SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________
Case No. 6D2024-0575 Lower Tribunal No. 2020CA-003048-0000-00 _____________________________
DAN PITTS, as Trustee for REVOCABLE TRUST OF EVELYN PITTS,
Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSITY PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and DRIRITE USA, INC.,
Appellees. _____________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County. Jennifer A. Swenson, Judge.
October 3, 2025
NARDELLA, J.
In this first-party property damage case regarding a water leak, the trial court
correctly entered final summary judgment in favor of Universal Property & Casualty
Insurance Company (“Universal”) because it was undisputed the named insured did
not reside at the subject property, which the policy unambiguously required.
Fifteen years ago, Evelyn and Logan Pitts purchased their first insurance
policy with Universal to cover their home in Lakeland, Florida (“Property”). After
Logan Pitts’ death, Mrs. Pitts deeded the Property to her revocable living trust (“Pitts Trust”), which was added to the policy as an additional interest holder. A few years
later, Mrs. Pitts entered an assisted living facility and began renting the Property to
tenants. Although she hoped her move would be temporary, she never returned to
the Property and for the years that followed she continued to renew her same policy
with Universal, never notifying Universal that she had moved out of the Property
and tenants had moved in.
Several months after Mrs. Pitts’ death, Daniel Pitts (“Appellant”), as
successor trustee of the Pitts Trust, inspected the Property and discovered water
damage, which he reported to Universal. A day after Appellant reported the loss,
Universal dispatched two third-party companies to begin remediation services. A
little more than a week after this work was performed, Universal learned that Mrs.
Pitts had not been residing at the Property for nearly two years before her death.
While Universal paid what it owed for the remediation that occurred before it learned
of Mrs. Pitts’ living situation, it denied the remainder of Appellant’s insurance claim
for lack of coverage. This suit followed.
Once the case was at issue, Universal successfully moved for summary
judgment, arguing that “[t]he Policy from which [Appellant] seeks recovery
excludes coverage for the alleged loss as the insured property was not the ‘residence
premises,’ as defined by the Policy, on the date of loss or at any point during the
policy period.” In response, Appellant argued that the policy was ambiguous and,
2 therefore, provided coverage and, even if there was no coverage, Universal had
waived its right to deny coverage by accepting premiums, including the Pitts Trust
as an interest holder on the policy, and issuing a partial payment after learning of a
coverage defense. In a well-reasoned analysis, the trial court rejected these
arguments, which are now presented to us on appeal.
Analysis
Upon a de novo review, Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P.,
760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000), we find that the trial court correctly granted
Universal’s motion for final summary judgment based on the policy’s “residence
premises” provision. The policy’s insuring agreement 1 required the named insured,
Mrs. Pitts, to reside at the Property to obtain coverage for a loss. Yet, it was
undisputed Mrs. Pitts did not reside at the Property at any point during the policy
period when the loss occurred. Instead, years before the loss, she moved out of the
Property and rented it to tenants. Based on the plain contractual language and
Florida law, final summary judgment was correctly entered in favor of Universal
because there was no dispute that the named insured did not reside at the Property.
And, because there was never property damage coverage under the insuring
agreement, Appellant’s arguments as to waiver fail as a matter of law.
1 “An insuring agreement contains the grant of coverage. It generally describes what is covered by the policy and under what circumstances.” Fojon v. Ascendant Com. Ins. Co., 393 So. 3d 806, 810 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). 3 I. Alleged Ambiguity
The Appellant argues that since the Property is not identified as the “residence
premises” in the declarations, the Policy is facially ambiguous, and the ambiguity
should be resolved in favor of coverage. While we agree that Florida law requires
ambiguous provisions to be resolved in favor of coverage, we find no ambiguity
here. Washington Nat’l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman, 117 So. 3d 943, 952 (Fla. 2013)
(explaining when a policy is ambiguous “it must be construed against the insurer and
in favor of coverage”).
