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet. denied); McCollum v. Mt. Ararat Baptist Church, Inc., 980 S.W.2d 535, 536 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.); Hickson, 926 S.W.2d at 398. To establish abuse of discretion, the complaining party must show that the trial court's action was arbitrary or unreasonable in light of all the circumstances in the case. Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex. 1984). Stated differently, abuse of discretion is determined by examining whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985); McCollum, 980 S.W.2d at 536-37.
In his first issue, appellant does not complain that the trial court dismissed his lawsuit as frivolous, but rather that the case should not have been dismissed "with prejudice" for failure to file an adequate affidavit of previous lawsuits, as required by section 14.004 of the civil practice and remedies code. (4)
The trial court dismissed appellant's suit and found that his affidavit of previous filings was insufficient to meet the requirements of section 14.004. In that affidavit, appellant listed nine other lawsuits. (5) Although he stated the type of relief sought for the nine listed lawsuits, he failed to state any operative facts for which relief was sought, failed to identify each party named in the previous suits, failed to state the result of each suit, and failed to state the date of the final orders affirming the dismissal if a previous suit was dismissed as frivolous or malicious. Because appellant did not meet the requirements of section 14.004, the trial court was entitled to assume that this case was substantially similar to one previously filed by appellant. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing appellant's suit as frivolous. See Samuels v. Strain, 11 S.W.3d 404, 406-07 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
However, dismissal with prejudice constitutes an adjudication on the merits and operates as if the case had been fully tried and decided. See Ritchey v. Vasquez, 986 S.W.2d 611, 612 (Tex. 1999); Mossler v. Shields, 818 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex. 1991). Therefore, orders dismissing cases with prejudice have full res judicata and collateral estoppel effect, barring subsequent relitigation of the same causes of action or issues between the same parties. See Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 630-31 (Tex.
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