Dan Larry Pennington; Norma J. Bryant; Aaron Parish Black, as Trustee of the Ralph J. and Reba J. Family Trust; And Aaron Parish Black, as Trustee of the Reba J. Parish Trust, Individually and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Individuals v. Bhp Billiton Petroleum (Fayetteville), LLC; And Mmgj Arkansas Upstream, LLC

2021 Ark. 179, 631 S.W.3d 555
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedOctober 14, 2021
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 2021 Ark. 179 (Dan Larry Pennington; Norma J. Bryant; Aaron Parish Black, as Trustee of the Ralph J. and Reba J. Family Trust; And Aaron Parish Black, as Trustee of the Reba J. Parish Trust, Individually and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Individuals v. Bhp Billiton Petroleum (Fayetteville), LLC; And Mmgj Arkansas Upstream, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Dan Larry Pennington; Norma J. Bryant; Aaron Parish Black, as Trustee of the Ralph J. and Reba J. Family Trust; And Aaron Parish Black, as Trustee of the Reba J. Parish Trust, Individually and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Individuals v. Bhp Billiton Petroleum (Fayetteville), LLC; And Mmgj Arkansas Upstream, LLC, 2021 Ark. 179, 631 S.W.3d 555 (Ark. 2021).

Opinion

Cite as 2021 Ark. 179 Reason: I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS Date: 2022.06.15 13:49:40 No. CV-21-163 -05'00' Adobe Acrobat version: 2022.001.20117 Opinion Delivered: October 14, 2021

DAN LARRY PENNINGTON; NORMA J. BRYANT; AARON A CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM PARISH BLACK, AS TRUSTEE OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT THE RALPH J. AND REBA J. FAMILY COURT FOR THE EASTERN TRUST; AND AARON PARISH DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS BLACK, AS TRUSTEE OF THE REBA J. PARISH TRUST, INDIVIDUALLY HONORABLE LEE P. RUDOFSKY, AND ON BEHALF OF A CLASS OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT SIMILARLY SITUATED COURT JUDGE INDIVIDUALS PETITIONERS/PLAINTIFFS CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED. V.

BHP BILLITON PETROLEUM (FAYETTEVILLE), LLC; AND MMGJ ARKANSAS UPSTREAM, LLC RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS

RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice

The five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract starts when a plaintiff can

first bring the cause of action to a successful conclusion. Here, the contract required monthly

oil-and-gas royalty payments. Plaintiffs alleged defendants had been underpaying those

royalties for more than five years. We accepted a certified question from federal court

whether Arkansas law prevents plaintiffs from pursuing their breach-of-contract claim when

the first breach occurred outside the statute-of-limitations period. We conclude a separate

statute-of-limitations period began as each monthly royalty payment became due. I. Factual Background

This case arose when oil-and-gas royalty holders, plaintiffs, sued their lessees,

defendants, in federal district court. Their primary cause of action was breach of contract.

Under the contract, defendants would extract natural gas from wells, prepare it for shipment,

and transport it for sale at an interstate pipeline. Once the natural gas arrived at the pipeline,

the gross proceeds were calculated based on the weighted average sales price, or WASP.

Then, either defendants or their agents would pay plaintiffs a monthly royalty based on the

gross proceeds.

According to the complaint, defendants improperly deducted certain costs from the

WASP for “midstream services.” Examples of these services are gathering, treating, and

transporting the natural gas from the wells to the pipelines. This deduction led to a lower

monthly gross-proceeds total and lower royalty payments. Plaintiffs alleged this post-

production cost deduction breached defendants’ contractual obligations. In response,

defendants raised the affirmative defense of statute of limitations.

Following the affirmative defense, the federal court faced an unsettled question of

law. The parties agreed the five-year statute of limitations for written contracts applied. Ark.

Code Ann. § 16-56-111(a) (Repl. 2005). Still, they disagreed over interpreting Arkansas

law to their contract. Defendants argued any alleged breach began when the first

underpayment occurred, which was more than five years before plaintiffs filed their

complaint. Plaintiffs countered that every monthly underpayment was a separate breach, and

they could pursue any breaches within five years of their action.

2 The federal district court then found no Arkansas case definitively settled the issue. Out of

deference to our state supreme court, it certified the following question of law:

In the oil and gas leases at issues in this case, does the five-year statute of limitations set forth in Arkansas Code section 16-56-111(a) bar Plaintiffs from bringing a breach of contract lawsuit for alleged underpayments of monthly royalties that occurred within the statute of limitations period because similar underpayments of monthly royalties took place outside of the limitations period?

We accepted certification and answer the question in the negative.

II. Law and Analysis

We agree with the parties that the relevant statute of limitations for written

instruments is five years: “Actions to enforce written obligations, duties, or rights . . . shall

be commenced within five (5) years after the cause of action shall accrue.” Ark. Code Ann.

§ 16-56-111(a). And a cause of action for breach of contract accrues “when the plaintiff

could have first maintained the action to a successful conclusion.” Dupree v. Twin City Bank,

300 Ark. 188, 191, 777 S.W.2d 856, 858 (1989). Said another way, “[a] cause of action

accrues the moment the right to commence an action comes into existence, and the statute

of limitations commences to run from that time.” Ray & Sons Masonry Contractors, Inc. v.

U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 353 Ark. 201, 216, 114 S.W.3d 189, 198 (2003).

The issue before us is, when did plaintiffs’ cause of action begin on any alleged breach

of monthly royalty payments? Typically, for contracts that require installment payments like

promissory notes, we have held that a discrete cause of action arises from each

underpayment. See Linke v. Kirk, 204 Ark. 393, 162 S.W.2d 39 (1942); Karnes v. Marrow,

315 Ark. 37, 864 S.W.2d 848 (1993). In Linke, the borrowers promised to repay a $300

promissory note in six annual installments of $50; the first installment was due in October

3 1930, and the last was due in October 1935. 204 Ark. at 394, 162 S.W.2d at 40. Borrowers

never made payments, but creditors did not sue until October 1940. Id. In this instance, we

held that the five-year statute of limitations did not bar recovery for the final installment

from 1935 because “[w]here a note or a bill is made payable by installments, the statute

attaches to and begins to run upon each installment as it become due.” Id. at 395, 162

S.W.2d at 40–41. We applied this rule in Karnes, holding that a deficiency judgment

following foreclosure could not include any underpayments exceeding five years from when

the lawsuit was filed. 315 Ark. at 44, 864 S.W.2d at 851. Both cases hold that the statute of

limitations begins each time a borrower fails to meet a monthly obligation under a

promissory note; assuming the five-year limitations period has not expired from that date,

the creditor can recover.

This certified question is different because the parties are not in a debtor-creditor

relationship. And no Arkansas case has directly addressed whether the above principle applies

to underpayments of monthly oil-and-gas royalties. Defendants alleged the breach accrued

outside the limitations period because their conduct amounted to a failure to perform. This

alleged breach violated a single obligation to properly calculate royalty payments. Any failure

in that regard started more than five years before plaintiffs filed their complaint, and thus

the limitations period had expired. Defendants cite two court of appeals cases as support.

But we decline to apply these cases to the current facts as neither case involved the monthly

payment obligations like those at issue here. See Beckworth v. Diamante, Priv. Membership Golf

Club, 2010 Ark. App. 814, 379 S.W.3d 752 (involving lawsuit against property developer

4 over sale of lots to third parties); Phillips v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 89 Ark. App. 223, 201

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