We begin with the policy’s insuring agreement, which states, in relevant part:
The policy defined “residence premises” as follows:
4 The term “you” refers “to the ‘named insured’ shown in the Declarations,” which
was Mrs. Pitts, “and the spouse if a resident of the same household.”
“[I]n construing insurance policies, courts should read each policy as a whole,
endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect.” Auto-
Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000). “[I]nsurance contracts
are construed in accordance with the plain language of the policies as bargained for
by the parties.” Id.
Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the policy is not facially ambiguous. The
insuring agreement covers the dwelling on the “residence premises” shown in the
declarations. The address of the Property appears on the declarations page,
identified as the “insured location.” The policy then defines “insured location” to
include the “residence premises.” The problem with Appellant’s argument is that
“residence premises” is also a defined term and its definition requires the named
insured to reside there. Reading the declarations and policy as a whole, we find no
ambiguity. And, since it is undisputed that Mrs. Pitts had not resided at the Property
for several years, it ceased to qualify as the residence premises. 2
2 The cases Appellant relies on are distinguishable and thus do not support a contrary result. Lamonica v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, No. 5:19-cv-78-RH- MJF, 2021 WL 12135390, *1–2 (N.D. Fla. June 15, 2021) (not involving an alleged ambiguity between the declarations and the policy’s “residence premises” provision); Harrington v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 54 So. 3d 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (involving a question of whether the second of the insured’s two properties was an “insured location” covered by the policy). 5 II. Waiver
The Appellant next argues that Universal waived its right to deny Appellant’s
insurance claim for two reasons. First, Appellant implies that because Universal
knew title to the Property was in the name of the Pitts Trust, which paid the insurance
premium each year, Universal must have known and accepted that Mrs. Pitts no
longer resided at the Property. Second, Appellant argues that because Universal
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SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________
Case No. 6D2024-0575 Lower Tribunal No. 2020CA-003048-0000-00 _____________________________
DAN PITTS, as Trustee for REVOCABLE TRUST OF EVELYN PITTS,
Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSITY PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and DRIRITE USA, INC.,
Appellees. _____________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County. Jennifer A. Swenson, Judge.
October 3, 2025
NARDELLA, J.
In this first-party property damage case regarding a water leak, the trial court
correctly entered final summary judgment in favor of Universal Property & Casualty
Insurance Company (“Universal”) because it was undisputed the named insured did
not reside at the subject property, which the policy unambiguously required.
Fifteen years ago, Evelyn and Logan Pitts purchased their first insurance
policy with Universal to cover their home in Lakeland, Florida (“Property”). After
Logan Pitts’ death, Mrs. Pitts deeded the Property to her revocable living trust (“Pitts Trust”), which was added to the policy as an additional interest holder. A few years
later, Mrs. Pitts entered an assisted living facility and began renting the Property to
tenants. Although she hoped her move would be temporary, she never returned to
the Property and for the years that followed she continued to renew her same policy
with Universal, never notifying Universal that she had moved out of the Property
and tenants had moved in.
Several months after Mrs. Pitts’ death, Daniel Pitts (“Appellant”), as
successor trustee of the Pitts Trust, inspected the Property and discovered water
damage, which he reported to Universal. A day after Appellant reported the loss,
Universal dispatched two third-party companies to begin remediation services. A
little more than a week after this work was performed, Universal learned that Mrs.
Pitts had not been residing at the Property for nearly two years before her death.
While Universal paid what it owed for the remediation that occurred before it learned
of Mrs. Pitts’ living situation, it denied the remainder of Appellant’s insurance claim
for lack of coverage. This suit followed.
Once the case was at issue, Universal successfully moved for summary
judgment, arguing that “[t]he Policy from which [Appellant] seeks recovery
excludes coverage for the alleged loss as the insured property was not the ‘residence
premises,’ as defined by the Policy, on the date of loss or at any point during the
policy period.” In response, Appellant argued that the policy was ambiguous and,
2 therefore, provided coverage and, even if there was no coverage, Universal had
waived its right to deny coverage by accepting premiums, including the Pitts Trust
as an interest holder on the policy, and issuing a partial payment after learning of a
coverage defense. In a well-reasoned analysis, the trial court rejected these
arguments, which are now presented to us on appeal.
Analysis
Upon a de novo review, Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P.,
760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000), we find that the trial court correctly granted
Universal’s motion for final summary judgment based on the policy’s “residence
premises” provision. The policy’s insuring agreement 1 required the named insured,
Mrs. Pitts, to reside at the Property to obtain coverage for a loss. Yet, it was
undisputed Mrs. Pitts did not reside at the Property at any point during the policy
period when the loss occurred. Instead, years before the loss, she moved out of the
Property and rented it to tenants. Based on the plain contractual language and
Florida law, final summary judgment was correctly entered in favor of Universal
because there was no dispute that the named insured did not reside at the Property.
And, because there was never property damage coverage under the insuring
agreement, Appellant’s arguments as to waiver fail as a matter of law.
1 “An insuring agreement contains the grant of coverage. It generally describes what is covered by the policy and under what circumstances.” Fojon v. Ascendant Com. Ins. Co., 393 So. 3d 806, 810 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). 3 I. Alleged Ambiguity
The Appellant argues that since the Property is not identified as the “residence
premises” in the declarations, the Policy is facially ambiguous, and the ambiguity
should be resolved in favor of coverage. While we agree that Florida law requires
ambiguous provisions to be resolved in favor of coverage, we find no ambiguity
here. Washington Nat’l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman, 117 So. 3d 943, 952 (Fla. 2013)
(explaining when a policy is ambiguous “it must be construed against the insurer and
in favor of coverage”).
We begin with the policy’s insuring agreement, which states, in relevant part:
The policy defined “residence premises” as follows:
4 The term “you” refers “to the ‘named insured’ shown in the Declarations,” which
was Mrs. Pitts, “and the spouse if a resident of the same household.”
“[I]n construing insurance policies, courts should read each policy as a whole,
endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect.” Auto-
Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000). “[I]nsurance contracts
are construed in accordance with the plain language of the policies as bargained for
by the parties.” Id.
Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the policy is not facially ambiguous. The
insuring agreement covers the dwelling on the “residence premises” shown in the
declarations. The address of the Property appears on the declarations page,
identified as the “insured location.” The policy then defines “insured location” to
include the “residence premises.” The problem with Appellant’s argument is that
“residence premises” is also a defined term and its definition requires the named
insured to reside there. Reading the declarations and policy as a whole, we find no
ambiguity. And, since it is undisputed that Mrs. Pitts had not resided at the Property
for several years, it ceased to qualify as the residence premises. 2
2 The cases Appellant relies on are distinguishable and thus do not support a contrary result. Lamonica v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, No. 5:19-cv-78-RH- MJF, 2021 WL 12135390, *1–2 (N.D. Fla. June 15, 2021) (not involving an alleged ambiguity between the declarations and the policy’s “residence premises” provision); Harrington v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 54 So. 3d 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (involving a question of whether the second of the insured’s two properties was an “insured location” covered by the policy). 5 II. Waiver
The Appellant next argues that Universal waived its right to deny Appellant’s
insurance claim for two reasons. First, Appellant implies that because Universal
knew title to the Property was in the name of the Pitts Trust, which paid the insurance
premium each year, Universal must have known and accepted that Mrs. Pitts no
longer resided at the Property. Second, Appellant argues that because Universal
knew that coverage was at issue when it made an initial payment on the claim, it
waived any right to later rely on a coverage defense to avoid additional payments.
We reject both arguments.
A. Revocable Living Trust
It is of no moment that Universal knew Mrs. Pitts had placed the Property in
her revocable living trust. A revocable living trust allows a trustee to manage assets
owned by the trust during the grantor’s lifetime and distribute the remaining assets
after the grantor’s death. See generally § 736.0603, Fla. Stat.; Jerome Ira Solkoff &
Scott M. Solkoff, 14 Fla. Prac., Elder Law § 10:6 (2024 ed.). It is a common estate
planning tool that transfers ownership from the grantor’s name to her trust.
Considering the nature of revocable living trusts, being aware that the Pitts Trust
owned the Property provided no indication to Universal that residency had changed,
only title. Thus, knowledge of the Pitts Trust’s ownership is not evidence that
6 Universal accepted premiums with knowledge that Mrs. Pitts no longer resided at
the Property.
B. Payment After Knowledge
As for Appellant’s second argument, Appellant’s failure to appreciate the
distinction between a provision of forfeiture and one of coverage in an insurance
contract is fatal. The distinction is important because an insurer generally can only
waive forfeiture provisions, such as post-loss obligations, not coverage provisions
like the insuring agreement or policy exclusions. United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Stand-Up
MRI of Miami, Inc., 327 So. 3d 386, 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (citing Doe v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 653 So. 2d 371, 373 (Fla. 1995)). See generally Lloyds Underwriters at
London v. Keystone Equip. Fin. Corp., 25 So. 3d 89, 92–93 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).
Here, the provision at issue is part of the insuring agreement, which, as
explained by the Fourth District in Lloyds, is a provision that pertains to coverage.
Id. (“Generally ‘clauses that are inclusionary or exclusionary, that outline the scope
of coverage, or that delineate the dollar amount of liability’ are described as
pertaining to coverage, while ‘forfeiture clauses often include provisions such as
filing a timely notice of claim and submitting proofs of loss, and are invoked to avoid
liability for existing coverage.’” (quoting Creveling v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 828
A.2d 229, 244–45 (Md. Ct. App. 2003))). Since there is no dispute that Mrs. Pitts,
the only named insured, did not reside at the Property at any point during the policy
7 period when the loss occurred, a fact Universal did not learn about until its post-loss
investigation, then Universal never assumed the risk to provide coverage under the
insuring agreement in Section I of the policy and Universal’s initial payment of the
claim did not waive its right to later deny coverage on that ground. See Allstate Ins.
Co., 653 So. 2d at 373 (“For many years the law in Florida has been ‘well established
that the doctrine of waiver and estoppel based upon the conduct or the action of the
insurer (or an agent) is not applicable to matters of coverage as distinguished from
grounds for forfeiture.’” (quoting Six L’s Packing Co., Inc. v. Florida Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co., 268 So. 2d 560, 563 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972) decision adopted by, 276
So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1973))); United Auto. Ins., 327 So. 3d at 390 (concluding trial court
erred by extending coverage through doctrine of waiver based on insurer’s previous
payments of claims stemming from the same incident); Arguelles v. Citizens Prop.
Ins. Corp., 278 So. 3d 108, 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (finding insurer neither waived
nor was estopped from relying on policy’s “residence premises” language to deny
coverage because insurer did not learn of insured’s lack of residency until its post-
loss investigation and, thus, had not accepted premiums with knowledge of the lack
of residency); Vargas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 6:22-cv-351-GAP-DCI,
2022 WL 20287962, at *2 n.2 (M.D. Fla. July 22, 2022) (“Under Florida law, State
8 Farm cannot waive the limits of its policy coverage simply by mistakenly making
payments under a policy.”). 3
Accordingly, we find no error and affirm the final summary judgment under
review.
AFFIRMED.
TRAVER, C.J., and WOZNIAK, JJ., concur.
Matthew Struble, of StrubleCohen, Indialantic, for Appellant.
David A. Noel and Kara Rockenbach Link, of Link & Rockenbach, PA, West Palm Beach, for Appellee, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company.
No Appearance for Appellee, DriRite USA, Inc.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED
3 Although not argued on appeal, it is worth noting that there was no evidence of inducement or detrimental reliance. 9